Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

447. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 10, 1960—noon.

897. Joint State/Defense message. Reference: Deptel 444.² Am in full agreement important eliminate Kong Le influence from RLG Vientiane scene and assure you that no opportunity is missed to bring this matter up with Souvanna though must admit he sees situation differently and always reflects confidence his full control situation Vientiane.

Reference possibilities presented in reference telegram.

A. Force—of all possibilities listed this appears most difficult though from information as given CX–204 and 211³ obvious Lao have not ruled it out. While Lao apparently considering some use force change Kong Le power position Vientiane we have no information sufficient detail make us believe it too practical although RLG military posture Vientiane is improving (see Embtel 861⁴ [document number not declassified]⁵). Do not feel we or Souvanna in position push for action by force. Nothing specific or practical enough to justify US support has yet been presented to us, nor do we feel situation is yet ripe for such action. For Souvanna to plot such action with Kouprasith, Ouane, Houmphan would be an admission his part that he not head of his house. For me to suggest use of force to him would only bring insistence he is in full command. For further information re dispatch military attachés see CX–195 [document number not declassified].³

B. Technique—(1) Change of commander Second Parachute Battalion and putting officers loyal to Ouane etc. in their place is two edged sword as if Second Para officers dedicated to coup objectives they might influence other units as readily as new commanders influence Second Para BN and since Second Para BN riding wave success they might well take new commanders with them. Some changes have been made, [document number not declassified].⁵

(2) The possibility sending Kong Le out of country has some chance of success, [document number not declassified]⁶ if invitation could be arranged. How long he would stay away is questionable as well as when he would be willing to leave. The British might be able help in some way. Souvanna would welcome his going out of country on a visit to “educate him”. As for Lt. Deuane, if comments paragraph 16, CX–211, [document number not declassified]⁷ have any basis, his continued presence might be helpful. In lieu of Deuane thought might be given sending Captain Kham Lom on trip or to school as several reports indicate he is very pro-Pathet Lao and is now in position considerable influence (Chief, Military Security).

(3) Several fragments information indicate Second Para BN can be weaned from Kong Le. Some say the NCO’s, not the officers, are key to Kong Le control and that they can be bought. We have steered clear of any involvement such action as indications are that security not too good and do not wish interrupt or become involved in internal process which seems to be moving, albeit slowly, in right direction.

C. Execution—(1) As mentioned (A) above this not practicable through Souvanna though Ouane and Houmphan obviously thinking along these lines, see CX–204, along with some associates Vientiane. They also conscious Pathet Lao problem Vientiane area. Again, we have taken wait and see attitude as much controversy and danger supporting such actions unless they are carefully planned, and reliably organized and we ready chance extensive involvement.

(2) Planning, timing, coordination action most important and some information is available Lao are working to that end. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ARMA have been contacted regarding coups against Kong Le. Both have had to be most careful. No one in position handle such delicate details when impossible tell actual allegiances various people or objective groups involved and both ARMA [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have experienced some doubles or questionable contacts. Should conditions develop giving reason to believe Lao elements working toward common objective against Kong Le and, more important, Pathet Lao, am prepared to take advantage of such developments if it clear that proper political preparations for exploitation of coup have been made.

If above is to take place, i.e., use of force against Kong Le, timing must be Lao and as stated on other points, all feel situation too uncertain to justify our playing positive role at this time with any chance success.

Before going to additional ideas in reftel wish summarize:

A. Increasing number Lao recognize the dangers and pro-leftist aspects NLHX and are taking action for some solution, Lao type, to insure their center road neutrality.

B. Some elements are preparing displace Kong Le, Quinim, and others if they feel trend is too far left.

C. Some elements also recognize possibility force must be used against PL and are planning against such eventuality.

D. Situation still too fluid, allegiances too uncertain, plans too fragmentary, uncoordinated, and conflicting, and personal ambitions too predominant, to give us any adequate material with which to work.

In additional areas, the carrot rather than stick might work, e.g., Kong Le travel abroad. He might be susceptible to persuasion, e.g., some fragmentary reports have been received to effect Kong Le ready line up against PL. Efforts continuing get more information this change attitude by Kong Le as well as by Lt. Deuane.

On maneuver, no question that RLG trying place Kong Le in harmless position, this includes even Souvanna. My analysis is military probably accomplishing this more rapidly than the political group.

(A) Some action now under way steer Second Para BN back to strict neutrality. This not isolation Second Para but is to develop hard line support RLG against PL.

(B) Dissipation of Second Para BN by assigning outside Vientiane not considered too practicable. Vientiane still does not trust Phoumi, and Vientiane group will not materially reduce their military capability in face Phoumi threat. Second Para BN still the elite unit FAL, is best trained, Thai plus US and French, and has had victory. To decimate it by assigning out small groups might well give other units a rallying point and if neutrality has attraction we here feel it has, such changes would only extend the problem.

All here understand problems engendered by continued prominence Kong Le and strength and influence Second Para BN. We also feel elimination of this prominence is primarily a Lao problem and must be handled in their way and in their time. However, as mentioned before will continue push point with RLG at every opportunity. Also will have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ARMA follow leads associated with coups against Kong Le and/or Souvanna, and based upon best info at the time will advise if we feel action has chances of success which can be enhanced or expedited.

We must also recognize that at this stage more formidable problem for US is actually NLHX and PL rather than Kong Le. We must be sure that our necessarily limited capabilities are used at the right moment and directed at the primary target from the US point of view.

Brown

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1060. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated priority to Bangkok and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Document 435.
3. Neither found.
4. See footnote 2, Document 442.
5. Not found.
3. Neither found.
5. Not found.
6. Reference is to the document cited in the second reference to footnote 5 above.
7. Not found.