Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

515. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, March 3, 1959—noon.

2226. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Chief JUSMAG has just brought my attention following situation which affects proposal provide Thai either minesweeper or jet squadron FY 1960.

JUSMAG FY 1960 program requested $32.2 million, including under major material (in which category jets and minesweepers fall) $13.8 million. I have recently received indications some $9 million already deleted, leaving $4.8 million for major matériel. Offset against this $4.8 million is a CINCPAC directed long-haul communications system (1 million) and radar (2.2 million) having high priority claim as it is part of regional communication program. This leaves balance of $1.6 million for major material for the three service programs for 1960.

FY 1958 MAP exclusive of local currency was $11.4 million. FY 1959 MAP is presently $8 million overall with FY I960 figure of $11 million now included in presentation to Congress. Chief JUSMAG advises Philippine program FY 1960 over $20 million and Burma program $19 million plus. He estimates Thai FY 1960 figure, FY 1959 figure, will shrink to 8 or less million dollars after completion of legislative and budgetary processes.² Further, guidance for refinement of FY 1960 program certain restrictive provisions have been announced which will undoubtedly cause severe unfavorable reactions from Thai when announced to them, as will have to be done. Examples of these provisions are: (A) provision of POL for use in SEATO exercises only and thence it must be covered by deleting other items of like value from program,³ (B) delivery of Navy craft and minesweeper contingent on further deactivation of non-MAP supported vessels, and (C) RTA force improvement deferred until Thai eliminate non-essential, non-MAP supported units such as their Cavalry Division and AAA division.

From Thai viewpoint this all adds up to diminishing program which is and has been among smallest in SEA. While they will not know dollar values, they can easily interpret item content and deduce that in FY 1961 they are at bottom of list with increasingly irritating restrictions being placed on their program.

I cannot express too strongly my deep concern over this trend which also appears to be indirect contradiction our national policies as set forth by NSC and OCB. I have already given Department my views on legitimate expectations our Thai ally that we provide reasonably modern military equipment and my firm conviction that we have an obligation to them to satisfy these legitimate expectations (Embassy telegram 2042).⁴ Thailand’s positive support major US objectives in SEA and elsewhere too well known to require repeating here. If our intention were to undermine our favorable position in Thailand, I can think of no better way to do it than to tell them, in effect, that they will continue be our lowest priority in area in military and economic support field. While I of course cannot pass judgment on desirability providing Philippines third jet squadron FY 1960, Thai will certainly invite comparison between Philippine program and failure replace obsolete Thai F 8 F squadrons. Substitution of jet squadron for minesweeper is inadequate stop-gap measure. Chief JUSMAG informs me that RTN mission requires minimum six minesweepers whereas they have only three now. Hit-and-miss juggling between service programs is not way to satisfy legitimate Thai expectations in field military support.

I recognize Department and other interested US Government agencies must face realities imposed by competing demands for US aid and limitations on financial and other resources available to meet these demands. However, my chief concern is to preserve and develop inestimable advantage we have in area provided by Thailand’s pro-US pro-West attitude. If we give Thai impression we assume their continued full cooperation without taking account their legitimate requirements, at same time providing greater aid to less dependable countries, I fear they will draw only one conclusion. If, as result, Thailand should decide best way to obtain US aid is to be less forthright in support US policies, we would have only ourselves to blame.⁵

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.5–MSP/3–359. Secret. Also sent to CINCPAC.
2. Telegram 1988 to Bangkok, March 4, requested a clarification of this sentence. Telegram 2273 from Bangkok, March 6, reads as follows: “Chief JUSMAG advises during refinement conference, CINCPAC team pointed out $11 million is asking figure for Thailand in presentation to Congress. Based on previous experience, asking figure almost always reduced.” (Ibid., 792.5–MSP/3–659)

3. In telegram 2331 from Bangkok, March 13, Johnson reported that he had been advised by the Chief of JUSMAG that POL programmed at $1.5 million for the Thai Armed Forces in the fiscal year 1959 military assistance program was scheduled for deletion by the Department of Defense. Johnson pointed to the adverse effects this would have on Thailand’s state of readiness and the serious adverse political reaction if the POL aid were abruptly removed. (Ibid., 792.5–MSP/3–1359)

   In response, the Department informed the Embassy in telegram 2230, April 6, that the Department of Defense had indicated it was authorizing inclusion in the fiscal year 1959 military assistance program for Thailand of $600,000 for POL. (Ibid., 792.5–MSP/3–1359)

4. Document 513.
5. On March 18, Johnson wrote to Admiral Harry Felt, Commander in Chief, Pacific, expressing further concern over the adverse political effects of proposed cutbacks in the military assistance program to Thailand. (Department of State, Central Files, 792.5–MSP/3–1859) Admiral Felt responded on March 30 that he shared Johnson’s concern. “It was with this in mind that after reviewing the FY 1960 program proposed by the Department of Defense I recommended a substantial increase in the program for Thailand. You will realize, of course, that CINCPAC recommendations are subject to review first by the Defense Department and other executive agencies and finally by the Congress.” (Ibid., FE/SEA Files: Lot 62 D 221, Official–Informal Correspondence)