Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

522. Letter From the Ambassador in Thailand (Johnson) to the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher)¹

Bangkok, June 29, 1959.

Dear Eric: I have received and carefully studied your letter of June 11 on the Thai opium problem.²

As you know from our previous correspondence I have been extremely interested in looking for ways in which we would at least be able to make a start in doing something about this repellent business. I am particularly disappointed that the arrangements for the stationing of a US Customs Service man in Bangkok, that I discussed with Mr. Strubinger,³ have not yet worked out. I and other members of the staff, particularly Bob Jantzen,⁴ always take advantage of the opportunities we have in conversations with Praphat and others to give them to understand that we are aware of the opium traffic and regard it with much disfavor. However, it has not been possible for us to utilize the very extensive and valuable information [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] developed in this field because of the sensitivity of the sources.

While, as Chang Lan-chen claimed, I believe that there is a certain amount of sincerity on Sarit’s part in suppressing opium consumption in Thailand, I do not believe that it necessarily follows that there is a corresponding interest in suppressing the very lucrative traffic from and through Thailand to other countries. In fact, I am inclined to believe that with the present reduction of revenue from other sources resulting from his anti-corruption campaign, he and the military group are now more dependent than ever on the profits from opium exports.

Thus we must separate the opium problem in Thailand into two aspects which are somewhat separate from each other. The first is the question of the growing and consumption within Thailand and the second is the traffic through Thailand of opium grown in the Burma–Laos–Communist China triangle for which Thailand is the natural export route.

I am inclined to believe that the latter problem is the largest and most difficult for which to find a solution.

The experience of Iran has a certain amount of applicability to the first aspect of the problem, that is the growing and consumption of opium within Thailand. With the presently announced policy of the government I believe that we have a valid basis for making an approach to them offering our assistance, and I would be willing to do so. I would think that probably the best first step would be for me to offer to have Mr. Williams⁵ come out here to talk with them, discussing his experience in Iran. If they accept this and his talks went well we might offer to arrange for a Thai Mission to be sent to Iran. Alternatively, I would have no objection to first making the offer to send the mission to Iran, possibly thus enlisting their interest in having someone like Williams come to Thailand. However, I am somewhat inclined to feel that the first course is the most economical method of testing their real intentions.

In this connection the Thai Government is showing every intent of cutting down consumption in Thailand by shutting down the opium dens as scheduled on July 1. Although they have set up special hospitals for the treatment of addicts it is my impression that they have thus far only scratched the surface of this problem. As far as the growing of opium within Thailand is concerned, Praphat spoke to me the other night about his efforts to get the hill tribes to grow substitute crops and I believe that they are doing something in this connection. In this regard, in respect to the points made by Mr. Williams, I am under the impression that in contrast with the apparent situation in Iran, opium production is for most of the hill tribes here a major source of income rather than simply an adjunct.⁶

With respect to the second aspect of the problem, that is the traffic through Thailand of opium grown elsewhere, I am not sanguine concerning the willingness of the military group to do anything about this problem. As I have mentioned, I believe that the military group is now more dependent than ever on the profits from this trade. Also the opium is produced in areas beyond the control of Thailand and outside the effective control of Burma and Laos. In this connection [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a knowledgeable source estimates that over 300 tons of opium pass through the KMT area in Burma each year. If the KMT problem could be liquidated there is no doubt that it would do much to reduce the opium problem. However, there seems to be no hope of this. Alternatively if the market for opium could be cut off it would cut off the major part of support for the KMTs and thus probably make them more amenable to removal from their present area. However, as I mentioned, I am not hopeful that the market can be cut off.

Nevertheless, I certainly am willing to consider an attempt at making an attack on the problem if a proper base can be found. I believe that the best base would be to confront the Thais with evidence that opium passing through or originating in Thailand was reaching the United States. I realize that there may not be much evidence as I understand most of the opium is processed in Singapore, Macau or Hong Kong prior to shipment to the States. However I believe it would be worthwhile to explore with our narcotics people what they have in this regard. This would enable an approach to be based upon obvious US interest which would be readily understood, even by Sarit, rather than upon a moralistic base that I feel would not be very effective. However it might be better to wait to make such an approach until Williams’ arrival, if the Thais accept him. If the Thais do not accept him, we might then consider making such an approach. I am inclined to agree that a unilateral approach on our part would be preferable to a joint approach with the UK. As I mentioned, I have little hope of any success in this latter aspect of the problem but I am willing to try if we can get a good base for doing so that is not dependent upon our sources here.

Sincerely,

Alex

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 892.53/6–1959. Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. David B. Strubinger, Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Bureau of Customs.
4. Robert J. Jantzen, First Secretary of the Embassy in Bangkok.
5. Presumably Maurice J. Williams, Program Officer with ICA in Tehran.
6. A marginal note on the source text by Bushner reads: “But what necessities do they buy (certainly not basic food items) which they could not purchase by sale of other products which might well bring in almost as much as the pittance they are paid for opium.”