Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

526. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, August 14, 1959—6 p.m.

353. Following is summary article Bangkok Post August 13 from “authoritative sources” on status Thai-DRV Red Cross negotiations in Rangoon for repatriation Vietnamese refugees:

Draft agreement for repatriation expected signed soon and movement to start immediately after, chiefly by sea, owing current situation Laos. TG will let DRV Red Cross representatives enter country “to cooperate in operation”. Thai delegate to talks returned Bangkok and reported to cabinet August 11. Said DRV willing share cost with Thailand; DRV proposed evacuation rate 1,000 per month but on insistence Prime Minister Sarit Thailand will counterpropose 2,000; delegations agreed only Vietnamese volunteering go DRV would be evacuated, and “regular” residence Thailand would be permitted stay; DRV agreed accept in first group Vietnamese now under arrest for Communist activity, but would not object if Thailand wishes court trials. Thai delegate returned Rangoon August 12.

Meanwhile, GVN reported still delaying evacuation refugees who wish go South Vietnam by insisting preliminary “brainwashing” (article explains term used by “high Vietnamese officials”) to eliminate any Communist ideas, and other measures which would hold up evacuation for year.

Article then quoted Interior Minister Praphat: “With us no other problem than getting Vietnamese out of country. We Want evacuate in as just manner as possible. Red Cross societies of two countries will handle evacuation; governments will have nothing to do with it. If no new obstacle, agreement expected to be signed shortly in Rangoon.” Said in response DRV request Thailand will permit some of Vietnamese themselves (presumably refugees) to join staff of headquarters set up to direct operation. “If necessary for DRV Red Cross representatives come here to cooperate in operation, we will permit them do so. We Want do everything make evacuation successful.” Regarding arrested refugees: “We Want send them back in first lot. We will not try them in court.”

Comment: Embassy has not yet been able confirm accuracy of article, but on basis Rangoon telegram 137 (14 to Bangkok, not repeated other addressees)² and earlier conversations Thai officials here, assure it substantially correct account present status.

Appears DRV heading toward substantial propaganda, political and diplomatic success which will probably see DRV mission, albeit ostensibly Red Cross, installed SEATO capital for extended period. Even at evacuation rate 2,000 per month mission would be here at least one year before even half refugees evacuated, and probably considerably longer given possibilities for “reasonable delays” in getting physical movement started.

DRV “presence” Bangkok probably not appreciably add to Communist subversive capabilities, since Thai officials alert to problem and expected exercise surveillance. Some damage will, however, result from “recognition” by Thailand and increased respectability accruing to DRV to detriment of GVN. Moreover, if DRV plays hand well, can stretch repatriation over many months and halt or slow down operation at will by passing word among refugees to stop “volunteering” for repatriation, and in end there may, in fact, be no full solution refugee problem.

GVN reaction cannot be judged here, but we would expect at very least development undesirable tension Thai-GVN relations.

For present, Embassy sees no US role beyond appropriate warnings to Thailand as occasions presented and perhaps continuation effort bring some cooperative attitude on part GVN. Any US efforts to divert Thailand from what appears to them to be reasonable prospect of eliminating an obvious threat to their security, threats sharpened by recent events in Laos, would place burden of alternate solution squarely on US.

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 292.51G22/8–1459. Confidential. Repeated to Rangoon, Saigon, Tokyo, CINCPAC for POLAD, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila.
2. Telegram 137 from Rangoon, August 10, reported on a conversation with Dr. Chalerm: “When asked whether Laos situation had affected talks replied ‘only indirectly’ and did not elaborate. Cheerful appearance conveyed impression he thinks he had done his job well.” (Ibid., 292.51G22/8–1059)