Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

145. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 17, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Contingency Exploration of Availability of Jets for Sale to Cambodia

The Cambodian Government is expected in the near future to present proposals for increased US military aid, possibly including jet training and jet aircraft. It is believed that we should begin exploring on a contingency basis the terms of a possible US position, since it appears likely that the Cambodians have, or in time will, become determined to obtain jets, and may be tempted to accept reported offers of jets from the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Background

In late June the Cambodians launched an intensified campaign of publicized complaints against the alleged hostile designs of their neighbors, Viet-Nam, Thailand and Laos. Citing the relatively large amounts of military aid given by the United States to these neighboring countries, the Cambodians publicly demanded that U.S. military aid to Cambodia be increased to insure Cambodia’s defense capability against what they defined as threats to their national integrity. (Tab A)² We indicated to the Cambodian Government our readiness to consult on the nature and extent of the alleged threats and on means to counter them. (Tab B)³ We also specifically affirmed our willingness to discuss with the appropriate Cambodian authorities the US military assistance program (Tab C),⁴ and we expect presentation of the Cambodian proposals in the near future. (Tab D)⁵

Possible Cambodian Request for Jets and Jet Training

There is as yet no clear indication of what the Cambodian proposals will comprise; however, the Cambodians have manifested on various occasions an interest in jet aircraft and training (Tab E)⁶ and there are indications that they have received offers of assistance in this field from the bloc. (Tab F)⁷ Therefore, it is possible that the Cambodian proposals will include a request for some form of jet program.

While exclusion of Communist influence in the Cambodian armed forces has been a major objective of our military assistance program, we are reluctant to consider recommending the provision of jet aircraft by the US on a grant basis for the following reasons:

a) Absence of a military justification. Jets would not appreciably enhance Cambodia’s capability for the type of military operations (mainly maintenance of internal security) our assistance program is intended to support.

b) Anticipated unfavorable reactions in Viet-Nam and Thailand. In Viet-Nam, it would undoubtedly increase pressure for equipping the Vietnamese air force with jets, which in turn would constitute a violation of the Geneva Agreements. In Thailand (and possibly elsewhere) it would probably be regarded as yielding to neutralist blackmail. (Tab G)⁸

NSC Directive

In approving the revised policy paper on Mainland Southeast Asia (NSC 6012)⁹ on July 21, the National Security Council specified that “at such time as policy decisions are required as to whether jet aircraft should be provided to Cambodia or Viet-Nam, these questions should be referred to the National Security Council for consideration.” (Tab H)¹⁰

Alternatives to Grant Jets from US

It is not inconceivable that the Cambodians may be willing, or could be persuaded, to acquire jet aircraft by purchase. In any event, it would possibly be very helpful to have in hand information on the availability of such aircraft for sale in other free world countries. (We already have a report (Tab I)¹¹ that Australia has surplus Vampires.) Furthermore, some free world country with special interests in the area, such as France, might be willing to supply jets on exceptionally favorable terms. Cambodia’s acquisition of jets from a free world country other than the US would probably entail less serious repercussions than would provision of jets by the US. (Tab J)¹²

Information of this nature would be helpful for development of contingency plans and, particularly, for presentation of the problem to the NSC, should that become necessary.

Recommendation

That you approve approaches to the Australians, and, if subsequently found desirable, also to the British and French, along the following lines:

a) Whereas we are willing to consider Cambodian arms requests within the context of our current military assistance program, we are very reluctant to consider providing Cambodia with jet aircraft, owing in part to the risk of serious reactions in neighboring countries.

b) We believe such reactions might be less severe should Cambodia obtain jets from some free world country other than the US.

c) Therefore we would be interested in learning how far the Australian (British, French) would be willing to go toward meeting a possible Cambodian determination to obtain jet training and jets, either by purchase or grant.¹³

1. Source: Department of State, FE/SEA (Cambodia) Files: Lot 63 D 73, 16.14 Mid Year Crisis. Secret. Drafted by Askew on August 15 and cleared by SEA, S/P, U/MSC, and FE. None of the tabs was attached.
2. Tab A is telegram 1687 from Phnom Penh, June 28, which contained the text of an editorial written by Sihanouk in Neat Chiet Niyum, June 25, complaining about U.S. military aid to Cambodia. (Ibid., Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/6–2860)
3. Tab B is telegram 1147 to Phnom Penh, June 24; see footnote 3, Document 141.
4. Tab C is telegram 64 from Phnom Penh, July 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/7–1460)
5. Tab D is telegram 82 from Phnom Penh, July 19, which contained a note from Foreign Minister Tep Phan supporting Sihanouk’s views in his editorial of June 25. (ibid., 751H.00/7–1960)
6. Tab E is telegram 1619 from Phnom Penh, June 15; see footnote 2, Document 138.
7. Tab F is a memorandum of discussion between French Foreign Ministry officials and Assistant Secretary Parsons plus members of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, June 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 651H.93/6–260)
8. Tab G is telegram 121 from Bangkok, July 22, in which the Embassy reported that the Thais were complaining that Cambodia received more military aid than Thailand on a per capita basis. (Ibid., 751H.5–MSP/7–2260)
9. Document 65.
10. See Document 64.
11. Tab I is telegram 26 from Canberra, July 27, in which the Embassy reported that the Royal Australian Air Force had 50 surplus Vampire jets in storage. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5622/7–2660)
12. Tab J is CINCPAC telegram 052330Z, August 5; not further identified.
13. A note on the source text indicates that Acting Secretary Dillon eliminated recommendation b) and revised c) to read: ‘Therefore we would be interested in learning Australian (British, French) views on meeting a possible Cambodian determination to obtain jet training and jets, either by purchase or grant.” In a memorandum of August 26, Askew reported that Dillon approved discussions with the Australians, British, and French. (Department of State, FE/SEA (Cambodia) Files: Lot 63 D 73, 1.14.2 Briefing Papers)