Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

152. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Steeves) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)¹

Washington, November 8, 1960.

SUBJECT

• OCB Consideration of Jet Training and Aircraft for Cambodia

The attached Special Report to the Operations Coordinating Board (Tab A) was prepared in response to the Board’s interest in the necessity of developing a position on Embassy Phnom Penh’s recommendation that we offer jet training to Cambodia (Tab B).² The Special Report goes beyond the question of jet training to include consideration of jet aircraft, since an offer of training to Cambodia, unless specifically qualified, would carry an implicit commitment to furnish aircraft. Any decision touching on the question of providing jet aircraft to Cambodia should be referred to the National Security Council for consideration owing to the Council’s specific directive to this effect contained in NSC 6012 (Tab C).³

Need for a Favorable and Prompt Response

General Lon Nol, Cambodia’s Defense Minister and Chief of the Cambodian Armed Forces, has just completed a brief visit to Washington. He strongly emphasized Cambodia’s earnest desire for the increased US military and police aid requested earlier through the Country Team (Tab B) and cited the threats to Cambodia inherent in the troubled conditions in Laos and Viet-Nam. He also emphatically and repeatedly requested that he be given an indication of the US response prior to his departure, approximately ten days hence, for France to join Prince Sihanouk, Cambodian Chief of State. The latter is scheduled to leave France on or about November 19 for extended visits to Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Mongolia and Communist China. Should Sihanouk conclude, before departing on this trip, that Cambodia’s bid for greater US support has been rebuffed, he probably would be receptive to the offers of military aid which bloc countries have extended in the past and which they may be expected to reaffirm on the occasion of Sihanouk’s forthcoming visits.

Consequently, I believe our response to the Cambodian requests should be sufficiently favorable to retain Sihanouk’s confidence in US support and that it should be communicated to Sihanouk, probably through the Cambodian Ambassador here and General Lon Nol, before Sihanouk departs on his trip to bloc countries. It would also be communicated officially to the Cambodian Government through our Embassy in Phnom Penh.

State-Defense Split

The attached Special Report reflects a divergence of opinion between the Department of Defense and the Department of State. In essence, the State position as approved in principle by Mr. Dillon (Tab D),⁴ is that by not qualifying our offer of jet training, we allow the Cambodians to assume that we are prepared to meet their request for jet aircraft when the training is completed. Therefore, it would be necessary to decide now that we are willing to provide such aircraft under the US Military Assistance Program, beginning possibly in fiscal year 1962, and subject, of course, to the availability of funds.

Defense, on the other hand, believes we should not plan to give Cambodia jet aircraft and, therefore, should, in offering the training, specifically tell the Cambodians that we are prepared merely to give them diplomatic assistance to help them procure a few jet aircraft from some other free world sources. Defense also recommends, as a last resort, that we be prepared to help in the financing of six French jet aircraft for Cambodia.

In my opinion, the Defense position does not meet the political requirement for a reasonably favorable US response in the near future to the recent Cambodian proposals for a $120,000,000 increase in US military and police aid. The symbolic importance of the jet component in the Cambodian proposals has repeatedly been emphasized by our Embassy at Phnom Penh. It has gained further stature by reason of present indications that we will be hard put to show the Cambodians a favorable response on other major aspects of their military request. Furthermore, the Defense proposal appears to expose us needlessly to the political risk of confusing and irritating the Cambodians, without having sufficient compensating advantage.

In addition to my belief that an indicated willingness to supply jet aircraft, as well as training, is an essential element in the minimum reponse we can safely give the Cambodians, there are the following considerations:

(a) The time when we no longer will be able to supply and support propeller aircraft (in the categories of trainers and fighters) evidently is not far off. If, therefore, we probably are going to give the Cambodians jets within the next few years in any event, I believe we should do so now when we can garner decided political advantage.

(b) When Mr. Parsons discussed this problem with CINCPAC last month, Admiral Felt said that, if it should be decided for political considerations to grant jet training, it would make better sense to being furnishing jet training aircraft, rather than to continue supplying propeller trainers, as is now contemplated for FY 1962.

(c) By furnishing jets to Cambodia, we may be reducing the problem of obtaining international acceptance of their subsequent introduction into Viet-Nam.

(d) Finally, Cambodia’s prospective jet unit undoubtedly will constitute a major object of Cambodian national pride. I believe it would serve US and free world political interests to be associated with what will be regarded by the Cambodians as an outstanding manifestation of their national progress and prestige. Moreover, I believe that French association with this factor would not serve either US or free world interests in the same degree. To date, the French to all intents and purposes have used their influence in Cambodia primarily to uphold the French position there, rather than effectively to promote free world interests.

With regard to reactions in Thailand and Viet-Nam (and elsewhere), I believe we must stand frankly on the contention that a minimum, reasonably favorable response to the Cambodian military demands is necessary to reduce the risk of major Communist bloc gains in Cambodia which would adversely affect Thai and Vietnamese, as well as US, security interests. The current relaxation in tensions between these countries and Cambodia, and recent manifestations of Sihanouk’s preoccupation with internal Communist influence (throttling of Communist press, submission of resignation in protest against Communist criticism) should also lessen Thai and Vietnamese concern. (We already are providing Thailand with a sizeable, modern jet program, and Vietnamese pilots are receiving US jet training.) The Defense position emphasizes the danger of strongly adverse reactions not only in Thailand and Viet-Nam, but also in the Philippines and Formosa, and the risk thereby of weakening SEATO. These fears would appear to be somewhat exaggerated.

Possible Compromise

In the interests of resolving the split position, it was suggested to Defense that we undertake further to consult France and other free world countries with the view to persuading them to make a more acceptable offer to the Cambodians (i.e., provide the aircraft and training on a grant basis), provided, however, that we would supply the aircraft ourselves if necessary as a last resort. Recommendation(b) in the attached Special Report (Tab A) would thus read:

“(b) We seek to encourage other free world countries to make an acceptable offer of jet aircraft to Cambodia, and, in the event we are unsuccessful in this attempt, we be prepared to furnish⁵ Cambodia a small number of jet trainers under our military aid program.”

Defense did not accept this suggested compromise at the working level, but might be willing to reconsider at the Board.

Finally, should a deadlock develop over this point, you may wish to recommend approving merely the jet training, reserving the question of aircraft for further consideration. I strongly believe the Defense proposal to offer the Cambodians diplomatic assistance in procuring aircraft elsewhere in the free world fails to meet the political requirement for a reasonably favorable response, since it would indicate clearly to the Cambodians that we have no intention of providing aircraft. Therefore, if agreement on a decision in principle to grant aircraft to Cambodia cannot be reached, it would be preferable to limit action at this time to approval of recommendation (a), i.e. to grant training.

Attachment

Special Report Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board⁶

Washington, November 7, 1960.

POSSIBLE PROVISION OF JET TRAINING AND JET AIRCRAFT TO CAMBODIA

1. The Cambodian Government has requested a major increase in U.S. grant aid to Cambodian military and police forces. Included in the Cambodian proposals are requests for immediate jet training of from six to eight Cambodian pilots and for provision of jet fighter aircraft when the training has been completed.

2. Prince Sihanouk has repeatedly manifested his determination to push his country into the jet age. Moreover, he has stated repeatedly that if Cambodia does not receive assistance to this end from the West, he will turn to the Sino-Soviet Bloc for help. We hope to achieve a favorable political impact by making our response to the Cambodian requests known to Prince Sihanouk before he departs in mid-November on a trip to Moscow and Peiping.

3. Despite Cambodia’s equivocal attitudes in the international field, its popularly-based political stability and anti-Communist domestic policy under Prince Sihanouk’s leadership represent an element of strength in the Free World position in Southeast Asia.

4. Our Embassy in Cambodia strongly recommends that we promptly grant the request for jet training on the grounds that a favorable decision on this part of the Cambodian proposals would go a long way toward satisfying Prince Sihanouk that his country’s needs are understood by the West; that Cambodian resistance to attractive Sino-Soviet Bloc offers would be strengthened; and that Cambodian pressure for greatly increased military assistance of other kinds would be reduced. The Embassy recommends also that, if other alternatives are not feasible, we consider providing jet aircraft to Cambodia. We consider our support of the Cambodian Armed Forces as an important element in Cambodian resistance to Communist influence. The cost of providing jet training in the United States for eight Cambodian pilots is estimated roughly at $200,000.

5. A statement to the Cambodians at this time that the U.S. is prepared to grant jet training would imply at least a willingness to be of assistance in obtaining jet aircraft later.

6. Accordingly, it is proposed that without prejudice to action on other aspects of the Cambodian proposals:

a. We inform the Cambodians at a suitable time that we are willing to provide jet training promptly for six Cambodian pilots on a grant basis.⁷

State:	Defense:
b. We be prepared to furnish Cambodia a small number of jet trainers under our military aid program.	b. We also inform the Cambodians that we will give such diplomatic assistance as they may wish to assist them to procure a token number of jet aircraft from other Free World sources.
	c. We be prepared, as a last resort, to help in the financing of two to six French jet aircraft when the pilots are ready for them.

Annex A

STATE VIEWS⁸

7. Possible objections to providing a jet capability to Cambodia under our grant military assistance program include such factors as:

a. Lack of military justification for the use of jet aircraft in Cambodia at this time;

b. Likely adverse reactions in such friendly countries as Thailand and Viet-Nam, probably followed by requests for increased aid.

8. In this context, various other Free World countries were consulted regarding the Cambodian demands for jet training and aircraft. The French reaction was the most favorable, indicating a readiness to sell jet trainers at about $150,000 each and to provide pilot training as well as technical support.

9. It is believed, however, that the French sales proposal would not be regarded by Sihanouk as an acceptable response to the requests he has directed at the U.S. Owing to the rather unique and, in a sense, politically equivocal position the French have developed in Cambodia, Sihanouk may not even regard the French offer as a mark of Western support. He would probably still expect some further sign from the U.S.

10. It is believed that in addition to granting jet training, we should be prepared to provide such aircraft ourselves. The Cambodians probably could be induced to accept trainers, such as the T–37, in lieu of fighter aircraft.

Annex B

DEFENSE VIEWS⁹

11. As a political measure, approval of the Cambodian request for the training of a few jet pilots can be accepted in order to help create a favorable impression upon Sihanouk before he goes to Moscow and Peiping in late November.

12. A promise to provide U.S. jet aircraft, however, is not considered desirable at this time. Three major drawbacks are seen in providing jet aircraft to Cambodia under our grant Military Assistance program:

a. Lack of military justification for jet aircraft in Cambodia at this time.

b. Strongly adverse reactions in Viet-Nam (which, under the Geneva Accords is not allowed jets), Thailand, the Philippines and Taiwan, and the possible weakening of SEATO.

c. Increased aid requests from the countries listed in the above subparagraph.

13. One related matter which should be considered is the effect of the Laos situation. Viet-Nam and Thailand consider our actions there to demonstrate a lack of firm support for avowed anti-Communists. If we now voluntarily, and for no apparent quid pro quo, increase our aid to the noted neutralist, Sihanouk, our prestige will be further diminished among some of our firmest supporters. It would therefore be advantageous to be able to tell Thailand and Viet-Nam that we have made a minimum response to the Cambodian military requests and that this was considered desirable only in order to reduce the risk of major Communist bloc gains in Cambodia.

14. An alternate and preferable solution to the Cambodian desire for jet aircraft is the provision of such aircraft from other Free World sources. Consultations have been held with various other countries with respect to the possibility of their granting or selling such aircraft to the Cambodians. The best offer received thus far is the French offer to sell some trainers on which machine guns could be mounted and to include pilot training and a technical mission at a price of $150,000 per aircraft. In view of the fact that the French are the official Cambodian military advisers (and were consulted in the preparation of the Cambodian request for $94 million of additional U.S. aid), it appears that the French should be urged to make the offer at lower terms in view of their desire to maintain the French “position” in Cambodia. Cambodia appears to be a most appropriate place to push for the execution of our newly announced policy of getting our West European Allies to assist in sharing the Free World defense burden. If the French do no better, and no other country makes a better offer, there remains the possibility of sharing the cost through use of U.S.-held counterpart funds in France.

15. Another possibility is that of inducing the Japanese to make a gift of a small number of their excess F–86 aircraft.

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Southeast Asia 5. Secret. Drafted by Askew and concurred in by SEA and FE.
2. Despatch 93 from Phnom Penh; see footnote 2, Document 150.
3. Reference is to NSC Action No. 2267–c, approved on July 25, in which the Council agreed to refer the question of jets for Cambodia or Vietnam back to the NSC when a policy decision was required. See footnote 12, Document 64. NSC 6012 is printed as Document 65.
4. Tab D, a memorandum from T.L. Eliot, Jr., Special Assistant to Dillon, to Parsons, October 31, is not attached. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Asia, Southeast, US Policy in Mainland (NSC 6012))
5. The following revision is written on the source text at this point in Merchant’s hand: “then consider sympathetically furnishing.” Merchant indicated that this revision was to replace the original phrase: “be prepared to furnish.”
6. Secret.
7. Merchant added in his own hand the following additional phrase at this point in the source text: “with the question of the source of aircraft to be further considered.”
8. Secret.
9. Secret.