Office of the Historian

386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, August 31, 1960—4:57 p.m.

258. 1. Although new government has been approved by Assembly (your 444)2 we deeply concerned by position Kong Le has now assumed in opposing inclusion Phoumi and Inpeng (your 439).3 This may result in break up of cabinet which though far from ideal seems about as good as can be expected under circumstances. We appreciate delicacy of situation but consider US must define its position in situation which now appears hanging in balance. Unity of non-Communist leaders which seems now to have been achieved with formation this new cabinet is imminently threatened by renewed pressure from Kong Le apparently with PL support. Therefore unless events have again moved beyond present point you should personally and immediately deliver message along following lines to Souvanna if he in Vientiane or through Fromer if in Luang Prabang:

“USG desires support his cabinet as now composed but would find it difficult to deal with a government which appeared to be subject to will of a rebel officer. Such a government could hardly be considered free or have necessary authority to discharge its functions. USG would appreciate knowing what specific actions RLG planning to undertake to reestablish its authority. If RLG considers it needs help to resolve present situation, USG prepared furnish such support as feasible. [Page 830] For example, USG would be prepared move men of first paratroop battalion now training in Thailand to whatever location in Laos RLG desired.”

2. We also find it unacceptable that only troops of 5th Military Region (including rebel 2nd paratroop battalion) have apparently been paid (SITREP Aug. 30, para. 20).5 You (or alternately Fromer and/or PEO regional rep) should therefore deliver this additional message to both Souvanna and Ouane, with Chief PEO participating as you consider desirable:

“USG which responsible for financing military budget finds it impossible understand why no troops have apparently been paid except those in 5th Military Region. Thus troops innocent of present situation are being penalized and a premium given to rebel soldiers. No military establishment can long exist under these circumstances. Therefore rather than witness deterioration FAL, US Govt would be prepared help meet needs of troops outside Vientiane in answer to requests from regional commanders.”

3. Above messages should be passed to Phoumi.

4. Department planning call in British, French and Australians today to inform them of Kong Le’s threat and propose we all make separate approaches to Souvanna along lines first three sentences of our message to him (para. 1 above). In view inadequate communications Thai and Vietnamese Embassies here, Bangkok and Saigon should make parallel representations.

5. Events moving so rapidly it impossible obtain your comments prior consultation with allies here, but we strongly feel it essential that Souvanna’s backbone be stiffened at this crucial time and that Phoumi be aware our continued confidence in him as staunch anti-Communist and our full support for broadly based and constitutional cabinet which unites responsible non-Communist elements.

6. Question our public posture re RLG and Kong Le’s apparent defiance thereof may also have to be faced at any moment. If time permits we would appreciate your suggestions. If not we will use some [Page 831] variant of formula that we support an RLG which vigorously seeks to maintain independence and integrity of Kingdom. We would add situation not yet clear enough to warrant further comment.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–3160. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Chapman; cleared with SEA, WE, BNA (in draft), and with the Department of Defense; and approved by Parsons. Also sent priority to Bangkok and Saigon and repeated to London, Canberra, Paris, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
  2. Dated August 31. (ibid., 751J.00/8–3160)↩
  3. In telegram 439, August 31, the Embassy reported that Radio Vientiane was broadcasting indications of Kong Le’s strong opposition to inclusion of Phoumi and Inpeng in Souvanna’s government. (Ibid.)↩

  4. Paragraph 20 of situation report 20, August 30, [document number not declassified], reads:

    “(Noforn) Info Vientiane 30 August is that second para units paid 29 August, fifth milreg being paid 30 August, others still supposedly waiting approval Gen Ouan. United States Ambassador has passed message for Ouan in Luang Prabang urging release of pay to other milregs on 30 August. Comment: to pay troops in Vientiane promptly while dragging feet of payment remainder of army, could undercut position Phoumi with his forces.” (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records, International Series, Lao Situation Reports)

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