Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

506. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹

Washington, December 17, 1958—6:36 p.m.

1291. Ref: (A) Bangkok 1489 rptd Saigon 162, other addressees unnumbered, not sent New Delhi.² (B) Saigon 1172 rptd Bangkok 147, Vientiane 167, Phnom Penh, New Delhi unnumbered, not sent to Manila, Rangoon.³ Department’s views on refugee problem follow:

1. To achieve objective of removing threat posed by refugees to Thai and Lao security and at same time avoid handling problem in manner which would damage prestige GVN, appears two important steps involved: a) segregation of Communist leaders from bulk refugees and b) reorientation remainder of refugees. This confirmed by history unsuccessful efforts resolve this problem over period years. Essential first step would require arrest of leaders which would pose problem their eventual disposition. Second step should probably also involve removal balance refugees from present location because of effect on security Thailand and Laos. This particularly important because of crucial period leading to anticipated general elections in Laos.

2. Re question disposition arrested leaders they could either be detained in Thai prisons or deported. Former probably not very satisfactory since dubious TG would keep them imprisoned for prolonged period. Deportation would presumably not contravene UN convention on refugees if done in accordance due process Thai law, but would be necessary find country which would receive them. Would be preferable send them to North Viet-Nam if arrangements could be made on basis which would not involve official TG negotiations with North Vietnamese regime such as private arrangement suggested Ref (A) which has additional public relations advantage of giving them choice of area to which sent.⁴ If North Viet-Nam refuses accept them, then deportation to South Viet-Nam could be considered. Recognize GVN might find it difficult accept leaders since they presumably hard-core Communists not suspectible reorientation. However probably more effective imprison them in South Viet-Nam than Thailand in view fact Thai willingness keep them imprisoned may weaken.

3. Appears resettlement bulk of refugees within Thailand would avoid policy and public relations problems raised by mass repatriation but would be large and expensive undertaking. U.S. can give no commitment provide funds and no consideration can be given request for same unless Thai come up with specific plans and details affording promise effective solution whole problem. Re Wisut’s tentative proposal,⁵ preliminary research indicates Tarutao unlikely support large resettlement project owing size (5 x 15 miles) and limited arable area (few small patches alluvial soil on east and northwest coasts which appear to be only areas suited rice cultivation). Also location ten miles off coast Malaya and proximity to areas containing last strongholds Malayan Communists pose question attitude Malayan Government. Request Kuala Lumpur comment this point without raising with Malayan authorities.⁶ Recognize further search might turn up more suitable resettlement area.

4. Request Bangkok and Saigon comment on above statement problem.⁷ In particular, request Bangkok comment on GVN claim real Communist leaders of refugees not apprehended, and assess possibility Sarit may act effectively to segregate such leaders from bulk refugees. Lacking such action do not believe successful resettlement effort possible and would wish continue avoid any U.S. involvement.⁸

5. Request Saigon comment on possibility GVN could be persuaded accept arrested Commie leaders as last resort if DRV refuses receive them.

6. Embassy Bangkok authorized, in its discretion should opportunity arise, suggest Thai avoid hasty attempt solve this complex problem by mass repatriation effort, also seeming unsuitability Tarutao as resettlement area.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central files, 292.51G22/12–1558. Secret. Drafted by Bushner; cleared by Jenkins, Kocher, and Richard R. Brown, Director of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs; and approved by Parsons. Also sent to Saigon and Kuala Lumpur and repeated to Manila, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, Vientiane, and New Delhi.
2. In telegram 1489 from Bangkok, December 12, Ambassador Johnson reported on conversations held with Visutr and the Vietnamese Ambassador in Bangkok, Le Van An, concerning the expressed desire of Sarit and Thai authorities to oust the Vietnamese refugees from Northeast Thailand, where they had been living since fleeing the fighting in Indochina in the 1940s. (Ibid., 292.51G22/12–1258)
3. In telegram 1172 from Saigon, December 15, Ambassador Durbrow reported on a talk with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau concerning the refugee problem. The Vietnamese position was essentially that Thai authorities should arrest the Communist leaders among the refugees and then allow the Vietnamese Government to work with the rest in order to repatriate them. (Ibid., 292.51G22/12–1558)
4. In telegram 1489, Ambassador Johnson stated that he had pointed out to Ambassador An “that Thai Government had every right deport undesirable, law-breaking aliens; if latter did not wish go to South Vietnam, they could be told that if they could make arrangements on private basis with other country. They could go where they wished, thus obviating objectionable Thai–DRV official contacts.”
5. Reference is a suggestion, also reported in telegram 1489, that the Thai Government, since it expected the Republic of Vietnam to refuse to accept the refugees and since it did not consider it practical to send them to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, might consider sending them to Tarutao Island near the Malayan border.
6. In telegram 221 from Kuala Lumpur, Ambassador Byington noted that the Malayan Government would oppose any resettlement of the refugees on Tarutao unless it were certain there were no Communists among the group and that the Thai could guarantee no refugees would leave the island. (Department of State, Central Files, 292.51G22/12–1958)
7. In telegram 1199 from Saigon, December 19, Ambassador Durbrow commented that more discussion was necessary with the Vietnamese authorities who were sensitive to the criticism which would arise if the Communist leaders among the refugees were repatriated by the Thai only to be immediately jailed by the Vietnamese Government. Durbrow felt it would be preferable to send the leaders to North Vietnam under a private arrangement but also thought a satisfactory settlement could be worked out through the International Red Cross. (Ibid., 292.51G22/12–1958)
8. Ambassador Johnson made further observations on the refugee question in telegrams 1536 and 1582 from Bangkok, December 19 and 24, respectively. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the whole matter, he thought that the U.S. Government should avoid becoming directly involved. (Ibid., 292.51G/12–1958 and 292.51G/12–2458)