Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

114. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, May 9, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Vietnamese/Cambodian Relations

Mr. Parsons has emphasized in his preliminary observations² on the Cambodian-Vietnamese problem three obstacles of basic importance:

1) President Diem’s persistent contempt for Sihanouk and refusal to consider doing business with him;

2) The emotional and antagonistic reaction on the part of the Cambodians toward Viet-Nam;

3) The narrow and self-serving attitudes of French representatives in Phnom Penh.

In light of the above, Mr. Parsons has recommended consideration of three possible courses of action:

1) A warning to Diem and, if need be thereafter, sanctions in the form of reduced aid to terminate Vietnamese interference in Cambodian affairs.

2) Pressure on the French Foreign Office to cure its representation in Phnom Penh and use its influence in Cambodia in Free World interests.

3) Extension of U.S. good offices to settlement of Vietnamese/Cambodian disputes under certain circumstances.

SEA comments on the courses of action set forth by Mr. Parsons are given below, as requested, for possible use in your discussions with Mr. Parsons. We have also suggested an additional course of action dealing with the border control problem.

Begin Limit Distribution

A. Prevention of Continued GVN Interference in Cambodian Affairs

Mr. Parsons has suggested that we warn Diem against continued interference in the internal affairs of Cambodia, and if necessary thereafter, impose sanctions in the form of reduced aid in an effort to compel cessation of Vietnamese interference.

We agree with Mr. Parsons’ fear that Diem and Nhu still desire to get rid of Sihanouk, since they believe that his policies in Cambodia present a continuing grave threat to the security of Viet-Nam. Since, however, there is no apparent alternative to Sihanouk on the Cambodian scene and Son Sann has indicated to Mr. Parsons that he and his colleagues would not hesitate to invite the Chinese Communists into Cambodia militarily to avenge an assassination of Sihanouk, we believe that fundamental U.S. as well as Vietnamese interests in the area require an acceptance of Sihanouk’s continued possession of political authority in Cambodia, discontinuation of maneuvers against him, and efforts by the GVN to work with him.

We believe that these factors warrant a U.S. approach to Diem to try to induce him to see this situation as we do. Insofar as such an approach is concerned with trying to stop Vietnamese interference in Cambodian affairs, it must be based on the evidence that we have. There is no evidence since the Dap Chhuon fiasco that the GVN is actively promoting a coup against Sihanouk. There is evidence, however, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the GVN is actively continuing to print and distribute for use in Southeast Asia anti-Sihanouk propaganda. We, therefore, believe that this is what we would be justified in asking the GVN to terminate.

As for sanctions against the GVN in case it continues anti-Sihanouk maneuvers in one form or another after such an approach, we believe that threatened or actual reduction in aid for this purpose is inadvisable for the following reasons:

1) Threats to reduce aid as a means of political pressure have been rarely executed in fact, because consideration of all the factors involved has usually led to the conclusion that over-riding U.S. interests would be defeated if the threats were carried out. We believe, in view of Viet-Nam’s closely allied relationship with the U.S. and the vital importance to U.S. interests of maintaining it as a strong anti-Communist bastion in Southeast Asia, we would be forced to conclude that we could not reduce aid to Viet-Nam for purposes of political pressure.

2) We doubt that Diem could ever come to understand how the U.S. could threaten or reduce aid to Viet-Nam (or a close ally) in an effort to compel it to take a definite course of action toward neutralist Cambodia when the U.S., after deliberate consideration, decided against threatening or reducing aid to Cambodia following its recognition of Communist China—an act not only contrary to the most fundamental U.S. policy in the Far East but the one which has led Viet-Nam to engage in maneuvers against Sihanouk.

3) It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find the place in our aid program to Viet-Nam at which a cut should be made for reasons of political pressure. Embassy Saigon has already told the GVN that the U.S. wishes to reduce its contribution to Viet-Nam’s military budget by $14 million in FY 1960, and Mr. Dillon, apparently on the basis of this and perhaps unaware that Embassy Saigon had hoped to divert an equivalent amount to an increase in the economic sector of our aid program, has informed Mr. Saccio in ICA by a memorandum that Viet-Nam’s Defense Support program for FY 1960 can be cut $10–$15 million. Moreover, it is likely that we shall have to absorb in the Vietnamese program part of a Congressional appropriations cut which would mean a level of aid to Viet-Nam below what we in SEA think necessary to achieve our policy objectives there. As there is very little room left for financing economic projects out of the counterpart pipeline, any cut in Fiscal Year 1960 will be likely to reduce the size of the economic program and, if serious, could even jeopardize the road projects, which constitute the biggest component of the economic sector of our aid program. Needless to say, such cuts would throw South Viet-Nam further behind the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam in the economic development race between the two zones, and would postpone progress toward greater self-support by Viet-Nam. Under these circumstances any further cut for political pressure purposes would seem out of the question.

However, we believe a different kind of sanctions might be possible if Diem fails to heed our warning about interference in Cambodian affairs. On proof of continued GVN maneuvering, we could tell him that we propose to go to Sihanouk and say 1) that we have no connection with such maneuvers; 2) we do not approve of them; and 3) we have strongly urged the GVN to discontinue them. We believe that such action or threat thereof by the U.S. might stand some chance of bringing Vietnamese maneuvers to an end. End Limit Distribution.

B. Pressure on Paris to Cure French Representation in Phnom Penh

Expressions of U.S. dissatisfaction over the actions of French Ambassador Gorce at Phnom Penh already have been made to the French several times and at high levels:

1) Mr. Parsons pointedly mentioned to M. Daridan on February 4 that it would be in the interest of all three powers if Ambassador Gorce were to dispel Cambodian illusions that the U.S. was plotting to overthrow Sihanouk.

2) Mr. Robertson also raised the subject with M. Daridan, on February 6, stating that Gorce appeared not to be convinced of U.S. non-involvement in Cambodian coup plotting and stressing the need for the Western powers to work in the same direction in Southeast Asia.

3) Governor Herter, while Acting Secretary, detailed our complaints over Gorce’s action to French Ambassador Alphand on March 4.³

4) Finally, Under Secretary Dillon told M. Joxe, Secretary General of the French Foreign Office, on April 22⁴ that Gorce could do considerably more than he had to date in disposing Sihanouk more favorably to the Free World and lessen suspicions of U.S. motivations in particular.

In not a single instance did the French attempt to defend Gorce and there have been some indirect indications of French dissatisfaction with him. However, Gorce has recently been in France (concurrently with Sihanouk’s visit), and we have heard no reports of his dismissal from the Phnom Penh post or of any change in his tactics.

An additional approach to the French in Paris may, nevertheless, be worthwhile. It is suggested that the approach be made to Couve or Joxe along the following lines, citing Department instructions:

1) Review the setback to the Free World position in Cambodia arising from the recent coup plots.

2) Reiterate U.S. non-involvement and refer to the efforts exerted by the U.S. to prevent a deterioration in Cambodia’s relations with Thailand and Viet-Nam, which served only to enhance the position of the Communists in Cambodia.

3) Note that Gorce on repeated occasions undertook unilaterally actions which had the effect of seriously undermining Cambodian confidence in the U.S. and of further weakening Sihanouk’s orientation toward the Free World.

4) Recall that U.S. concern over these actions by Gorce have been expressed to the French repeatedly and at a high level.

5) Emphasize that by reason of the favorable position enjoyed by France in Cambodia, French representatives there are in a particularly advantageous position to exert influence on Sihanouk.

6) Express U.S. concern over continued tension in the area, particularly between Cambodia and Viet-Nam, and explain that the U.S. regards an improvement in these relations to be of critical importance to prevent a further leftward drift in Cambodia, where Communist subversive potential and influence already has reached an alarming stage. An essential element in any move toward such an improvement is a more rational attitude on the part of Sihanouk toward the effects of his policies and actions on Cambodia’s Free World neighbors. While exercising extreme care and discretion in his relations with the Communists, Sihanouk does not hesitate to abuse his neighbors (and the U.S.). The strength of the Free World and assistance from the Free World are assets to Cambodia that cannot be eroded with impunity if Sihanouk honestly wishes to pursue a genuine neutral policy.

7) Urge the French Government to see that the extensive French influence in Cambodia is exercised so as to strengthen Sihanouk’s orientation toward the Free World, to alert him to the threat of the tightening Communist embrace, and to encourage him toward more rational relations with Cambodia’s Free World neighbors.

8) Suggest that toward this end particular attention be given to selection and guidance of French representatives in Cambodia.

C. U.S. Good Offices

Mr. Parsons suggests in effect that we be prepared to extend U.S. good offices in Cambodian-Vietnamese disputes under cautiously circumscribed conditions. It is believed that the exercise of U.S. influence in the area definitely is desirable whenever such action holds the promise of improving—or preventing a further deterioration in—relations between the two countries. Such action would appear to be in consonance with existing over-all policy of exerting our best efforts to promote friendly relations in the area short of involvement carrying the risk of further damage to the U.S. position. As Mr. Parsons points out, U.S. interests are perforce inextricably involved in Cambodian-Vietnamese relations. Recognizing the harm to these interests inherent in the Cambodian and Vietnamese reactions to their problems, we already have sought on several occasions to apply a moderating influence, particularly in connection with the recent coup plotting against Sihanouk. We are now considering further measures in this direction (A and B above). The desirability of U.S. involvement in specific issues in dispute, such as border incidents, should be judged on an ad hoc basis, taking into account the circumstances of each particular case and considering in particular whether such action holds a reasonable promise of reducing tensions or whether it would merely serve to incur resentment against the U.S. The basic antipathies on which Mr. Parsons remarked must lead us to consider very carefully, before extending our good offices, whether or not the two parties genuinely want to arrive at a settlement of the point at issue. At the same time, we should be on the alert for possibilities of assisting the two countries in reducing such specific problems (as for example border control, mentioned below) when it promises to remove a bone of contention and thereby contribute to a lessening of basic antagonisms.

D. Border Control Arrangements

While Mr. Parsons’ comment that the GVN has shown no responsiveness to reiterated suggestions from him and Ambassador Durbrow that it continue to seek a basis for negotiations with the RKG is discouraging, we believe our efforts in this direction should be maintained. The question of border control arrangements would seem to offer the best possibility at this time for some progress. It is the problem in Cambodian-Vietnamese relations of most interest to the GVN. Moreover, the reported RKG note to the GVN suggesting that the GVN supply information to the RKG whenever a dissident band is expected to cross into Cambodia indicates a more cooperative attitude by the RKG on this subject than in the past.

We believe we should try to convince the GVN that gradualism would be the best approach with the RKG on this problem. In view of the RKG rejection of the GVN’s hot-pursuit proposal and its sensitivity to any arrangement which smacks to it of a military alliance, it would seem best for the GVN to take the olive branch offered by the RKG and to start with the simple measure of establishing a system of exchange of information on dissident activities between the two governments. It may be that a cooperative arrangement would never mature beyond this step, but that could be seen after this first step was given a chance to operate.

Ambassador Trimble has suggested it may be preferable for arrangements re such exchange of information to be worked out at the military rather than the civilian level in order to avoid sabotage by Communist sympathizers in Cambodia and to take advantage of reasonably friendly relations between the GVN and RKG military staffs. This might depend upon feasibility on the Vietnamese side since the army had until recently been largely withdrawn from internal security duties. During the last few weeks, however, the army appears again to be assuming a more active role in this field, presumably because of the GVN’s concern with the deterioration in the situation.

1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 61 D 6, Vietnam. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Askew and Mendenhall, cleared by Jenkins, and sent through Parsons.
2. See Document 112.
3. The meeting was on March 3, not 4; see Document 105.
4. Reported in a memorandum of conversation, April 22. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)