Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

529. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 29, 1959—noon.

662. GVN Foreign Office sent to Embassy August 27 full text its note August 22 to RTG protesting RTG–NVN Red Cross accord on VN refugees in Thailand². Covering confidential message states copy note for information US Government because matter of interest free world as well as Vietnam and Thailand since United Front against communism in Asia placed in question.

Note expresses GVN keen disappointment with accord, and states RTG by negotiations and accord with NVN has ignored friendly relations with GVN and disregarded GVN efforts to find solution refugee problem.

Detailed summary given of GVN efforts to solve problem since opening of its legation in Bangkok in 1951 (including offer shortly after signature Geneva accords to accept all refugees wishing to go to SVN, request that rest wishing remain Thailand be accorded immigrant status, and proposal to open consulates in northeastern Thailand). Reference also made to renewal these proposals in December 1958 and to GVN insistence on neutralization VC cadres before start repatriation. These proposals said to have met same fate as earlier ones and RTG, instead of examining them, decided on removal all refugees from Thailand and started negotiations with Viet-Minh. Note declares GVN could not accept alternatives of repatriation all refugees or allowing them to be evacuated to NVN. Reference made to proposals presented Thai Foreign Minister during recent visit, which remain unanswered.

Note also makes following points: RTG–NVN accord contrary accepted principles international law since RTG in establishing diplomatic relations with GVN accepted latter as jurisdiction over all Vietnamese in Thailand. Also contrary international refugee convention³ and Universal Declaration of Rights of Man. Repatriation under conditions of accord would injure refugees economically and would subject them to regime of terror in North Vietnam. Accord rather than attaining Thai objectives gives propaganda weapon to NVN by increasing its prestige among refugees and enabling it through dilatory tactics to draw maximum psychological advantage from existence of accord and presence two Viet-Minh observers in Bangkok. It will not prevent subversion since cadres will be left on spot or reinfiltrated into Thailand.

Note concludes accord is highly regrettable because it ignores good relations between Vietnam and Thailand to advantage their common enemy—Communism.

Essence of note carried by Vietnam Presse. Complete text being pouched.

Comment: RTG–NVN accord and strongly worded GVN protest likely cause severe strain in GVN–RTG relations for some time. Lengthy summary GVN proposals over years for solution problem designed show GVN has taken constructive attitude toward question. Allusions conditions awaiting refugees repatriated NVN represent effort contain extent NVN psychological victory in achieving accord with Thai. Embassy agrees accord will not really solve subversion problem for Thailand.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 292.51G22/8–2959. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok.
2. Not printed.
3. Presumably reference is to the Final Act and Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees agreed to by the U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons in 1951.