150. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State1
494. For Asst Secretary’s Parsons and Steeves from Trimble. Our many messages have emphasized importance of making known to Sihanouk before his departure on bloc visit that US responding favorably, although not in full, to RKG request for increased military and police aid. Importance of doing so in my opinion further underscored by publication October 30 “Neak Chiet Niyum” (NCN) of Sihanouk’s detailed report of his mission to US and UN, including account his activities and treatment accorded him by US and other Western, bloc, and neutral countries (reporting fully by despatch).2 He has little good to say for any these groups but US clearly comes out worst.
Report studded with various indications his pique over lack of attention shown him—inferior treatment in comparison that given Sukarno, Nasser and various African dignitaries in such matters as police escort, absence of high ranking US (and other Western) officials his reception, etc. He also disappointed “rather vague” statement by President in response his request for “minimum modernization” of FARK. Attitude summed up in his statement that “America showed its true face; it is far from recognizing in fact the equality of big and small, as enunciated its constitution and KC [UN?] Charter.”
I fully appreciate that Sihanouk was very small frog in very large puddle and that we must take manifestations of his exaggerated but habitual sensitivity in our stride. Nevertheless I am concerned by timing within few weeks his departure bloc capitals where he can be expected to receive full red carpet treatment, and feel that unless he [Page 390] can be brought into better frame of mind by concrete evidence that US is making real effort to be helpful, he will certainly be more receptive to Commie blandishments and offers.
I can also appreciate, as mentioned Steeves’ letter October 21,3 desirability utilizing normal channels to communicate our decisions on Cambodian proposals rather than conveying them through London and hence merely telling him they being given sympathetic consideration. However, I do not think that this will be enough. Sihanouk is no fool and could undoubtedly interpret this as deliberate footdragging on our part designed to deter him from accepting Commie offers during forthcoming trip behind Curtain, and I am afraid this tactic may well have opposite effect on him than intended.
I therefore strongly recommend that Lon Nol at least be informed before he goes to France to report to Sihanouk that we prepared:
- (a)
- Furnish jet training for six pilots;
- (b)
- Provide equipment necessary to bring existing army units up to full TO&E;
- (c)
- Expedite delivery of equipment already funded;
- (d)
- Provide DS for FARK pay and allowances for JCS approved force goal of 31,000;
- (e)
- Suspend 10 percent reduction policy in troop pay and allowances for CY61; and
- (f)
- Furnish additional police equipment along lines recommended Embdes 93.
I would also hope Lon Nol could be informed that balance RKG requests still being studied and decisions will be communicated RKG at later date.
Finally urge that Nong Kimny be informed soonest that ICA prepared finance survey team to study proposed technological institute as recommended Embdes 1104 and Toica A–473.5 Believe demonstrated US interest in this pet project will be helpful in putting Sihanouk in better frame of mind.