Office of the Historian

464. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vientiane1

Washington, November 21, 1960—9:44 p.m.

539. I met this afternoon with Secretary Gates, Admiral Burke, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Merchant and others to consider specifically arguments you made in your message through other channels2 urging delay in direct payment Phoumi troops. Shortly before meeting reports received [document number not declassified]3 indicating Kong Le and Southep forces probably combined with Pathet Lao were moving on Luang Prabang from Vientiane. Based on these reports and on assumption these reports correct4 we dispatched message to Admiral Felt5 (being repeated to you) instructing (1) direct payment Phoumi troops [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], (2) provision Phoumi any matériel requests and air lift by CAT, and (3) removal any military restraints hitherto imposed by us on Phoumi. Foregoing decided in full awareness risks and complications with our allies but seemed obvious minimum in support anti-communist units FAL in situation wherein Kong Le units and Pathet Lao forces starting civil war by moving on Luang Prabang.

Foregoing decisions increase importance our efforts to obtain a substitute legal government or at least cover of legality which a request to us from the King for assistance of character covered by above JCS message would give. Through Phoui or whatever channel you think best you should make renewed effort to persuade King to take role of active leadership either dismissing Souvanna Phouma or by other means creating government which could gain widest support anti-communist and non-communist elements in Laos.

[Page 975]

We are puzzled by your 964 and 9686 reporting conversation with Souvanna which gives no indication military movement underway and suggests to us Souvanna either ignorant or deliberately misleading us. In any event it would seem height of imprudence to attempt to move Assembly and anti-communist leaders to Luang Prabang when under imminent threat of attack nor do we see any useful purpose in providing Souvanna with aircraft for transmitting his letter to the King under such circumstances. You should reply to Souvanna in this sense.

This message FYI only to addressees other than Vientiane and Bangkok. Latter should discuss situation with Sarit.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2160. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Merchant and cleared with SEA. Regarding the drafting of this telegram, see supra. Repeated priority to CINCPAC and Saigon.↩
  2. Memorandum from Weiss to Bell, November 22. (ibid., G/PM Files: Lot 64 D 341; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  3. See footnote 2, supra.↩

  4. Brown appraised these reports in telegram 963 from Vientiane, November 21, as follows:

    “Number reports being sent via other channels indicate possibility attack by Vientiane FAL forces on Luang Prabang now appears much greater. Also considerable indication PL will be involved in such attack if it comes off. While seems little doubt there has been some troop movement out of city, there still no positive indication purposes such movement. Overall, believe it too early to attempt definitive evaluation. Necessary warnings have been discreetly issued to Phoumi, Ouane, Bounleth emphasizing sensitive nature info and necessity take no action which would disclose prior knowledge. Following closely and will report.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2160)

    ↩
  5. Apparent reference to JCS 986140 to CINCPAC, November 21. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, CCS 092 (6–25–48) (2))↩
  6. See Document 462.↩