Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

51. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, August 20, 1958—5 p.m.

404. Re Embtel 393.² Further comments re probable Nehru-Noon meeting in mid-September follow.

Perhaps most significant is quasi-certainty that regardless of what may be agreed upon beforehand in the nature of an agenda, Noon with his well-meaning openness and impulsiveness bound bring up canal waters and Kashmir. Likewise, regardless of attempts beforehand to restrain him virtually certain Noon unable resist temptation refer to package deal and the US good offices on behalf thereof in both Karachi and New Delhi.

We entertain no illusions as to Nehru’s willingness discuss substance package deal; furthermore we fully expect that recent events in the ME together with London Baghdad Pact meeting with its implications of additional military aid for Pakistan have only further increased Nehru’s already expressed and apparently firm intent not to consider substance package deal until after Pakistan elections. However notwithstanding what precedes, we do believe that Pakistan Government’s most difficult position at this time must be taken fully into consideration and helped insofar as possible.

Noon Gott [?] and President Mirza have acted with real courage and statesmanship regarding Kashmir. It was unpopular to postpone SC action from June until September. It was highly dangerous politically to take the decision to prevent freedom marchers of Karachi liberation movement from crossing border. Thus, none too strong or coherent Pakistan Government has knowingly accepted the political risks of providing an unscrupulous opposition with highly explosive ammunition since Kashmir issue closest to heart—if not to reason—of all Pakistanis. We cannot expect continuation of above restraint much longer, particularly as so far there has been no profit whatsoever to show for it.

One result of above situation is quasi-certainty that Pakistanis will press Kashmir in September session SC regardless of results of meeting with Nehru because of coming elections. Degree of virulence, however, will vary depending on outcome of meeting.

Other result will be pressure by Noon on Nehru at meeting re package deal and/or its principal components. General line of US action in response above situation that we may jointly wish to consider includes following: In Karachi we should exercise maximum restraint on Noon in particular and on Pakistan Government in general in its preparations for Delhi meeting. Specifically, we should urge Noon not attempt go into details package deal, but rather create atmosphere conducive future discussions overall problems. In New Delhi, we should urge Nehru and Indian Government to exercise moderation border dispute issue and, if possible, negotiate exchange of territory and enclaves which would give Noon something tangible return home with. Of course, if Nehru could be brought to take step in package deal context, be it even very small, such as agreement to talk procedure through third party (i.e., US), this would be most helpful. Above all, if package deal raised by Noon, we should urge that Nehru not reject out of hand or react abruptly in such manner as to jeopardize future decision. Of course we are assuming Nehru still desires keep door open.

Noon’s failure achieve even glimmer of success likely contribute to hardening Pakistan position on Kashmir in SC. May also strengthen hand KLM supporters provide further grist for rising ML attacks, and enhance position rightist-communal groups as election date approaches. In a more specific respect, political situation and psychological atmosphere may so deteriorate as to kill chances ultimate success of package deal.

We ever seek painstakingly to regard situation in Pakistan as dispassionately as possible and in broader context of sub-continent as a whole. We do however wish to stress our view that we are presently at a point when some satisfactions must be given Pakistan national pride—more important to most Pakistanis than their national economy—if serious results are not to ensue.

Langley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/8–2058. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, New Delhi, Lahore, and Dacca.
2. In telegram 393, August 19, Langley reported that Noon had proposed a meeting with Nehru for mid-September to discuss recent incidents along the Pakistan–India border. (Ibid., 690D.91/8–1958)