Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

524. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State¹

Rangoon, August 5, 1959—9 a.m.

125. Embtel 68, repeated Bangkok 6.² Doctor Chalerm, Thai Delegate to Thai-North Vietnam (NVN) refugee talks, told Embassy officers July 31 he expects finish talks by August 8.

Said while clear NVN main desire is to get “their people” into Thailand he did not think failure achieve this objective would cause the break off talks or allow them collapse at last moment. He reasserted his determination resist all attempts NVN find way introduce official mission into Thailand. As example said had achieved agreement screening potential repatriates would be done by Thai and ICRC with NVN participation limited to “observation” teams elected from Vietnamese already in Thailand who apt to return NVN. Thai would select such team and ensure they not capable applying duress.

Attempts by Embassy officers induce Chalerm be specific re status discussion disposal of property and financial arrangements for transportation unavailing. He agreed disposal of property is important problem. Said air and ocean transport had been agreed with, air for ill and aged. Cost charter flights direct to Hanoi (he mentioned Indian Airways and SAS as possibilities) would average 14000 ticals per head. Said both governments had agreed waive landing charges. Re ocean transport his only comment was “very expensive”.

When asked about apparent differences between his remarks and Bangkok press items appearing from time to time re progress of talks he replied Bangkok usually about three days late in its information.

Comment: Doctor Chalerm seemed think had clear idea just where he and NVN stand. Said Communist tactics had been just what he had been told expect. Appeared fully aware political implications all matters discussed and of efforts by NVN obtain de facto recognition “their people”. When Embassy officer asked Chalerm whether NVN would cause talks collapse he said thought they would not but suggested indecision whether Thai Government might do so, perhaps because of growing suspicion his part that Thai Government never prepared conclude agreement on limited terms he has been negotiating and which he now seems to consider within reach. Re repatriation to South Vietnam said “of course, this not Red Cross matter. We have relations with them and so matter should be taken up on government-to-government level”.

Chalerm disclaimed any special personal interest in matter, saying he was picked accompany Durand of ICRC on earlier survey of refugee areas only because he spoke English and French and selected for present job on same basis.³

McConaughy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 292.51G22/8–559. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok.
2. Telegram 68, July 21, reported on the earlier stages of the refugee talks in which Chalerm was said to have characterized the negotiations as “tough.” (Ibid., 292.51G22/7–2159)

3. Telegram 160 from Rangoon, August 14, reported on the talks, which ended on August 14, as follows:

   “In conversation with Emb officer, [Chalerm] said North Vietnamese apparently willing take all refugees who elect return there. Said no figure mentioned although preliminary Thai–ICRC survey indicated ninety percent of estimated 48,000 total would elect return. Gave affirmative response to probing re Thai readiness accept North Vietnamese mission in Bangkok in connection with repatriation. When asked what he thought of chances agreement being useful, replied not too hopeful.” (Ibid., 292.5 1G22/8–459)