Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

44. Memorandum of Discussion at the 419th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 17, 1959¹

Washington, September 17, 1959

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants in the meeting.]

1. U.S. Policy in the Far East (NSC 5429/5;²NIE 13–59;³NSC 5913; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 15, 1959⁴)

Mr. Gray presented NSC 5913 on the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note⁵ is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.) In the course of his briefing, Mr. Gray read Paragraph 1 and the first two sentences of Paragraph 2 of NSC 5913, saying that these sentences, in his view, stated very well the problem to which NSC 5913 was addressed:

• “1. The primary problem confronting U.S. policy in the Far East is to cope with the growing threat to Free World security posed by increasing Communist power in Asia. There has been a basic trend over the past five years toward a stabilization of the line of demarcation between Communist and non-Communist Asia and toward an intensified awareness in the free Far Eastern countries of the nature of the Communist threat. But at the same time the power of Communist China backed by the USSR has increased rapidly and continued increases in this power must be expected. One factor of major significance in this connection is the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be based in Communist China some time before 1963, though almost certainly under Soviet custody.
• “2. Our planning must assume that for the predictable future the Peiping regime will continue to exercise effective control over mainland China, that its military and economic strength and its resultant power position in Asia will continue to increase, and that despite likely frictions the Sino-Soviet alliance will hold firm. On the other hand, Communist China will undoubtedly encounter severe strains, dislocations, and setbacks in its efforts to deal with the problems confronting it.”

After summarizing the remainder of “General Considerations” of NSC 5913, Mr. Gray read Paragraph 9, which he characterized as a conclusion with respect to U.S. strategy forming the key to the balance of the paper:

“9. Since the Communist regime in China is unlikely to be replaced in the foreseeable future and since it is unlikely to be alienated from the Soviet Union, the principal means for dealing with the threat it poses is by helping to build up the political and economic strength and stability of free Asia, while maintaining an adequate Free World military posture. At the same time, we must be prepared to exploit any opportunities which may occur to retard the growth and extension of Chinese Communist power and influence and to place strains on Sino-Soviet relations.”

Mr. Gray then turned to the differences of view reflected in NSC 5913. The first such “split” occurred in Paragraph 21, where Defense, JCS and Budget proposed to insert the injunction that “care should be taken to avoid over-committing and over-identifying the U.S. with one-man regimes.”

Secretary McElroy said that in discussing this proposal with officials in the Department of Defense, he had discovered that it was difficult to make the words of the proposal (which Mr. Gray had just read) carry their true meaning. He felt it was important that the U.S. should not fail to maintain continuing relations with the possible successors to the strong men of “one-man regimes.” If the language proposed by Defense, JCS, and Budget for insertion in Paragraph 21 conveyed such a meaning, then the language was a desirable addition to the paper. He understood that our diplomatic service already followed the practice, in one-man regime countries, of maintaining contact with possible successors of the one-man regime. He wanted to avoid over-identification with one-man regimes, but did not mean to suggest in any way that on that account we should adopt the unrealistic practice of neglecting to deal with such one-man regimes. He believed the problem was, in fact, covered by a provision in Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1).⁶ In any case, the problem was a general one rather than one limited to the Far East.

The President said he understood the proponents of the additional sentence in Paragraph 21 felt that a note of caution would do no harm. However, in his view, this sentence was like the admonition of a mother sending her daughter to a party: “Be very careful.”

Mr. Dillon agreed with Secretary McElroy that the U.S. should not be over-committed to one-man regimes; but he felt the U.S. had not, as the language suggested, been over-committing itself to such regimes. In the case of Chiang, Rhee, and others, delicate matters were involved, matters with which the Department of State should be able to deal on a flexible basis.

Mr. Stans⁷ said he would not press for adoption of the Defense, JCS, Budget proposal, which was merely a caution. In discussions of Latin American policy, the question of greater U.S. restraint in dealing with dictators had been raised. The President said the Defense, JCS, Budget sentence might be adopted if it led off with the words, “as always before.”

The Vice President referred to Paragraph 21–b which mentioned “democratic growth” and “governments having popular support.” He hoped it was not being assumed that one-man regimes in underdeveloped countries did not have popular support, or were the worst regimes for these countries.

Reverting to Mr. Dillon’s reference to Rhee, the President said that man, though mortal, sometimes clings to power longer than he should. Referring specifically to Paragraph 21 of NSC 5913, the President did not think it was important whether the sentence proposed by Defense, JCS and Budget was included or omitted from the paper.

Secretary McElroy agreed that the subject was not worth more discussion and offered to withdraw his support from the proposed new sentence if the State Department was still opposed to it. Mr. McCone⁸ pointed out that the flexibility desired by the State Department was already provided for in Paragraph 21–b. The President believed one-man regimes would not last long without popular support. He noted that Khrushchev emphasized his popular support.

Mr. Gray then read Paragraph 36 of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1) which provided that while maintaining correct relations with recognized governments, the U.S. should also maintain contact with selected elements of the non-Communist opposition to such governments. The President said the new sentence proposed by Defense, JCS and Budget for insertion in Paragraph 21 of NSC 5913 should be omitted, on the basis that if the proponents of the sentence felt in the future that we were becoming over-committed in a particular instance, they could bring the matter to the attention of the Council.

Mr. Gray continued his briefing. After explaining Paragraph 24 covering U.S. action to deal with aggression or subversion, Mr. Gray reported that the Planning Board had considered a proposal that the U.S. should recognize or enter into appropriate relations with Outer Mongolia (Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Briefing Note).

Mr. Dillon said the question was whether intelligence information gained by recognition of Outer Mongolia would be of more value to the U.S. than the political loss which would result from such a step. Our recognition of Outer Mongolia would be regarded throughout the Far East as a weakening of our position with respect to the recognition of Communist China. In addition, there was no indication that Outer Mongolia desired recognition, so that we might find ourselves in the embarrassing position of having our recognition refused unless we accepted a whole series of unacceptable conditions. Such a development would be a distinct political disadvantage.

The President was under the impression that we did not recognize nations which did not ask for recognition. He recalled that President Truman had been criticized for recognizing Israel in the absence of a request.

Mr. Allen Dulles agreed that recognition of Outer Mongolia might be premature at present; but if some means could be devised to enable the U.S. to send personnel into the country, a great deal of desirable information about conditions in Outer Mongolia might be developed. Technically, Outer Mongolia was a Soviet country, but in practice it enjoyed a measure of independence vis-à-vis the USSR and Communist China. Collectivization had not progressed far in this nomadic land. Mr. Salisbury (New York Times) believed that Outer Mongolia, now dominated by the USSR, would in time be dominated by Communist China. Mr. Dulles inquired about travel restrictions relating to Outer Mongolia.

Mr. Dillon said travel restrictions relating to Outer Mongolia were the same as for the USSR, except for the factor of recognition.

Mr. Dulles believed that if a reasonable amount of travel and work in Outer Mongolia on a commercial basis could be permitted, the country would be a valuable lookout post [and?] as a country which might become a point of strain between the USSR and Communist China.

Mr. Dillon said there was no objection to travel by U.S. citizens in Outer Mongolia.

Mr. Gray said he was not requesting a decision on the matter of Outer Mongolia at this time. Perhaps State and CIA would keep the matter under study.

Mr. Gray then referred to the split on passport policy in Paragraph 30, where the majority wished to continue our present restrictive policy on travel by Americans to Asian Communist areas, while Defense and the JCS would like us to permit travel except where U.S. interests would be damaged thereby.

Secretary McElroy said the intent of the Defense proposal was simple. We know little about Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea; in order to find out more it might be desirable to increase travel, but if such travel was considered politically undesirable, then he would not continue to advocate it. The President wondered whether such travel would be worthwhile if some Americans were arrested and sentenced to 25 years as spies. Mr. Dillon said that even under present U.S. policy, news correspondents can travel in Communist Asia, though they find it difficult to get in. A change in our passport policy would be interpreted in the Far East as a weakening of our attitude toward Communist Asia.

Mr. Dulles supported the Defense proposal. He would like to obtain from Communist Asia more information than was obtainable at present. In fact, our present information was quite inadequate. He hoped existing regulations respecting travel would be adjusted with the intelligence potential of travel in mind. It was possible that Communist countries would admit more travelers in the future.

Secretary McElroy asked whether Communist countries of Asia had attempted to have their nationals admitted to the U.S. Mr. Dillon said they were apparently willing to permit a reciprocal, case-by-case exchange.

Mr. Dulles noted that the majority version of Paragraph 30 referred to “present restrictive policies” on travel of Americans to Communist Asia. He suggested the word “restrictive” be deleted in order to allow leeway in the interpretation of policy.

The President believed the majority version of Paragraph 30 should be adopted.

Mr. Gray then reported that Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to insert in NSC 5913 a new Paragraph 33 providing that the U.S. should not allow European countries to influence unduly actions considered essential to attaining or preserving U.S. objectives in the Far East.

Mr. Dillon asked whether this point had been covered in Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1). Mr. Gray said the matter had been debated in connection with Basic Policy, and the decision had been to omit any provision on the question from Basic Policy.

Secretary McElroy was unable to understand why there should be objection to including in the paper a statement of what certainly should be our policy. Mr. Dillon said the only objection was that the statement was gratuitous. Secretary McElroy believed the paper contained a great deal of gratuitous language. Mr. Dillon felt it was essential for the U.S. to take account of the interests of the European countries in the Far East; for example, we could not ignore Dutch interests in our dealings with Indonesia. Secretary McElroy said the proposed paragraph was not vital in any event. The President remarked that a great many admonitions were being included in the paper; but added that he had no objection to the new Paragraph 33 proposed by Defense.

Mr. Gray explained the split in Paragraph 36–a, which read as follows:

“Majority”

“Treasury-Budget”

“36.a. Through military and support assistance and other measures, support to the extent necessary the maintenance by free Asian states of military forces which (1) are capable of maintaining internal security and of identifying and delaying Communist aggression and which (2) together with U.S. and other allied military power are capable of coping with, and thereby deterring, Communist aggression.”

“36.a. Continue to provide military and support assistance to free Asian nations whose increased ability to defend themselves and to make their appropriate contribution to collective military power is important to the security of the United States.”

Secretary McElroy did not believe the two versions of Paragraph 36–a represented a major difference of opinion. While he favored the majority proposal because it was more specific, he believed the Department of Defense could operate satisfactorily under either version of the paragraph.

Mr. Dillon believed it was important to state the role of the indigenous forces, as the majority proposal did. However, the majority proposal was totally “open-ended” and failed to take a scarcity of resources into account. He suggested that the majority language, if adopted, should be amended to provide that the U.S. would support free Asian forces “to the extent practicable and necessary.”

The President felt that one additional thought was implied by this paragraph, i.e., that assistance would be furnished only to those countries desiring and seeking assistance. Perhaps this thought was covered in Basic National Security Policy. Mr. Gray believed it would do no harm to qualify the Far East policy along these lines.

Mr. Stans observed that the majority language in Paragraph 36–a said a great deal more than anyone intended to say; in fact, it authorized the operators to do anything they desired in any country, as was indicated by the phrases “to the extent necessary,” “free Asian states” (implying any or all free Asian states), “other measures,” etc. The Treasury-Budget proposal was taken from Basic National Security Policy. Mr. Stans was unable to understand why the language from Basic Policy was not acceptable, especially in view of the budgetary situation in Congress, which would raise difficulties about broadening our military assistance obligations. In Mr. Stans’ view, the Treasury–Budget proposal was more specific than the majority proposal, because it included criteria for the provision of military assistance. Military assistance paragraphs in recent policy papers (e.g., South Asia) had included such criteria.

The President remarked that he had assumed the “other measures” mentioned in the majority proposal referred to covert measures. He then said it was his conviction that we should increase our expenditures on military assistance to the Far East, even if it became necessary to reduce other programs in order to do so. He believed military assistance was our most important program in this part of the world. Of course he did not want to adopt inexact language which would leave important decisions to junior staff officers; but he had thought the majority language a good description of what we were trying to achieve.

Mr. Dillon believed the changes which he had earlier suggested in the majority proposal would meet the Budget criticisms of the proposal.

The President said Mr. Stans had based his views in part on the prospect of difficulty in Congress. He agreed there would be difficulty in securing Congressional agreement to our military assistance program.

Mr. Stans felt that, if the majority language were about to be adopted, it should at least be qualified by the phrase “important to the security of the U.S.” Mr. Gray said the word “support” might be qualified by “to the extent practicable and necessary in the interest of the U.S.” The President approved the majority version of Paragraph 36–a with this amendment.

Mr. Gray then turned to Paragraph 37, which appeared in NSC 5913 as follows:

“37. Do not agree to GRC, ROK or GVN offensive actions against Communist territory, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to actions by these countries against Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Communist attack, provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success [and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Communist reaction against free Asian countries.]*

“*JCS proposes deletion.”⁹

However, since NSC 5913 was issued, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had submitted the following as a proposed substitute for Paragraph 37:

“d. Paragraph 37, page 13. Delete. In place thereof substitute the following wording, placing it in a Limited Distribution Annex:

“Under circumstances approved by the President, agree to actions by the GRC, ROK, and GVN which are in clear retaliation against Communist attack; and condone and support certain military activities by these governments against Communist held territory which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success.”

“Reason: The paragraph proposed in the draft policy is passive in tone, and inhibits the Free World from gaining the initiative in the Far East. Neither purely defensive moves made to meet actions initiated by the Communists, nor concessions made in an effort to appease them will relieve the tensions or resolve the issues in the area. It is possible that condoning small-scale military activities would regain for the Free World a certain degree of initiative in the Far East. The sensitivity of the substitute proposal makes its desirable to Limit Distribution.”

Mr. Gray explained in some detail the issues raised by the differences of view on Paragraph 37 (See Paragraphs 14–18 of the Briefing Note) and called on General Twining.

General Twining said Mr. Gray’s briefing seemed to have covered the subject. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that Paragraph 37 as it appeared in NSC 5913 was purely defensive in character, and that a purely defensive attitude could only result in loss of the initiative. Careful consideration should be given to measures designed to regain the initiative and throw the enemy off balance. Mr. Gray pointed out that the actions suggested in the JCS proposal would be undertaken by indigenous military forces. General Twining added that such actions would be undertaken only on a case-by-case basis after Presidential approval in advance.

The President said that if a whole series of examples of the effective use of small military forces against a large power could be cited, he might be inclined to agree with the JCS. But if we suggested under present circumstances that the small forces in the Far East take action against Communist China, we were asking them to get their faces slapped. In effect the JCS proposal told military staffs to be on the lookout for ways to “needle” the enemy. In his view, we did not gain the initiative by putting a chip on our shoulder. He would, however, take a different view of this problem if the indigenous allied forces in the Far East were effective, well-equipped armies.

General Twining said the Chinese Nationalist forces were effective. The President agreed, and added that a specific commitment as to what these forces could do already existed. The President also observed that some of the measures which could be taken under the JCS proposal would be like putting a lightweight in the ring with Jeffries.

Mr. Dillon recalled the late Secretary Dulles’ efforts to induce the Chinese Nationalists to agree that the primary means they would employ for taking over the mainland again would be peaceful in nature. Free World support for our position with respect to the Offshore Islands was necessary. To condone the actions proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be to risk loss of Free World support for our China policy.

Governor Hoegh said he understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were taking the position that they did not wish to be restricted but wished to be free to seize an opportunity if one arose, taking action only with the approval of the President, of course. General Twining agreed, saying the Planning Board paragraph was too negative.

Secretary McElroy called attention to the extreme restriction in the last clause of Paragraph 37. This extreme restriction, i.e., consideration of the “undesirability of provoking further Communist reaction”, was even applied to cases of prompt and clear retaliation against a Communist attack. Mr. Gray believed Secretary McElroy had raised a different issue. The President believed the last clause of Paragraph 37 was unnecessary.

Mr. Dillon said that at the time of the Chinese Communist bombardment of the Offshore Islands, Chiang had proposed retaliation by air bombing of the Chinese Communist batteries. We opposed this suggestion because we estimated that such action would provoke a major clash. The effects of a retaliatory action on the Free World must be borne in mind; hence a judgment as to retaliation cannot be based solely on military considerations but must also take political factors into account.

[1 paragraph (3½ lines of source text) not declassified]

The President thought Paragraph 37 might well consist of the first sentence only. Mr. Gray believed the Defense–JCS point of view would be met by eliminating the bracketed language from Paragraph 37. Mr. Dillon opposed Mr. Gray’s suggestion. Elimination of the bracketed language would make the question one to be decided on purely military considerations. Secretary McElroy believed each case was different and should be considered separately.

The Vice President suggested that in the last clause of Paragraph 37 the word “undesirability” should be changed to “risks” to avoid negative implication. The President thought the reference to provoking “further” Communist reaction might be changed to provoking “heavy” or “overwhelming” Communist reaction. The Vice President suggested “substantial” Communist reaction. The President then said he was inclined toward confining Paragraph 37 to the first sentence. Secretary McElroy agreed that this suggestion would provide the necessary flexibility in our policy. The President said the first sentence of this paragraph permitted staff planning but made it clear that action would not be taken without Presidential approval.

Mr. Gray pointed out that the first sentence of Paragraph 37 referred to “offensive” action. The President said retaliatory action could be offensive in nature. Mr. Gray noted that the language of the paragraph did not specifically say that retaliatory action would be approved by the President; in other words the language of the first sentence did not carry into the second sentence. The President doubted the wisdom of saying to Chiang, in effect, “we agree to any action you wish to take which is clearly retaliatory.”

Mr. Dillon believed the second sentence of Paragraph 37 should be qualified by “under circumstances approved by the President.” Mr. Gray said agreement appeared to have been reached; the language could be worked out later.

Continuing his briefing, Mr. Gray then noted that NSC 5913 did not include language which clearly stated U.S. policy in the event of a major uprising in Communist China. The President said that a major uprising had once occurred in Hungary and everyone had been afraid to take action. In the event of an uprising in Communist China, we have to decide what would be gained by action and what the people of China wanted. The Chinese people were not a pawn in a struggle between Mao and Chiang. If they wanted freedom and called for help, that might be one thing; but a decision by the U.S. to intervene in the absence of an appeal for help would be quite another thing. This was the type of situation the governing factors of which could not be calculated in advance. General Twining wondered whether Paragraph 37 could not be used in such a situation. Mr. Gray said he had merely wanted the Council to be aware of this gap in NSC 5913. He believed the problem of a major uprising might be considered covered by Paragraph 37, however.

Mr. Gray then completed his briefing. There was no further discussion.

The National Security Council:¹⁰

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5913; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 15, 1959.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5913, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 8, paragraph 21–c: Delete this subparagraph and the footnote thereto, with the understanding that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff may bring the matter up whenever they believe that the U.S. is over-committing or over-identifying itself with any one-man regime.

(2) Pages 10 and 11, paragraph 30: Include the Majority version on the left and delete the Defense version on the right.

(3) Page 11, paragraph 33: Include this paragraph, deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto.

(4) Pages 12 and 13, paragraph 36–a: In place of the two versions shown, substitute the following:

“Through military and support assistance and other measures, support to the extent practicable and necessary in the interests of U.S. security the maintenance by free Asian states, requesting such support, of military forces which (1) are capable of maintaining internal security and of identifying and delaying Communist aggression and which (2) together with U.S. and other allied military power are capable of coping with, and thereby deterring, Communist aggression.”

(5) Page 13, Paragraph 37: Substitute the following:

• “a. Except under circumstances approved by the President, do not agree to GRC, ROK, or GVN offensive actions against Communist territory.
• “b. Under circumstances approved by the President, agree to actions by the GRC, ROK or GVN against Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Communist attack, provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the risk of provoking heavy Communist reaction against free Asian countries.”

c. Noted that the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency would continue to study the possibility of obtaining additional information regarding Outer Mongolia through such means as increasing travel and contacts in that area.

Note: NSC 5913, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5913/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.¹³

Paragraph 11 of NSC 5723 subsequently revised to correspond with the wording of paragraph 37 in b–(5) above and circulated to all holders of NSC 5723.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow items 2 and 3. For the discussion of Laos under item 2, see Document 271.]

Marion W. Boggs

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs. The drafting date is uncertain; the source text is dated July 1, 1960.
2. Entitled “Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East,” dated December 22, 1954. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xii, Part 2, pp. 1062–1072.
3. [Footnote (3 lines of text) not declassified]
4. This memorandum encloses a memorandum of the same date from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, giving the views of the JCS on NSC 5913. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5913 Series; included in the microfiche supplement)
5. included in the microfiche supplement.
6. Dated August 5, 1959. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5906 Series)
7. Maurice H. Stans, Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
8. John A. McCone, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
9. Brackets in the source text.
10. Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2128. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
13. NSC 5913/1 is printed as Document 48.