103. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State1
1107. Reference: Embassy telegram Presidential Handling 1088.2 Despite discouraging aspects situation, believe we can still prevent Cambodia slipping further to left. Full views this subject expressed to Department most recently in despatch 289 of February 17, 1959.3 Fact that Sihanouk turned to us in his distress is significant. I believe he is acting in good faith. I hope at least an interim reply in affirmative tone can be given soon. Since Prince gave British, French and Australian Ambassadors copies letter I have discussed it with them.
[Page 290]Gorce agrees with me on basic anti-Communist orientation Cambodia but like me foresees long and difficult period of insecurity as result Dap Chhuon dissidence. In spite earlier reports, it seems clear considerable number his men stayed with him although Puth Chay, Commander Kompong Thom in Fourth Region, has allegedly rallied to government with two companies. Dap Chhuon can be made nearly impotent if supplies can be denied him but this will require active cooperation Thais and Vietnamese. Even if this should be obtained, danger exists Red China or Viet Minh will find means of supplying him simply to continue insecurity and disorder. There is also danger that scattered groups in other provinces will be encouraged by Dap Chhoun example to go in for banditry. Prospect this regard is not attractive.
Australian Stuart believes U.S. must respond affirmatively to Sihanouk despite obvious difficulties ahead. He is emphatically of opinion Sihanouk [letter?] to President represents West’s last chance hold country with government in its present form. British Garner is in essential agreement with Stuart.
Jean Barre, French editor for Realites Cambodgiennes and close confidant of Prince has supplied commentary on statement to Antara. Barrett, Chief Political Section, has called on him many times but yesterday for first time Barre came to see Barrett.
Barre’s immediate object was to obtain, if possible, text of statement issued by Antara quoting Sihanouk’s remarks about SEATO. Text was given to him. Barre read statement and said Prince would be extremely angry about it and that there would be a public denial.
Barre indicated he had been one of authors of letter to President and was fully cognizant of Prince’s motives in writing it. He stressed Prince’s complete sincerity and genuine feeling desperation in case of negative U.S. response. Barre stated Prince realized appeal to Peking would mean end monarchy but this might be necessary to prevent split Cambodia between Vietnam and Thailand. Barre quoted Prince as saying, “President Eisenhower is our only salvation. There are other solutions but there is no other salvation”. Prince anticipates possibility guerrilla warfare and serious insecurity in Cambodia.
Barrett and Barre discussed difference between this appeal to U.S. which was submitted without publicity and appeal last summer in case of Stung Treng incident which was given maximum publicity. Barre stated that Prince would not make this appeal public until clear U.S. would give negative response.
Barre also gave impression (as had Son Sann in my interview yesterday) Prince’s fear his remarks re SEATO in Djakarta might prejudice U.S. reply his letter. Prince apparently plans make public denial these remarks in hope appease Washington feelings.
[Page 291]Barre further commented that Prince planned to make statement soon that in his opinion RTG had pulled out of Bangkok plot since resumption relations but that certain initiatives had been set in motion which RTG could no longer control.
Request Department in its discretion pass Bangkok, Saigon.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/2–2559. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling.↩
- See Document 100.↩
- included in the microfiche supplement. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51H/2–1359)↩