426. Memorandum of Discussion at the 463d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 13, 19601

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1. The discussion on Laos was part of item 2, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

Mr. Dulles then briefed the Council on the situation in Laos. He noted that we did not yet have a full report on the mission of Mr. Parsons, Mr. Irwin and Admiral Riley. They had gone initially to Bangkok, then to Vientiane, and were just now arriving in Luang Prabang. A preliminary report on their talk with Souvanna Phouma had been received this morning but there had not been time yet to analyze it.2

The President inquired whether they had seen Phoumi while they were in Bangkok. Mr. Dulles stated that they had not. Secretary Dillon went on to point out that we had not decided where or when they will see Phoumi. They would try to get him to come to Luang Prabang. If they could not see him there, they would attempt to arrange a meeting in Bangkok, and if that proved impossible, Mr. Irwin would go to see him in Savannakhet. Secretary Dillon went on to say that Phoumi’s fortunes were up somewhat. Troops in Plaines des Jarres had disassociated themselves from the Vientiane group although we were not sure whether they had lined up fully with Phoumi. The situation in the First Military Region was also better. According to the latest report, Secretary Dillon stated, the government had agreed to move to Luang Prabang. This had been suggested to them as a result of instructions from Washington. We were not sure whether Souvanna Phouma was playing straight on this. However, the agreement would help us smoke him out; if he did not move, we could draw certain conclusions.

[Page 898]

Secretary Dillon noted that a preliminary meeting between the government and the Pathet Lao had taken place and that another was scheduled today. The new Soviet Ambassador, who is also the Soviet Ambassador to Cambodia, was arriving today in Vientiane. However, in order to be formally accredited, he had to go to Luang Prabang. Thus all of the forces involved in this situation were coming together and a denouement could be expected in the next day or two. Secretary Dillon went on to observe that one difficulty in getting Souvanna Phouma to go to Luang Prabang was the fact that he was engaged in negotiations with the Pathet Lao. We had asked him to postpone these negotiations. He had not acceded but had stated that no agreements would be reached on hard terms.

Mr. Dulles resumed his briefing, stating that we think the Soviet Ambassador will make some kind of offer to the Laotian Government. Souvanna Phouma had been warned of this possibility by Mr. Irwin and Mr. Parsons. It looked as though General Ouane, the senior military commander in Souvanna Phouma’s camp, was breaking away from him more and more. We may be able to induce him to go to Luang Prabang. This would permit the possible fusion of his forces with those of Phoumi. Mr. Dulles concluded that the military situation had improved.

Secretary Dillon noted that we had made representations to our allies on our plan for dealing with the situation. The French had come along best; they had bought it. They did not think it was possible to avoid the first meeting between Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao but they agreed that after this meeting, Souvanna Phouma should disengage and go to Luang Prabang. The British reaction had been the worst. They feared that if Souvanna Phouma leaves Vientiane, it would mean turning Vientiane over to the Pathet Lao. They also believe that great care should be taken in breaking off negotiations with the Pathet Lao, although they agree that no agreements should be made in the present weak situation. These views had been conveyed to us as the considered views of the British Foreign Office. In the view of the Foreign Office, the conclusion of a cease-fire between the Pathet Lao and the government was the overriding consideration. The Foreign Office believed that gradual progress should be made toward a neutralist government as the only solution in the long run. The Foreign Office had told the British Ambassador not to support the U.S. plan but it had asked him to listen to the U.S. and to go along generally but not on details of the plan.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that 200 paratroopers trained in Thailand were now in the Fourth Military Region in Laos. He also noted that there was a press report that all Thai nationals in Vientiane had been ordered back to Thailand. A figure of 20,000 such nationals had been mentioned. There are not that many Thai in Vientiane. It was more [Page 899] like the total for all of Laos. We do not know why the Thai Government has taken this action. Secretary Herter observed that it sounded a little ominous. Mr. Dulles noted that this report had not been confirmed but that the indications were that the Thai Foreign Ministry had made such an announcement.

[Here follow discussion of subjects unrelated to Laos and the remaining agenda items.]

Robert H. Johnson
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson on October 18.
  2. Apparent reference to telegram 729, supra.