Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

446. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, November 9, 1960—9:33 p.m.

498. Embtel 861² highly appreciated.

1. Basic problem is how to deal with PL to prevent their gaining decisive advantage. Souvanna’s concept of negotiating with them is one way of meeting this problem. However it can be successful only if Souvanna’s government resists PL demands which go beyond legitimate goals of unity and independence of Laos. We agree that considerations set forth your 861 may indeed indicate that Souvanna sincerely striving succeed in this respect, albeit on mistaken basis.

2. However our fear is that despite these efforts he is not succeeding and that political and military power is shifting in favor of PL. We think this occurring because he has conceded too many advantages to PL by his use of Quinim and Sisoumang as negotiators, by his hesitancy to take action against Kong Le, by his willingness to acknowledge PL zones of influence in Vientiane, by his apparent unwitting acquiescence in the formation of the Committee for Neutrality.

3. He is thus getting himself so enmeshed that his position cannot be clearly distinguished from that of PL and is therefore not susceptible of being supported against them. Those who would support Souvanna on Souvanna’s terms would become almost by definition similarly enmeshed. If he is to be susceptible of being supported he must first determine to extricate himself from this enmeshment and be prepared to accept the views of those who would support him.

4. Would appreciate your consideration of following exposition reasons for our deep concern re Souvanna’s position:

5. In pursuing his policy of neutrality Souvanna has apparently first made tack to left by entering into diplomatic relations with USSR and negotiating with PL; then to reestablish balance, tack to right by anti-Communist statement from National Assembly, house arrest of Kong Le and acquiescence to our supplying troops directly. He now appears embarking on new tack to left with setup of Committee for Neutrality. We share your reaction that this Committee is front organization in classic sense. We note Pheng’s declaration that “its (Committee’s) policy is also to support setting up of coalition government with participation of representatives of various political parties.” It is our growing fear that step by step PL’s position will be strengthened until they are able to take over government under guise of some national front government. This has been pattern elsewhere; this is pattern we see developing in Laos. In sum we cannot avoid impression that despite Souvanna’s efforts PL are gaining substance their objectives.

6. Following are some remarks re your comments on political situation (para A)³

a) We fear that non-Communist leaders wield little power in Vientiane under present circumstances. It appears to us that revolution in real sense of word has taken place and unless situation can be normalized on new basis, power can only be objectively determined by force of arms. Somsanith, Ngon, Tiao Souk, Oun Heuan although friendly are essentially weak men. They do have following in their provinces of Nam Tha and Luang Prabang but in Vientiane what have they to oppose 1800 armed PL? (CX–211)⁴ Sananikone clan which once powerful in this province appears for time being to have been eliminated as power factor.

b) Agree quieting Youth Movement helpful, but if we understand its position correctly, Movement supports negotiations with PL and we question whether it would support Souvanna in event of break with PL. Thus it seems their net influence favors PL.

c) Recognize that Syndicat des Fonctionnaires is important force but given nature of functionaries everywhere we rather believe they would go along with any government which would use their services.

d) Kong Le’s “punishment” gives us no reassurance in view his recent activities such as trip to Sam Neua.

e) Finally what is “major” concession to PL and who among above groups and individuals will determine when it has been made?

7. Re military situation (para B)⁵ we note following:

a) That PL represent most significant single military element.

b) That Kouprasith who is “prime leader” of group supporting Souvanna is in liaison with PL and in fact his troops at Paksane are actively collaborating with them (CX–211).

c) That leftist military elements are in “key positions of influence,” evidently have complete freedom of action and have access to supplies.

d) That Ouane’s presence in Luang Prabang has resulted in confusion among military leaders there and in weakening their resolve to stand up to PL (LRPA 260–261).⁴ Ultimate foreseeable result is that region will lose its determination to resist concessions to PL as Souvanna gradually becomes further enmeshed in negotiations. His orders to maintain cease-fire and divide country into areas of responsibility will sap Army’s will to fight.

8. Regarding test of Souvanna’s position on negotiations with PL, is not the real test what is done in fact, rather than what Souvanna openly agrees to? Thus we are encouraged by your 887⁶ which indicates negotiations have come to standstill pending fulfillment preconditions (cease-fire; return of Sam Neua to RLG control; rearming troops). However reported appointment of Champa as governor of Sam Neua raises new doubts re Souvanna’s firmness. Champa is opportunist who voted with NLHX bloc in Assembly in 1958. As governor of Sam Neua he could only be considered as creature of PL.

9. (Para D)⁷

a) While we recognize difficulties of creating new government we hope that some of your apprehensions may be overdrawn. Nub of our plan is to get quorum of Assembly to meet freely in Luang Prabang. If such meeting were held King who limits his action to within constitutional boundaries might be more willing to use his influence and deputies free from fears of Vientiane might be more willing to criticize present composition of government, as some have indicated they would like to do. Such meeting might only result in reshuffle of Cabinet and keep Souvanna as Prime Minister. However we would hope reshuffle would at least lead to elimination of Quinim and inclusion of stronger anti-PL Ministers such as Phoui. You may be right in believing that Phoui could not become Prime Minister at present but we should nevertheless aim at this objective if at all possible. Phoui who is shrewd observer will be able to give us his assessment.

b) We recall that grievances between Lao are not insuperable obstacles to old enemies reaching an accommodation. Phoui has already expressed his willingness to work with Phoumi (Bangkok’s 788)⁸ and we wonder whether in his present dilemma King might not be rather happy have Phoui at his side.

c) If Phoui were to be named Prime Minister, he could espouse Souvanna’s neutralist policy. He has already endorsed it publicly.

d) Such “leftist” Cabinet members as Sisoumang and Khamsing who appear able might be included to give neutrality flavor to Cabinet.

10. a) While we consider that Phoumi may be held as one of those primarily responsible for present situation, fact is that Phoumi does represent in our view essential anti-Communist counterweight to Souvanna’s penchant to accommodation with PL at any price. Consider therefore we must maintain Phoumi’s faith as long as he serves our purpose.

b) Possibility of accommodation between Souvanna and Phoumi seems increasingly remote under present circumstances. Kind of pressure needed to bring Phoumi to heel would we believe have gravest repercussions in SEA. Sarit and Diem could only interpret such policy as sell-out to Communists requiring on their part readjustment of their own policies.

11. Recognize above views may appear unrealistic when situation considered on ground. Nevertheless consider it important you understand our concept of present situation.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–960. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Chapman and Usher, cleared with Parsons and in draft with Steeves, and approved by Merchant. Repeated to Bangkok and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. See footnote 3, Document 442.
3. Of telegram 861 from Vientiane.
4. Not found.
5. Of telegram 861 from Vientiane.
4. Not found.
6. Dated November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–860; included in the microfiche supplement)
7. Of telegram 861 from Vientiane.
8. Dated November 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–360)