83. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, October 9, 19591
SUBJECT
- Pakistan Foreign Minister Qadir’s Call on the President
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- His Excellency, Manzur Qadir, Minister Foreign Affairs, Pakistan
- His Excellency, Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States
- His Excellency, Mohammed Ikramullah, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan
- The Honorable Christian A., Herter, Secretary of State
- The Honorable G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA
After the Pakistani party had been seated Mr. Qadir began by thanking the President for the deep honor of being received by him.2 He thought holding the CENTO Conference in Washington clearly had been useful.
The President promptly introduced the subject of Pakistani-Indian relations and the remainder of the discussion was largely devoted to this.
The President said that almost two years ago he had had a most interesting talk with Mr. Nehru who had spoken “very reasonably” on the subject of Indian-Pakistani relations.3 He had told the President that he thought all outstanding problems with Pakistan were susceptible to being resolved by peaceful negotiations if good will existed on [Page 188] both sides. The truth of the matter was that there was no great difference between the people of Pakistan and the people of India, although the former were mostly Moslems. They had grown up on the same continent and had the same tastes and the same aims. Highly placed on Mr. Nehru’s staff was a Moslem whose brother occupied a similarly important position in Pakistan. The partition line had separated families and this state of affairs, Mr. Nehru thought, could and would be taken care of by negotiation. Mr. Nehru had told the President he thought the British bore an important share of the responsibility for partition in that by following a “divide and rule policy” they had encouraged the Moslems to think of themselves as being separate and different.
Mr. Qadir said that he was glad to hear that Mr. Nehru had spoken to the President in these terms. He could confirm that there was much truth in what Mr. Nehru had said, although he might have glossed over the length of time in which the British had followed the “divide and rule” policy; this went back 50–60 years. Mr. Qadir then told the President of the meeting, at the instigation of President Ayub, which took place last month at the airport in Delhi between President Ayub and Mr. Nehru.4 The former had indicated that there were three basic questions which had to be settled—Indus waters, Kashmir and the borders. Mr. Nehru had not been forthcoming on the last two, but under the aegis of the World Bank progress was being made as regards the Indus waters. On October 14, Mr. Qadir had just been informed, there would be a meeting between the Minister of Interior of Pakistan and an Indian negotiating group, presumably to discuss border questions.
The President commented that Kashmir always remained as a “sore thumb”.
Mr. Qadir said that this was the case and that nothing would please Pakistan more than if some outside party would adjudicate the Kashmir problem. Pakistan had brought this before the Security Council, but the USSR had exercised its veto. Because of a clause in the Commonwealth Agreement Pakistan and India were stopped from taking their case to the International Court. It had been agreed that members of the Commonwealth would not have recourse to this Court.
The President recalled that his old friend, Admiral Nimitz,5 had been appointed in this connection to the plebiscite in Kashmir and that he had waited around for two years for something to happen.
[Page 189]The President reverted to his conversation with Mr. Nehru and spoke of the suspicion with which India regarded the Pakistani military establishment.
Mr. Qadir admitted that this suspicion existed and attributed it to the fact that, being more numerous and having taken the larger part of the country, the Indians had a suspicion that sooner or later the Pakistanis would endeavor to recover militarily what they had been forced to give up. This, of course, was unrealistic but nonetheless the Indians felt that they must have armed forces three times the size of those of Pakistan in order to be secure.
The President recalled an incident in which the UK had been forced to rush to India some Canberra bombers to ease the Indian minds following the rumor (untrue at the time), that the United States was giving Pakistan some light bombers.
The Secretary also recalled this incident and said that Mr. Krishna Menon had come to see him and had been told the truth about what we had supplied to Pakistan. Mr. Menon had insisted he knew better.
The President asked Mr. Qadir whether he thought the attitude of India towards communism was not undergoing some degree of change owing to the incidents along the Chicom-Indian frontier.
Mr. Qadir replied that he had just seen Mr. Krishna Menon, Minister of Defense of India, in New York and that the latter had minimized the frontier incidents as being unimportant and said that if occupation of territory was to be the criterion of aggressive intention, then Pakistan was more at fault than the Chicoms since Pakistan occupied in Kashmir a larger area than that involved in the recent disputes. On the other hand, said Mr. Qadir, reports from India via Karachi indicate that the Indian people are becoming aroused. He thought this a good thing since the menace lay in the north and the subcontinent should, ideally speaking, be defended by both India and Pakistan.
The President agreed that the danger lies clearly in the north and welcomed the signs that public opinion in India seems to recognize this progressively. He thought nothing was gained by India and Pakistan being suspicious of each other’s intentions; in their defense planning they should look northward. The President indicated that he would like to be of any help he could in relieving the tensions between India and Pakistan.
Mr. Qadir replied that he hoped the President would be able to find means to do this. The counsel of the United States would be even more effective now that India is so deeply beholden to the U.S. for so much economic assistance. He mentioned the Kashmir problem and the Indus waters problem as being areas in which suspicions persist and in which U.S. counsel of moderation might be useful.
[Page 190]Mr. Qadir gave a lengthy exposé of the complex problem of the Indus waters, but summed up by saying that all these complexities were resolvable by quiet negotiation in an atmosphere of good will.
The President said he was delighted to hear this. He was giving a great deal of thought to the problems of South Asia, which has a special importance “now that China is gone”.
Mr. Qadir stressed the hope the President would find it possible to visit Pakistan if he visited the area. The President said that he would do so if he could. He was very interested in the area.
The talk lasted approximately 48 minutes.
Mr. Qadir did not raise the question of Pushtunistan or Afghanistan–Pakistan relations.
Mr. Qadir was deeply touched (he told me so) by the President’s thoughtfulness in giving him a colored portrait photograph and by the entire manner in which he and his delegation have been received in Washington.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.90D11/10–1759. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jones on October 13 and approved by the White House on October 17. Another copy of this memorandum of conversation is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Herter briefed Eisenhower for this meeting in a memorandum of September 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.90D11/9–2959)↩
- Qadir was in Washington for the seventh Ministerial Council meeting of CENTO, held October 6–9; see Document 369.↩
- Reference is presumably to the Nehru–Eisenhower conversation of December 19, 1956; a memorandum of that conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. VIII, pp. 331–340.↩
- See Document 81.↩
- Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.↩