Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

243. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 19, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Situation in Laos

The Royal Lao Government decided last week to send a special representative to the UN to discuss the situation in Laos with the Secretary General and possibly to make an appeal to him to send an observer. The representative, Ngon Sananikone, brother of the Prime Minister, arrived this morning in New York, Wednesday, August 19.

The Lao Government’s decision to appeal to the Secretary General was triggered by the British presentation of their proposal to have the UK and USSR, as co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, request the Secretary General to send an observer to Laos who would report both to the co-Chairmen and the Secretary General. The co-Chairmen then would consider the matter further to see what additional action was required. Upon being informed of this proposal, the Lao Government feared that unless it took some action first the world would have the impression Laos was in the wrong and had something to hide.

On the afternoon of Monday, August 17, the British presented their proposal to Soviet Ambassador Malik, who argued for the return of the ICC and only grudgingly agreed to forward the proposal to his Government.² The Soviet Government has not yet given its answer.

We seriously doubt that the Soviets will accede to the British proposal. Such an agreement would mean a reversal of the position that the Communist Bloc has so far taken, namely, that the situation in Laos can only be resolved by the recall of the ICC. As an indication of Soviet attitudes, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, August 18, issued a lengthy statement attacking the Royal Government primarily and the U.S. secondarily for violating the Geneva Agreement.³

We are concerned that (1) the Lao representative might make a premature formal request for an observer to the Secretary General and (2) that the Soviets will turn down the British proposal. Since we believe that the Secretary General will not accede to a unilateral request from the Lao Government and will only agree to send an observer if this request were backed by the co-Chairmen, the effect of a Soviet refusal would be to force the Secretary General to turn down the Lao request and to put the British in a highly embarrassing position. (The British already consider themselves to be in a difficult—if not ludicrous—position.)

If, as we expect, the Soviets turn down the British proposal and if our analysis of the causes of the fighting in Laos is correct, then we should expect a further outbreak of fighting in northern Laos following a Soviet refusal. The purpose of creating new tensions would be to add further pressures for the recall of the ICC.

While diplomatic moves are probably the only ones which have a real chance of bringing peace to Laos, nevertheless we feel we should help strengthen the Lao Army in order to maintain its morale and will to resist, as well as to strengthen its security posture. Our representatives in Laos and CINCPAC have strongly supported a Lao request for raising the force levels as follows:

• Army from 25,000 to 29,000
• Auto-defense from 16,000 to 20,000.⁴

The proposal is under urgent study.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–1759. Secret. Drafted by Chapman and cleared with FE and SEA. Murphy was Acting Secretary.
2. Reported in telegram 884 from London, August 18. (ibid., 751J.00/8–1859)
3. Reference is to a statement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, August 1 7, charging that the Royal Government of Laos had violated the Geneva Agreement of 1954 by delaying the integration of the Pathet Lao, by evading the obligation for ICC control over the introduction of foreign military personnel into Laos, and by violating the November 1957 agreement for a political settlement with the Pathet Lao. The Soviet Union also charged that the Lao Government was flooding the country with U.S. servicemen. The Soviet statement is summarized in Department of State Bulletin, September 7, 1959, p. 344, footnote 2.
4. In a memorandum to Bell, August 19, Weiss described a meeting on the morning of August 19 among Murphy, Parsons, Green, other FE staff, and himself, in which Acting Secretary Murphy queried the rationale and cost behind the request for raising Lao force levels. Murphy required the recommendation of Ambassador Smith before definite action was taken. (Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 64 D 351, Laos; included in the microfiche supplement)