96. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 7, 1960, 3 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Call by Pakistan Ambassador: Trend of Indus Waters Negotiations
PARTICIPANTS
- H.E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
- Mr. Najmul Saqib Khan, Third Secretary, Pakistan Embassy
- Mr. G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary, NEA
- Mr. Frederic P. Bartlett, Director, SOA
- Mr. William F. Spengler, SOA
During a conversation on a number of subjects of current interest to his government (see separate memoranda),2 Ambassador Ahmed referred to the Indus Waters negotiations currently in progress in Washington. He stated that, after some hesitancy, he had decided to inform Mr. Jones of the latest trend in these crucial negotiations over which his government had become deeply concerned.
By way of background, the Ambassador stated that agreement had been reached between Pakistan and India some time ago, through the good offices of the IBRD, on most of the terms of a basic water treaty. Only the so-called “interim arrangements” (i.e., the division of Indus Waters during the first ten years while the GOP was constructing its replacement works) remained to be settled. These arrangements had been under active negotiation for several months. However, about two or three months ago the Bank had concluded that a deadlock had been reached. Under the circumstances Pakistan had suggested that the IBRD present India and Pakistan with a proposal for interim arrangements on a “take it or leave it basis”. This the Bank did, but Mr. Gulhati (the chief Indian negotiator) had refused to accept it. The Bank continued its efforts to mediate the question. The Pakistanis, however, had begun to suspect that the Bank might now be prone to take the minimum Indian terms and present them to Pakistan as its own proposal. Their suspicions, he said, had been borne out when the President of the IBRD had informed Mueenuddin (the chief Pakistan negotiator) two days ago that the Bank had decided “to try to beat India down as far as possible” and then to offer the new Indian terms to [Page 211] Pakistan on a “take it or leave it basis”. If Pakistan rejected these terms, instead of breaking off the negotiations the Bank would invite the Pakistan Finance Minister to London for private talks.
Ambassador Ahmed stated that, in a sense, the interim arrangements were more important than the final provisions of the treaty since the interim period of the next five or six years would be crucial in terms of Pakistan’s water requirements. He and Mr. Mueenuddin not only thought Mr. Gulhati’s position unfair but suspected that the agreement which Messrs. Gulhati and Iliff had reached did not really reflect the official position of the Indian Government. Evidence which the GOP had developed indicated that the GOI did not want the negotiations to fail over the issue of interim arrangements and that the GOI position on this question was actually flexible. Gulhati, however, had been pressing for more than his government was willing to settle for, and had objected to referring the matter back to his government on the ground that he possessed complete authority to deal with the question.
Another matter which he (Ambassador Ahmed) wished to bring to Mr. Jones’ personal attention was the fact that the Bank’s engineers had been under heavy pressure from Mr. Iliff to substantiate the latter’s views concerning the uses of the waters of the three western rivers. Bank engineers, in fact, had privately termed Mr. Iliff’s attitude “outrageously unfair”. When Mr. Iliff had learned that Pakistani representatives had been talking directly with the Bank’s engineers, he had instructed the latter to avoid contact with the Pakistanis.
All this, the Ambassador continued, left Pakistan very disturbed. Pakistan feared that the eventual Bank proposal would turn out to be not what the Government of India wanted but what Mr. Gulhati personally wanted, and that it was not likely to be acceptable to Pakistan. If Pakistan were going to have to reject the Bank’s proposal—and it did not now appear that a fair proposal would emerge—it desired that the breakdown in negotiations not be blamed on Pakistan.
The Ambassador declared that he did not know what the U.S. Government could do to “save the situation”. Above all, he did not want his remarks to get back to Mr. Black in such a way as to cause him to think that Pakistan did not have confidence in his fairness or was trying to apply pressure on the Bank. He added, however, that it might help save the situation if the U.S. Government could somehow persuade the Bank to refer the question back to the Government of India for further consideration.
Mr. Bartlett asked the Ambassador if it were not true that Mr. Black had just written to the Governments of India and Pakistan on the matter. The Ambassador replied that he understood Mr. Black had done so.
[Page 212]Mr. Jones thanked the Ambassador and added that Mr. Mueenuddin had just provided Mr. Bartlett with similar information. As the Ambassador knew, we had deliberately “kept our distance” and had left the conduct of the negotiations entirely up to the IBRD. In a larger sense, however, we were intensely interested in the problem and were already deeply committed with the U.S. Congress in supporting financially the anticipated agreement. We hoped the negotiations would be successfully concluded.