Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

391. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, September 10, 1960—11 p.m.

502. Manila for MLG. CINCPAC for POLAD. Addressees pass interested agencies. Embassy officer and Army Attaché in presence [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] PEO representatives spent over hour with Phoumi Savannakhet this morning.² Most of time spent on question Phoumi return Vientiane, with Embassy officer presenting arguments in paraphrase appropriate portions Department telegrams 275³ and 285.⁴ Only shortly before end at 1140 hours Phoumi said he could reveal that at noon announcement would be made of revolution against Souvanna government in name Boun Oum.⁵ In answer questions, Phoumi indicated Boun Oum name used as front, King not “well informed” remove but Boun Oum would send message offering loyalty to Crown, Vientiane to be placed under siege but not to be attacked (at least not immediately) and first four region commanders on his side. Phoumi’s question whether explosion heard in Vientiane last night and whether airport damaged (when Embassy officers replied in negative Phoumi appeared surprised) interpreted by Embassy officers as indication possibility his plan sabotage city and prior knowledge lobbing two mortar shells from Thailand reported other messages.⁶

In reply Embassy officer arguments, Phoumi accused Souvanna as behind Kong Le coup and trying lure him Vientiane in order arrest him. Phoumi said accepted Cabinet post Luang Prabang only to insure his safe departure from city. Acknowledging Souvanna no Communist nor pro-PL, Phoumi said Souvanna has too much confidence in brother Souphanouvong and is risking loss of country to Communists as consequence. Phoumi said had unsuccessfully urged Souvanna avoid using Vientiane as captial temporarily, setting up instead Luang Prabang or Savannakhet. Meanwhile, General Bouleuth as FAL commander four outside military regions and Ouan in Vientiane as military governor should return situation to normal. RLG could then return Vientiane and Phoumi would come along. Phoumi said his return under present circumstances while Souvanna unable exercise authority would play into hands PL by reducing his influence countryside while Communists infiltrated Laos. Phoumi said PL attacks in north and on bridges in south disproving Souvanna thesis he could deal with PL. Phoumi said PL attempting recapture Phong Saly and Houa Phan (Sam Neua) provinces in order return status quo 1957 and thus be in position negotiate from strength with Souvanna, though real PL goal military take over country which required military solution he advocated rather than dangerous present course of Souvanna pushing on with negotiations. At least twice, Phoumi said he understood position USG, which could only assist legal government. All I ask of US, he said, was to let me go ahead and judge me afterwards in light what happens. He also repeated contention in case he fired from cabinet, Souvanna government would fall, leaving impression this might be part his plan try return Laos to recent situation with two non-legal governments at same time.

Comment: Believe Phoumi decision made some time ago since today’s new counter-coup announcement required advance preparation. Situation in effect now returns that previous counter-coup committee this time behind new facade. Rather than imminent outbreak active hostilities, feel can expect renewal psychological warfare and jockeying for most tenable legal and constitutional positions.

Brown

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1060. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Manila, Paris, London, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. A fuller account of this meeting is in despatch 86 from Vientiane, September 27. (ibid., 715J.00/9–2760; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Document 387.
4. In telegram 285, September 7, the Department instructed Brown to inform Souvanna that the U.S. Government insisted that Phoumi remain in the Cabinet and that it would not support a separatist movement or an attack on Vientiane by Phoumi. In addition, the Department believed that if Phoumi returned to Vientiane he could significantly minimize the influence of the Pathet Lao and therefore preserve the integrity of Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–760)
5. According to telegram 501 from Vientiane, September 10, Boun Oum declared at 1 p.m. on September 10 on Radio Savannakhet that as the leader of the revolutionist party he was declaring the present government and constitution abolished. Boun Oum announced the establishment of martial law throughout Laos. (ibid., 751J.00/9–1060; included in the microfiche supplement)
6. Not further indentified.