425. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
729. Department pass Defense. From Parsons. Reference: Deptel 384.2 Ambassador Brown took Secretary Irwin, Admiral Riley and myself to see Souvanna late today and we had two-hour talk. Following is brief summary main points: 1) Parsons opened with statement our concept of aid to unify non-Communist Lao elements in order face PL from position of strength. He recited historical facts, indicating PL were instrument of international Communism and as such would never cease their efforts to win country. He ended by citing insurgency of 1959 and events of 1960 as two latest Communist efforts to win country, the latter being most dangerous of all. During presentation he again emphasized main points of Deptel 384 and reminded [him?] Ambassador Brown could tell him General Phoumi’s reaction which [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Bangkok has no doubt by now reported. Ambassador Brown then stated Phoumi had accepted these points and in response to Souvanna’s question he added Phoumi proposed no conditions of his own.
2) During Parsons’ presentation, he made special point of impending arrival Soviet Ambassador, stating USSR did not work for independence and integrity of free-world countries. This had been proven true in Congo and would be in Laos. No doubt Russia would quickly make offer of large line of credit which might sound well but [Page 896] would prove to be of little tangible or immediate value. He then contrasted this with years in which US and true friends of Laos had extended very substantial aid of various kinds.
3) Souvanna gave apologia for his policy and actions of 1956-57 and indictment of what he considered provocative errors of subsequent governments. His present view was that Lao army and people will no longer struggle and that therefore talks with PL must be held to implement 1957 accords before PL present even greater demands. During his presentation he made clear that he advocates containment of PL not by military action but by education of rural population so as to engage their active loyalty.
4) Ambassador Brown asked Souvanna if PL had at opening meeting yesterday accepted Souvanna’s preconditions; namely (A), restoring arms to FAL soldiers disarmed at Sam Neua and (B), restoration RLG’s authority there. Souvanna replied PL would answer tomorrow.
5) Parsons asked if Souvanna could give indication of RLG’s reaction to proposals in Deptel 384. Souvanna said Cabinet had discussed move to Luang Prabang this morning and nearly all were agreeable. Minister Finance Inpeng was charged with certain necessary preparations. General Ouan was charged with necessary precautions to insure security of government.
6) Secretary Irwin asked if it would help to have Phoumi meet with Souvanna in LP. Latter replied there was nothing to meet about; all that was required was for Phoumi to acknowledge the legal government. He added that he was doubtful that Phoumi would go through with this and said he did not understand what Phoumi wanted or had in mind; in fact, he suspected there must be a plot with Sarit of which neither Ambassador Brown nor he himself had knowledge. Parsons [garble—interjected?] that we had made clear to all friends of Laos importance we attached to unity of country and that we had impression Sarit fully understood this and had, in fact, taken very restrained line toward problems of Laos. Parsons very much doubted that there was any such plot.
7) At several times during talk, we indicated it would greatly facilitate our task of aiding non-Communist Laos if unity could be achieved on basis referenced Deptel. Souvanna at one point expressed bitterness that “friends of Laos” were siding Phoumi in setting up military base in Pakse for purpose unknown and while Phoumi was in status of rebel. On whole, however, he gave impression that he preferred so conduct affairs as to avoid further split with us. He did not give us any reliable indication however as to whether he is accepting, if indeed he is accepting, proposals referenced Deptel because of Kong Le-PL situation in Vientiane area or because he knows Laos must have American aid, or both.
[Page 897]We will report at greater length and comment as soon as possible. We have audience with King 11 a.m. 13th in LP and expect see Souvanna again here in evening at his suggestion.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1160. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Canberra, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 6:58 p.m., October 12.↩
- Document 421.↩