420. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
683. Addressees pass interested agencies. Following is report audience King 1130 Oct 6. I said I had come on instructions.2 Expressed pleasure my govt at initiative King had taken last week bring about meeting military commanders Luang Prabang. This had seemed offer beginning of hope for improvement situation. Unfortunately situation had continued deteriorate rapidly, particularly in matter extension power and improved position Pathet Lao. Situation continuing worsen. I was instructed impress upon His Majesty most important take second step in plan he had outlined to me Sept 223 and call political figures together arrive at political solution. In fact, situation was so critical that USG felt drastic measures were required, such as King’s taking power into own hands and appointing Prime Minister and C-in-C capable of dealing with situation. We did not feel Souvanna had shown himself able cope with Pathet Lao and did not feel he should attempt negotiate with them from position weakness.
King said hope useful meeting reconciliation between Savannakhet and Vientiane had been destroyed by action Vientiane by [of?] attacking at Nam Cadinh morning after cease-fire had been agreed under Royal aegis.
Souvanna had just seen him and had asked him telegraph Savannakhet ordering Boun Oum and Phoumi dissolve revolutionary committee and acknowledge allegiance legal govt. He told Souvanna he could not do this. Said was up to govt to govern. They could seek reconciliation or they could seek capture Savannakhet and subdue committee by force. This was up to them. If they could not put themselves in command whole situation then they should resign. (It was not clear, and I could not get it clear, whether he had said this last sentence to Souvanna or was simply saying it to me.)
He said Souvanna felt Phoumi and Boun Oum at end their tether and was much more concerned about negotiations with Pathet Lao than with them.
King criticized Souvanna severely not only for breach cease-fire but for letting Pathet Lao get in such position strength and for his activities Sam Neua. He said Kong Le was still force in Vientiane and that Pathet Lao were pulling strings there.
[Page 884]King said people Laos ignorant dangers Communism. They were apathetic. They had enough to eat and unaware dangers that faced them. They believed in promises that peace could be made with Pathet Lao. They would remain apathetic unless aroused by some explosion. Perhaps this was necessary. When they had been aroused he would act (he did not specify how). He thought probably things would have to get worse before they got better.
I reiterated how important it was for him to act. He was only person who had power and influence now to act to resolve situation and establish firm govt. I cited the more conciliatory tone Radios Vientiane and Savannakhet in last two days. King refused believe this and said two sides still snarled at each other over radio. He asked why Radio Vientiane continued to say Vientiane will capture Savannakhet. (We have not heard this for last two days.)
I said if no action taken, all might be lost. King said perhaps all was already lost. At this point I thought he was going to cry.
He said it was sad for a Monarch to meet with his military commanders, one side feeling that it had scored off other by having succeeded in having meeting, by [but?] both sides full of suspicion and then a breach of cease-fire.
King said he could only act in accordance Constitution. Could not act without support of either or both a united army or a united public opinion. He had neither. Laos was suffering from democracy imposed upon a politically immature and apathetic people, saddling them with responsibilities of self-government for which they were not ready.
He said Souvanna had wide support of people deluded by illusory hopes and hearing what they wanted hear. Leaders at Savannakhet had no popular support largely because of their personal reputations. He again recounted deficiencies Boun Oum. He said arms was not firm even in south.
I told King about our suspension aid, since under present circumstances our aid not being effectively used for preservation of integrity country and in sense was being used permit two parties to fight against each other. I said we were ready channel aid through him, or through any channel he could establish, to troops ready fight Pathet Lao. He said he fully understood that people receiving aid had duty to free world and donors to use aid for purposes for which it was given. He wished we had acted like this before. Let troops go without pay and food for while. They would learn lesson. Withdrawal aid would have its effect one way or other.
I said I had told Souvanna about suspension aid and he had said govt would pay from own resources. He knew about two hundred million kip borrowed from National Bank and was aware its adverse implications for stability kip.
[Page 885]I suggested that progress might be made by having new govt and Assembly come Luang Prabang where atmosphere freer than at Vientiane. He simply commented that there were no men of courage in Assembly. He said some of them were in Savannakhet, some of them were in Tokyo. He repeated that coup had long been planned and was supported by unnamed persons of importance. He spoke of great responsibility of US in this situation without defining when questioned what he meant. He said Laos needs support of big power. US should not take position that it would only help country if it helped itself. SEATO was not important help. He was not certain whether it would even intervene if situation got very critical. Powers to north might intervene. He recognized that intervention by friendly outside forces would precipitate intervention from north who are much closer than SEATO.
I made final plea that King act as we had suggested. If he succeeded we would be glad resume our aid and consider public statement of support next government. If meeting failed, situation would be no worse than before. I thought both sides might now be willing to come to Luang Prabang. The King only said this would be very difficult.
King went back frequently over past history and complained again that present situation would never have arisen if Somsanith govt had not so incontinently resigned.
He said several times he would act to appoint new govt only if Souvanna resigned or if Assembly took action make it do same. In commenting on undesirability of negotiating with Pathet Lao, he said Souvanna claimed he was just going to negotiate about implementation of 57 agreements. In King’s view, those agreements had been made. There was nothing left to negotiate about with respect to them. Let Souvanna get along with their implementation if he established.
He said Souvanna would see him again later in day, “he probably wants to know what US Ambassador said to me.” He said he would simply tell Souvanna that I had expressed US Govt’s anxiety about situation and our concern at increased strength and influence Pathet Lao.
Comment: In this interview, King reverted to his attitude of reluctance act shown interview Sept 13.4 He seemed disgusted with all concerned, particularly Souvanna, even with people of Laos in general. He seemed feel he had been rebuffed in his one effort at reconciliation and therefore willing to let situation further degenerate rather than commit Royal prestige in effort which he inwardly fears might fail and thereby further diminish Royal power and authority. Whether this will continue to be his mood remains to be seen. He did, of course, [Page 886] change between Sept 13 and Sept 22. I think he will think seriously about what I said and what Souvanna says to him this afternoon may also bear upon his decision if any. But I not optimistic respect any decisive or effective action. Hope send comments and recommendations with respect situation foregoing presents for US tomorrow when we have received and considered result Calhoun visit Savannakhet.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–660. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, London, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to USUN as Tosec 68.↩
- See Document 412.↩
- See Document 404.↩
- See footnote 7, Document 394.↩