Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

61. Memorandum of a Conversation, London, January 19, 1959¹

London, January 19, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Henry Lintott, K.C.M.G., Deputy Undersecretary of State, CRO
• H.A.F. Rumbold, C.M.G., C.I.E., Assistant Undersecretary of State, CRO
• W.A.W. Clark, Superintending Undersecretary, Foreign Affairs Division, CRO
• H.A. Twist, O.B.E., Head South Asian Department, CRO
• R.P. Heppel, Head Southeast Asian Department, Foreign Office
• H.S.H. Stanley, South Asia and Far East Department, CRO
• J.J.B. Hunt, CRO
• F.P. Bartlett, Director SOA, State Department
• F.J. Galbraith, First Secretary of Embassy

SUBJECT

• India–Pakistan Relations

Mr. Galbraith had arranged with Mr. Twist of CRO for an informal meeting and exchange of views between CRO and Mr. Bartlett of the Department who was passing through London on January 19. Mr. Galbraith had understood that Mr. Twist would arrange for the attendance at the meeting, along with himself and Mr. Stanley of the South Asian Department, of the Superintending Undersecretary, Foreign Affairs Division, CRO, Mr. Clark. Both Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Galbraith were somewhat surprised to find the meeting heavier in both rank and numbers than had been anticipated. They concluded that this was an indication both of the importance which CRO attached to the opportunity for an informal exchange of views on this subject, and of the weight which CRO wanted to give to the views which they were able to express to Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. Bartlett outlined for those present the current trends of US thinking on India-Pakistan relations, especially as they are affected by the problems of Kashmir, arms limitation and Canal Waters.

Mr. Bartlett began by stating that he thought it was pretty well accepted in the US that India was a member in good standing of the free world despite her neutrality (in fact there was the feeling in some quarters that it would not be desirable to change India’s foreign policy even if it were possible in view of the heavy defense burdens which would evolve should such a change take place). He said it was no longer a very important or widely held view that Prime Minister Nehru was some kind of “fellow traveler or crypto-Communist”. At the same time, the US wants to continue its close and friendly relations with Pakistan and, in fact, to improve those relations if possible, including closer cooperation in the Baghdad Pact. He said the US is having some difficulty, in the absence of any tangible and material contribution, to convince the Paks and others in the Baghdad Pact that we are offering anything new in our bi-laterals now under negotiation. The US has shown its sympathy for the situation in which the Pakistanis found themselves which brought them to install a dictatorial kind of government and we seek to encourage the Ayub regime to under take land, fiscal and economic reform, looking toward an eventual restoration of civilian control. The US views fiscal and economic re-form as of especial importance to the programs which it supports in Pakistan. Educational, and other types of social reform the US views as more of an internal problem.

The “package proposal” which the US had put forward last year had not had a very good reception from Nehru who had not felt that there was a sufficiently stable government in Pakistan to warrant an expectation that the three large areas of trouble between the two countries could be negotiated and an agreement reached. In retrospect, Mr. Bartlett thought, it seemed that Mr. Nehru was right. Although, Mr. Bartlett added, it could not be said that General Ayub would not have honored any agreements which might have been reached by former Prime Minister Noon. But it now seems that these things were going to be dealt with by the US Government, as it were in seriatim. This is the way it seems to be working out, Mr. Bartlett said.

With respect to Canal Waters, Mr. Bartlett said that he had talked to Iliff of the World Bank on two occasions just shortly before Mr. Bartlett had left the US. Iliff had seemed reasonably optimistic, in fact Iliff himself had said that he was more optimistic now than he had been at any other time. He had given Mr. Bartlett on a strictly confidential basis very rough outlines of the plan for settlement of the Canal Waters problem which the Bank plans to put forward now that the proposals and counter proposals of India and Pakistan have reached a deadlock. Mr. Bartlett said he had given a résumé of his talk with Iliff to Mr. Bottomley of the British Embassy in Washington who had doubtless communicated it to CRO. CRO officials present indicated that they had received Mr. Bottomley’s report but that they were not clear on some of the figures. Mr. Bartlett said that the plan the Bank has now is to approach the US, UK, and Canadian Governments in about two months concerning their willingness to finance part of the foreign exchange costs. Mr. Bartlett said the US would not, at that time, probably be able to make any legal commitment but that we hoped to be able to express our sympathy for and our desire and intention to support the plan. He said the Bank plan will call for storage at Mangla and on the Beas at a total cost of approximately $616 million of which approximately $300 million would be in foreign exchange. Of this, the UK and Canada would be asked to contribute $50 million, India $50 million, the World Bank $50 million and the US the rest. The total amount for India in rupees and in foreign currency would be $212 million which would be the exact estimated cost of their Mauru Tunnel proposal. Mr. Bartlett said that Iliff hoped to have reasonably firm commitments from the US, the UK, and Canada and to be in a position to indicate the amount that the Bank would put up before broaching the plan to the Pakistanis and the Indians. He said the plan would, it was thought, be quite acceptable to the Pakistanis. The thought was that Eugene Black would be able to go to Nehru and offer him a plan which was reasonably complete. In this way it was thought that Nehru could be persuaded not to gag at some of the details one of which involved the furnishing by India of some of its storage waters on the Beas. Mr. Rumbold questioned Mr. Bartlett about some of the figures which had been contained in Mr. Bottomley’s report and Mr. Bartlett attempted to clarify them. Mr. Bartlett said, however, that he had only had a glance at the figures and was discussing them from memory and that Mr. Bottomley would soon have an opportunity to hear from Iliff the same sort of report that Iliff had given Bartlett. It was thought that perhaps out of this would come some additional details of what the Bank has in mind.

Mr. Rumbold also raised a question about the Bank’s tactics of presenting its proposals to the Indians and Pakistanis only after financing had been arranged. Mr. Rumbold wondered if this would not suggest to the Pakistanis and the Indians that this plan was something that had been cooked up between the Bank and the countries financing a part of the cost. Mr. Bartlett stressed the importance of not divulging to either the Indians or the Pakistanis the fact that discussions had taken place before they had been informed of the plan. Sir Harry Lintott said that he tended to agree with Mr. Rumbold that these might not be the best tactics. But everyone agreed after some further discussion that both the US and the UK had been wise and correct in following a policy of strict “hands off” as far as the Bank’s negotiations were concerned. It was concluded that this policy of strict impartiality and nonintervention should be continued. Mr. Bartlett said this could be the Bank’s last attempt to settle the difficult Canal Waters problem.

Mr. Bartlett then discussed briefly the defense situation of the sub-continent. He said the US viewed the defense of India and Pakistan very much as the British had always seen it, namely as a unit. He said it made no sense at all for India and Pakistan to go on putting their substance into military defense aimed at each other and where their armed forces were mostly in the Punjab facing each other rather than disposed on their borders and in other locations which would constitute a defense of their countries. They should in fact plan their defense together and have some kind of agreement on mutual defense, with a neutral Afghanistan as a buffer. He said he had recently been reading Curzon’s “Russia in Central Asia”, written in 1889, which put forward a thesis that applied very much today. He said that discussion had been going on at working level in Washington about what the US should do in the way of additional military assistance for Pakistan. He said military assistance under the 1954 Agreement had mostly been completed and that what would be discussed next would be the level of assistance for fiscal years 1960, 61, and 62. He said it is current thinking at his level that the US should not add any more to the divisions disposed by Pakistan but should in the future contribute only to maintenance (POL and training ammunition) and to a certain amount of modernization. It was the modernization that was difficult because of the question about where modernization left off and an actual increase in fire power began. But it was hoped that this could be worked out and the Pakistanis persuaded to freeze their forces at the present level. If this could be done and at the same time India could be persuaded not to buy any more military equipment which would increase its firepower, then you could have in the area what would amount to a de facto arms limitation agreement. If both sides could be got to agree that for a period of two or three years they would freeze their forces at the current level if the other one did, it could constitute the accomplishment of the second component of what had been envisaged under the package proposal on arms limitation.

There was some discussion of how this would be put to the Indians in a context which would not smack of interference with India’s sovereignty. Mr. Bartlett said the gist of the idea was that both sides would be persuaded to take this unilateral action so long as the other side persisted in not adding to its armaments. At any time one side abandoned this freeze, all bets would be off. The idea seemed to be a new one to CRO officials and there was some headshaking among them but no further discussion of this subject.

Mr. Bartlett said the remaining problem was, of course, Kashmir. He said no one had any very good ideas on that. CRO officials jokingly commented that they had hoped that he would have brought the answer to that problem. Discussion ensued of just what the Pakistanis had in mind in threatening to take the issue into the Security Council at this time. Mr. Clark said CRO had been wondering if this was not purposely timed by Pakistan to coincide with the upcoming crucial juncture of the Canal Waters talks, to put a kind of pressure on the US and the UK to extend themselves financially for some more generous solution to Canal Waters than might otherwise have been possible. Mr. Bartlett said it seemed the worst possible timing to have going on when the IBRD would be trying to get the two parties together for agreement on Canal Waters, a Security Council debate, which would likely be acrimonious, between other representatives of the two countries in the UN. Both British and American representatives present agreed that the US and UK had identical policies of wanting to discourage the Pakistanis from introducing Kashmir in the next Security Council meeting and in encouraging instead resort to bilateral negotiations. It seemed that the Pakistanis should recognize that there would be little to be gained in forcing Kashmir into the Security Council and provoking a Soviet veto. Mr. Galbraith wondered if the Pakistanis were really as determined to put Kashmir before the Security Council next April as their Ambassadors in London and Washington had given to understand. He said that latest reports from Karachi indicated that possibly Pakistan had merely been sounding out the US and the other governments and had not yet decided definitely on the next step. Sir Harry Lintott asked what possible motive there could have been behind the instructed approach by the Ambassadors if this were true. Mr. Galbraith said he supposed it would be just the new government’s familiarizing itself with its various problems and possibilities.

Mr. Bartlett said he would be returning through London in about four weeks time after trips in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Afghanistan. Mr. Galbraith said that he would try to arrange a meeting with some of the people in CRO for a discussion of Mr. Bartlett’s impressions upon his return.

Following the meeting with the officials named above, Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Galbraith paid a brief courtesy call on Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Permanent Undersecretary in CRO. Sir Gilbert indicated his awareness of the report by Mr. Bottomley about Mr. Bartlett’s talks with Iliff, and he expressed his appreciation for Mr. Bartlett’s having made the information available to CRO. Sir Gilbert stressed perhaps even more than had been done in the previous meeting the importance of avoiding any discussion of Kashmir in the Security Council because of the likely devastating effect it would have on the promising negotiations which the World Bank was conducting on Canal Waters. Both Sir Gilbert and Mr. Bartlett agreed there was reason for some optimism, as expressed by Iliff, with his having got down to discussing amounts of dollars and acre feet, etc. Sir Gilbert said a Canal Water settlement was absolutely vital to Pakistan and he hoped they would recognize it. He said he hoped both India and Pakistan would also recognize the danger to their own interests of prejudicing their relations with the Bank. He said they not only relied on the Bank for part of the financing of the Canal Water settlement but for other financing of their economic development. Sir Gilbert was emphatic in stating that we should if necessary come down very hard on the Pakistanis to dissuade them from raising Kashmir at this time. He said a Canal Waters settlement would to some extent perhaps relieve the Kashmir issue, since it is because of the relationship of Kashmir to Pakistan’s water supply that makes Kashmir so important to her.

1. Source: Department of State, SOA Files: Lot 62 D 43, SOA General—1959. Secret. Drafted by Galbraith.