Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, September 19, 1960.

322. Embtels 554,² 555,³ 556.⁴

1. Your assessment of consequences in various courses of action particularly helpful in arriving at decisions here regarding courses we should follow. Our immediate primary concern continues to be preservation capability and integrity of FAL. Our concurrent concern is restoration of political order and stability.

2. Our posture has been to insure that no troops fighting PL were left unsupported because of Vientiane–Savannakhet stalemate. If troops were supplied and reinforced as necessary from Vientiane, well and good. But if not, then supplies should be channeled through Phoumi. Your recent messages (Embtels 551, 552)⁵ and other reports however create grave doubts that we can do so effectively through Vientiane:

a. On his own admission Ouane does not have control of Vientiane.

b. Kong Le retains reality of power as witnessed by his capability hold up supply mission to Sam Neua.

c. Kong Le in touch with PL and even apparently working with them.

d. Nothing to our knowledge has been done to retrieve arms distributed by Kong Le.

e. Vientiane thus appears to be under ultimate control of paras and PL.

3. It therefore appears that situation in Vientiane has not changed in past month despite Souvanna’s assurances. It also appears that much of your concern is based on problem of Kong Le and PL reaction to change of government (Embtel 355).⁶ Kong Le’s removal from Vientiane would of course alter entire picture (note Embtel 493).⁷

4. State and Defense believe essential you carry out action prescribed Deptel 315,⁸ unless in particular instance you percieve urgent logistical advantages to supply from Vientiane, in which case you should consult Department. Phoumi should be informed immediately.

Additional considerations are desirability of preventing further fragmentation of FAL most of which appears to be loyal to Phoumi, and of precluding further illegal and damaging distribution of MAP armament to PL sympathizers. It is intended that Chief PEO have maximum flexibility in selecting source of supplies and means of delivery.

5. Another factor which convinces us that Souvanna cannot be supported to exclusion of Phoumi (even aside primary consideration of their political orientation) is that Revolutionary Movement not just that of one general but appears encompass majority southern leadership. Thus country faces danger of split.

6. We are therefore convinced that Souvanna government cannot reunite country or FAL and that a new government must reestablish situation. Even if willing do so (which we are not for reasons given Deptel 316)⁹ we doubt even giving full US support could render Souvanna government effective. Furthermore tactics he outlined to you (Embtel 556) would only further split FAL. However we see no indication of move toward new governmental formation (except report of desire of Inpeng, Ou Voravong and Ouane to resign) and therefore believe external impulse must be given.

7. We recognize validity of your statement (Embtel 555) that Souvanna seems to be only figure on scene who has been able restrain Kong Le and provide any reasonable degree of assurance that he and PL will not assume overt control of city. However Souvanna has purchased this influence at great price, i.e., providing opening for PL to infiltrate quietly, preventing return of Phoumi to Vientiane to make Souvanna government work effectively, and bringing about rapid disintegration of entire situation in Laos.

Kong Le problem apparently can only be resolved in one of three ways: a) effective rapprochement between Kong Le and Phoumi; b) sending Kong Le on assignment elsewhere in country; or c) overpowering Kong Le in Vientiane through military action. At moment solution b) would be only one which would give substance to Souvanna’s claim of authority in Vientiane.

8. Re restoration of political order, we believe that on basis of foregoing posture re FAL you could logically proceed to take following positions with Souvanna and King:

Following conversations described in your 556 you could explain to Souvanna our position re supplying FAL. Remind him of your frank discussions based upon relationship of mutual trust and of our loyal collaboration with him to bring about peaceful solution. But as stated in past US continues to be deeply disturbed by evidence of Kong Le’s power in Vientiane and by extent to which he has either wittingly or unwittingly allowed himself to be used by PL for their own ends. As far as US can see nothing has in fact been done to change this situation and you can cite above facts (para 2) if RLG cannot even assert its authority in Vientiane, it is difficult see how it can extend it to country. Also deeply concerned that country is divided and believe problem more complex than simple question of Phoumi’s individual recalcitrance. It appears that significant elements of population fear with reason that as outgrowth of Kong Le’s revolt PL are steadily gaining influence in Vientiane and that majority of southern leadership is setting up what may become separatist state. This is grave danger. We believe therefore it imperative that immediate steps be taken to recon-ciliate North and South, Vientiane and Savannakhet. We now wonder whether there is any alternative to formation of government so organized that it can command loyalty of essential elements of patriots throughout country.

While US will continue seek maintain integrity of FAL by whatever means, we must warn all those concerned that continuing disintegration of political and military situation and split of Laos into two parts is diametrically opposite to objectives of US aid in Laos and is rapidly creating situation in which our aid can no longer be effective.

You should tell Souvanna that we shall explain our position to Phoumi and King and for this purpose audience requested with King.

9. If feasible you should again send Embassy officer to explain our position re supplying FAL to Phoumi and tell him of your conversations with Souvanna and plans for another audience with King. Repeat our fears re disintegration of country. Separatist movement directly contrary to objectives of US in its efforts to preserve integrity of Kingdom. We believe that only prospect for resolution of situation is for Boun Oum–Phoumi group to negotiate in good faith under aegis of King for formation of new government whose members and policies will command loyalty of patriotic elements. You should also convey to Phoumi in strongest possible terms that attempts to improve his negotiating position by continued acts of violence against Vientiane are unwise. To extent that he is identified with such actions he will build up a strong Western opposition to his interests. Already foreign opinion in Vientiane is becoming embittered toward him.

10. You should repeat our position to King and describe foregoing approaches to Souvanna and to Phoumi. You should emphasize disintegration of situation and real risk of separation of Kingdom.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1860. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Usher and Chapman and cleared in draft with Knight of the Department of Defense and with Steeves. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Paris, London, and CINCPAC for POLAD. The time of transmission is illegible on the source text.
2. See footnote 5, Document 399.
3. Document 399.
4. In telegram 556, September 18, Brown reported that Souvanna had told him of plans to reestablish control of Laos by peaceful means and asked for a clarification of U.S. support for his government to offset the impression that the United States was supporting Phoumi. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1860; included in the microfiche supplement)
5. Telegram 551 and 552, both September 18, concern the Lao Government’s resupply of Sam Neua. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1860; included in the microfiche supplement)
6. See footnote 2, Document 377.

7. In telegram 493, September 8, the Embassy transmitted the terms proposed by Phoumi at Savannakhet for reconciliation with Souvanna Phouma’s government. These demands were:

   • “1. Kong Le return his post; FAL Chief of Staff assume responsibility security Vientiane.
   • “2. Kong Le recapture weapons distributed civilians.
   • “3. Kong Le evacuate Pathet Lao from Vientiane.
   • “4. General Staff Vientiane assure the security that city.
   • “5. Pathet Lao stop present combat.
   • “6. (first part garbled) Two camps will not take advantage present situation.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751F.00/9–860)

8. In telegram 315, September 16, the Department suggested that Phoumi and FAL forces under his control be supplied directly by CAT aircraft under U.S. charter. (ibid., 751J.00/9–1560; included in the microfiche supplement)
9. Document 398.