149. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State1
464. Department pouch London, Paris. From Parsons.2 As result of our preoccupation with internal security Laos and Vietnam in face of intensified Commie threat to each, my attention during Cambodian visit was directed more to internal policies bearing on Cambodian survival and less to absent Sihanouk’s external policies which might compromise country. Consequently situation there appeared in somewhat novel perspective.
For instance Cambodia is at present by far most stable of three Indo-China states. Also it is one in which people are most united in their loyalty to government. Perhaps regime in power (Sihanouk) has greater survival prospects than that of any other mainland SEA country. Thus viewed Cambodia oddly appears at moment more as asset and less as threat to U.S. interests in area. This is consideration which we should take more consciously into consideration when assessing Sihanouk’s erratic behavior in foreign field.
This view may be influenced by present good atmosphere in U.S.-Cambodian relations which contrasts with that obtaining at time my last visit shortly after Dap Chhuon affair in early 59. I believe Ambassador Trimble will comment on this and cite various special indications of desire to show friendship for USA during Irwin–Parsons visit. It would be too much to hope that this will last without setbacks but, in Orwellian terms, while all countries are equal in Cambodian eyes, we decidedly more equal than Commie China or USSR right now. However, Commie China has two important assets which we don’t. ChiComs are feared and we are not, and also Commie China is closer.
Least equal of all are neighbors as always. Queen abetted by Prince Monireth made this emphatically and repeatedly clear in our long audience. Sihanouk himself could not have done better job than this extremely sharp pair. Cabinet Ministers acknowledged Thai-Cambodian informal talks going well at U.N. but not so Queen. She went back centuries to explain perfidy of Thai and Annamites and deep animosity which persists today. As Embassy Phnom Penh has [Page 388] consistently emphasized, this will remain critical problem for U.S. Problem may become more acute wake of Sihanouk’s year end trip to bloc capitals including Peiping.
On other hand Sihanouk’s internal policies as reflected in our talks have shrewd consistency of some value to us (even though he may weary his supporters by his constant over reactions and resignation from whatever office he has chosen to occupy).
For instance General Lon Nol volunteered (and this is I am told his basic belief) that FARK originated as French mercenary force and its first task was to win people over. This he said took years. He remarked that no matter how large FARK might be it could not cope with internal security problems or meet more serious incursions unless people in country had confidence in its ability to protect them and in its desire to promote their well being. Now he says villagers are volunteering information on caches of arms hidden by Vietminh years ago. Incidentally it seemed to be consensus of Americans in Phnom Penh that Lon Nol is basically more favorable to free world and U.S. particularly than he can afford openly to indicate. This probably should be qualified by recognition that as true Cambodian he no doubt is not eager to be helpful where Thai or Vietnamese concerned.
There are other illustrations of constant effort to tie people closely to Royal Family and government at Phnom Penh. It sufficient merely mention Queen’s contempt for Laos King inactivity which she says will demonstrate to whomever wins out there that monarchy has no utility. In Cambodia she indicated principle is just opposite—to move in quickly and make Royal Family center of authority. Cambodia’s institutions are being consciously used to this end including traditional oriental device of weekly public audience when anyone can petition Prince and when for political effect he often interferes with due process of law and grants relief to petitioners. Nhiek Tioulong’s grandiose and no doubt exaggerated development schemes for remote areas have he says been worked out in close collaboration with Sihanouk and are another facet of this central purpose of national unity and active popular support of regime.
None of foregoing has gone unreported over the years but at policy level in Department I suspect it has gone relatively unnoticed in face of spectacular and irritating Sihanouk moves on international checkerboard. My conclusion on leaving Cambodia is that we would do well to remember that internally Cambodia is relatively solid and there is no intent to give country away to Commies or anyone else (albeit younger, Paris educated intellectuals, 80 pct. of whom, in Sihanouk’s own estimate, return here strongly influenced by exposure Communist ideology, represent potential longer term threat). I believe this policy is backed by more ability and vitality in upper circle at Phnom Penh than we sometimes acknowledge. In sum it may be that [Page 389] Cambodia is less of a liability in region than it appears and that its internal policies as described are in our interest. This should be weighed as we consider our policies toward and cooperation with Cambodia.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/1–2360. Secret. Also sent to CINCPAC for POLAD and repeated to Saigon, Bangkok, Vientiane, and New Delhi.↩
- Regarding Parsons’ visit to Laos, see Documents 428–430. He was accompanied by Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin and Admiral Riley of CINCPAC; they stayed in Cambodia for only 24 hours. Additional reports of their conversations with Cambodian leaders are enclosed in despatch 121 from Phnom Penh, October 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 102.202/10–2660)↩