Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

387. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, September 5, 1960—12:32 a.m.

275. Vientiane’s 462.²

1. Phoumi’s position reemphasizes our conviction expressed para. 1 Deptel 269³ that Kong Le problem must be dealt with first. Phoumi has legitimate fear for his safety. We not overly impressed by Souvanna’s oral assurances. We only note that Kong Le retains capabilities of controlling government and at same time Souvanna proceeding with negotiations with PL conceivably leading to situation dominated by PL and Kong Le. As we see it therefore need is for early action by Souvanna to reestablish RLG’s authority in Vientiane and thus persuade Phoumi to return.

2. We believe that dissident movement led by Phoumi would have incalculable consequences. It would revive strong regional sentiments and very possibly provoke external intervention. It would seem have hardly any chance of success. It not difficult imagine situation wherein Souvanna in Vientiane would be supported by DRV and Phoumi in south by Thailand and GVN. In sum we do not see how present situation can be satisfactorily resolved by force. At same time we fear that unless Souvanna reasserts RLG’s authority in Vientiane permitting Phoumi’s return, Phoumi may very well carry out his threat.

3. Therefore believe you should immediately present to SouvannaUS views concerning problem of insuring Phoumi’s effective inclusion in cabinet along following lines:

a. US agrees with Souvanna that it urgently desirable for Phoumi return to Vientiane and take up his role in cabinet. However we do not see how Phoumi can be expected to do this while there is serious question even on such crucial point as his personal safety in Vientiane and while Kong Le and second paratroop battalion continue in effect control situation in Vientiane. While US desires support Souvanna’s cabinet as now composed, increasingly difficult to see how as practical matter any meaningful support can be rendered in situation where RLG unable establish control its administrative capital and key figure in cabinet cannot safely enter the city.⁴

b. Clarification of situation in Vientiane could presumably be accomplished by appointment of commander of military forces in Vientiane personally loyal to RLG, invested with necessary authority and supported by battalion of new troops from outside and who would thus be able insure RLG control of Vientiane and personal safety all members of cabinet. Action along these lines if acceptable to Phoumi might well provide a basis upon which the security of Vientiane could be established under the RLG’s control and the entire cabinet could be reunited in Vientiane.

FYI. We fully recognize fact that success this proposal depends upon acceptability to Phoumi of military commander and battalion to be brought in. Nevertheless consider such solution urgently required to reunite cabinet and avert dangers you point out. End FYI.

4. Inform Phoumi your presentation to Souvanna but warn him US cannot support separatist movement. US continues consider Phoumi’s participation in government most important. Without it Communist hand would be materially strengthened.⁵

5. Concur your not responding to Boun Oum. Recall that in 1956 belief existed certain Lao circles US backing southern secessionist movement. Such belief most harmful and contrary to US policy which seeks maintain integrity of Kingdom.

Merchant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–460. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Chapman and Usher, cleared with OSD/ISA, and approved by Parsons. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, London, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 462, September 4, Brown stated that the “essential next step here is get Phoumi into government.” Brown reported that Phoumi himself was resisting U.S. suggestions to return to Vientiane as a member of the Souvanna Cabinet and was talking about “going it alone.” (Ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. In telegram 269, September 2, the Department of State provided Brown with an analysis of the Souvanna Cabinet and his past policies, stated that it considered the reduction of Kong Le’s influence to be the primary problem, and authorized Brown to inform Souvanna of U.S. support provided his government was not under Pathet Lao control nor followed policies leading to a Communist takeover. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–160; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. In telegram 474 from Vientiane, September 6, Brown reported that he made these points to Souvanna, who denied that Kong Le was still in control of Vientiane. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–660; included in the microfiche supplement)

5. In telegram 476 from Vientiane, September 6, the Embassy reported that it sent the following message to Phoumi:

   “Have today urged strongly on Souvanna importance insuring your safety Vientiane. He assures me you entirely safe.

   “USG believes your participation in government most important. US cannot support you in any separatist movement or effort resolve situation by force.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–660)