Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

104. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, February 28, 1959—5 p.m.

1140. Reference: Deptel 761.²

My conversation with Sihanouk noon today was first one following his presentation evidence Dap Chhuon plot Siem Reap February 26.³ [3½ lines of source text not declassified] Furthermore, since it appears likely much of Sihanouk’s information about Dap Chhuon plot came from Red Chinese Ambassador I had to take into account that he probably feels indebted to Chinese for helping him break up plot which had his assassination as one object. Accordingly while holding to my instructions I spoke as follows:

I said I was profoundly shocked by what he had showed diplomatic corps at Siem Reap; that fortunately Dap Chhuon plot was discovered in time and government was able suppress it; and that I hoped MAAG’s contribution to effectiveness FARK had been element in government success. Sihanouk said trouble was not over yet by any means and that dissident forces were being assembled in Thailand and also at Loc Ninh Vietnam to continue action against Cambodia. I continued that, in events leading up to suppression of plot, it appeared from all evidence presented that Cambodia has been aggrieved party and that it was my hope he would not use this fact to aggravate situation further. I said US Government’s firm position was that modus vivendi among SEA nations was an absolute must; that I could assure him we had never ceased our energetic efforts to work for amicable relations in area through our Embassies in Bangkok and Saigon; that forbearance on Cambodia’s part at this point would be a great contribution to eventual settlement of SEA problems; and that he as leader of an SEA country, while defending his country, must not lose sight of his responsibility for maintenance peace and friendly relations in area.

Sihanouk broke in to say that he did not agree that he had a regional responsibility; that his reponsibility was toward Cambodia; that he would do his utmost to defend Cambodia in any situation and that Cambodia being the smallest of three countries, would certainly not be the aggressor. He added that things had happened recently in Thailand that he appreciated. For example a certain Thai magazine had prepared a full-scale attack on Cambodia and on himself personally and Thai Government had suppressed it. He was more optimistic with regard to his relations with Thai Government at present. In same breath he said that it was not of course, same with GVN.

Continuing, I referred to fact that in his letter to President Eisenhower, he had twice used words “Communist subversion”. He commented there is no more Communist subversion in Cambodia than in Thailand and Vietnam. I said in any event this Communist subversion to which he had referred was felt to be a very real danger in neighboring countries of SEA, and statements such as that attributed to him by Antara Djakarta caused real alarm in some places and placed additional obstacles in way our efforts promote better regional relations. I said I was therefore glad he had decided to publish denial that appeared Realites Cambodgiennes today (Embtel 1120).⁴ He pointed out it was not a denial but a correction. I agreed and said I hoped he would in other corrections show same spirit that he did in publishing this correction.

In concluding I expressed hope that his problem with Vietnam could be straightened out and that he would from this point on keep problem in diplomatic channels. He responded in a way that indicated he understood importance I placed on keeping subject in diplomatic channels but did not commit himself to do so.

Sihanouk was tense at beginning conversation which lasted half hour but relaxed noticeably as it proceeded. I think Department will appreciate that it is not quite reasonable to expect Sihanouk to be enthusiastic about regional relations at present.

Strom

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/2–2859. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Saigon and Bangkok.
2. In telegram 761, February 26, the Department instructed Strom to make an oral démarche to Sihanouk when delivering President Eisenhower’s interim reply of February 26. The proposed text of the démarche was sent from Strom through another channel and has not been found. (ibid., 751H.00/2–2658)
3. Sihanouk took the entire diplomatic corps, including South Vietnam’s representative, Ngo Trong Hieu, to Siem Reap on February 26 where he gave them a full exposition of the plot by Dap Chhuon, a tour of Dap Chhuon’s house, and a look at the material evidence of the attempted coup. Strom reported on the trip in telegram 1122 from Phnom Penh, Feburary 26. (Ibid., 123–Strom, Carl W.)

4. According to telegram 1120, February 26, Sihanouk’s correction of charges of SEATO intervention and attacks against Cambodia went as follows:

   “I have never criticized SEATO as such since I believe all countries entitled associate with others for purpose better assure defense. I only spoke as follows to my interviewer: ‘It hard to uncover Chinese subversion, which extremely discreet and impalpable, when I must spend my time combating overt subversion which is sponsored by two countries, one of which is member of SEATO, the other aligned with policy this organism’. I thus protested against attacks our neighbors but not against ‘attack by SEATO,’ which would be ridiculous since we have good friends among the adherents of this pact. What I cannot accept—and what, I hope, our Western friends will not accept either—is that money and arms given our neighbors in name common defense against Communism be diverted from these ends and employed to overthrow national regime of small country, monarchist and non-Communist.” (Ibid., 790.5/2–2659)