Office of the Historian

565. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1

Bangkok, November 12, 1960—7 p.m.

848. Embtel 768, Deptel 624 and Embtel 795.2 Yesterday morning Thanat asked to see me and then said that in spite his previous statement to me that message contained Deptel 624 was satisfactory, PriMin was still concerned and wanted something more. Thanat said that he argued unsuccessfully with the PriMin about this matter as he, Thanat, felt statement given him in accordance Deptel 624 entirely satisfactory (although never specifically stated by Thanat have feeling Wichit had put PriMin up to this and Thanat was considerably provoked).

Thanat showed me type of statement PriMin had in mind, which read as follows:

“The Government of the USA and the Govt of Thailand, sharing the view that the present situation in Laos may develop in a way that it may become a threat to the security of the free world, particularly if actions of the two governments are not coordinated with a view to ensuring that the situation in Laos remain in reasonable conditions, agree to the following:

1.
The Govt of the USA and the Govt of Thailand will consult and co-ordinate their actions so as to save Laos from the influence of and control by the Communists. Neither party will take action without [Page 1157] prior consultation and agreement of the other party. The Govt of Thailand will make efforts to provide adequate personnel and the Govt of the USA will ensure the success of any contemplated action by furnishing material and financial support. Such support will not have the effect of curtailing and reducing assistance already extended to Thailand prior to this agreement.
2.
If circumstances similar to those which took place in Laos should occur in Thailand, the Govt of the USA pledges its support in every possible way to actions which may be taken by the Govt of Thailand under the premiership of F.M. Srisdi Dhanarajata so that these occurrences may be circumscribed and brought to an end as soon as possible.
3.
In case aggression is launched against Thailand as the result of actions specified in clauses 1 and 2, the Govt of the USA will consider such aggression or attack to be aggression or attack against the US itself and will take without delay appropriate measures both in military and political fields to ward off such attack or aggression.”

During course of my approach to PriMin this morning he again brought up matter.

During course long discussion it gradually emerged that PriMin’s point was that operation which was background to statement contained Deptel 624 was outside SEATO framework and therefore SEATO should not be mentioned in statement. Apparently what he also had in mind was that operation might well be only first step in US-Thai involvement in Laos and having taken that step he wanted to be sure we would go all the way. I deprecated this interpretation pointing out that its very value lay in fact could be disavowed by both of us and did not necessarily commit either of us to future course of action. Regarded it in same light as US–PEO advisers with FAL. After long discussion he finally agreed that points of 2 and 3 above were met by statement contained Deptel 624 and in my approach today. With respect to point 1, I said this appeared to be only affirmation existing situation. He agreed but was still insistent on statement of some kind. Matter was left that Thanat and I will attempt work out some wording point 1 that would be acceptable incorporating by reference message Deptel 624 and my approach today. My present thinking is to do this in form aide-mémoire. Point 1 will of course require considerable rewording which I will undertake but believe there value in committing Thais to consultation and coordination with US. This of course requires reciprocal wording on our part but do not feel problem insurmountable. Of course will not agree to anything without approval Dept and will submit my thoughts on draft soonest. However if in meanwhile Dept has any observations would welcome them.

Johnson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1260. Top Secret; Priority.↩
  2. Telegram 624 is printed as Document 560; regarding telegram 768, see footnote 2 thereto. Telegram 795 is printed as Document 561.↩