Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

513. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, February 12, 1959—10 a.m.

2042. Department telegram 1711.²RTAF, particularly Marshal Chalermkiat, will be bitter over failure provide jet planes FY 1960. Chalermkiat will lose no opportunity express his feelings to Sarit and anyone else in RP who will listen. However, believe Sarit and others will be disposed judge nonscheduling jets in context total US aid program. If Thai believe total aid FY 1960 inadequate, failure provide jets will serve as additional irritant.

This connection Embassy noted one year ago (Embassy telegram 2048, January 16, 1958)³ that Thai operated propeller-driven fighter-bombers becoming increasingly difficult maintain and need replacement. At such time as replacement effected, believe adverse political reaction here would be very strong unless jets are supplied. Thais well-aware US furnishing F–86 and even more modern aircraft to other Asian allies.

Re timing replacements, Embassy wishes make following observations:

Program refinement instructions to JUSMAG from DOD give as objectives proposed FY 1960 program: maintenance of effectiveness of MAP-supported forces, replacement of overage or nonsupportable equipment and provision of limited force improvement which is of special political or strategic significance. (See also paragraph 53, OCB Operations Plan for Thailand, January 9, 1959.)⁴ Continued equipping of two of three MAP fighter-bomber squadrons of RTAF with F–8–F propeller-driven aircraft is certainly not consistent with these objectives. Furthermore, as F–8–F aircraft are on life-of-type support at present time, their phase-out is insured within 12 months. In effect, failure to supply additional more modern aircraft to RTAF in FY 1960 or before will, leave them with only one active fighter-bomber squadron as present F–8–F equipped squadrons become inactive. This likewise hardly consistent with JCS-approved force objective of three effective, combat-ready fighter-bomber squadrons.

RTAF was advised in Washington and again during visit to Thailand of Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense (ISA) in November, that unless utilization of its jet aircraft improved materially Thailand could expect receive no more jet aircraft. JUSMAG advises that average monthly aircraft utilization for 1957 was 226 hours and for 1958, 301 hours. More significant is effort made in past five months presumably in response to the warnings. Utilization of jets in September 286, October 385, November 572, December 636 and January 500 hours. Failure to program jet aircraft in FY 1960 will certainly look to Thais like breach of faith, as they expect as corollary to improved utilization which they have now shown, provision of some jets to replace their obsolete conventional aircraft.

Further and most important, unless jets are programmed in FY 1960, JUSMAG will be without any leverage to press for better training and utilization. Deliveries can be withheld until performance is assured only if jets are in the program. Programming however does not insure that they will be delivered.

While RTN would presumably be happy accept minesweeper, doubt that any Thai military would regard this as adequate substitute for jet squadron. Provision destroyer escort FY 1959 will also help offset impact failure provide jets but will of course not make RTAF any happier. Would also soften blow if we could indicate US still planning furnish jets as replacement for F–8F–s at some future time. While Embassy of course not in position make judgment as to type aircraft RTAF should have in future we feel that desire to have reasonably capable air arm is entirely understandable and justified. In this connection, Thais well-aware SEATO does not guarantee automatic and immediate US air support.

Also, believe it important bear in mind Thailand’s unique position in area as member SEATO and supporter US foreign policy objectives and understandable sensitivity over very small magnitude US aid as compared with other countries in area. To maintain Thailand’s exceptionally cooperative attitude toward US requires nurturing on our part and responsiveness to proper and reasonable Thai expectations. Chief JUSMAG concurs in foregoing.

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.5–MSP/2–1259. Secret. Also sent to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Telegram 1711, February 4, informed the Embassy that no jet airplanes were included in the fiscal year 1960 military assistance for Thailand. (Ibid., 792.5–MSP/2–459)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 792.5/1–1658)
4. Not printed. (Ibid., OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Thailand)