Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

5. Memorandum of Discussion at the 417th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 18, 1959¹

Washington, August 18, 1959

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–5.]

6. U.S. Policy Toward South Asia (NSC 5701; OCB Report on NSC 5701, dated March 18, 1959; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 22 and August 5, 1959; NSC Actions No. 2094; NIE 52–59; SNIE 54–59; NSC 5909; NSC Action No. 2117;² Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 14, 1959³)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the proposed South Asian policy (NSC 5909), particularly as to the changes that had been made by the Planning Board since the previous Council discussion of the paper. When he got to paragraph 51, the President inquired whether the second sentence of the paragraph, dealing with an Indus Waters settlement, hadn’t been overtaken by events. Secretary Dillon said that the agreement had not yet been signed and sealed, and that therefore the sentence was appropriate.

Mr. Gray then called the Council’s attention to the split in paragraph 60, over the modernization of Pakistani and Indian forces and the related split with respect to Pakistani forces in paragraph 76.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that if you intended to maintain Pakistani forces, you had, to some extent, to modernize them because you had to replace worn-out equipment with the available more modern equipment.

Mr. Stans said that if the Majority proposal referred simply to such normal replacement it was all right; but if it implied a broader-gauged effort it was not satisfactory. The President said that if the modernization was clearly limited, the language was all right.

Mr. Gray then turned to the split in paragraph 77, dealing with reduction of Pakistan’s non-MAP-supported forces.

The President raised the question, with respect to the Treasury–Budget language, of whether efforts to get Pakistan to reduce its non-MAP-supported forces were “politically feasible”. Secretary Dillon said that they were not, and would not be in the foreseeable future. These forces were needed in East Pakistan.

Mr. Stans felt that we ought nonetheless in the long run [to] seek to reduce Pakistan’s armaments. The President pointed out that the paper was reviewed every year, and that, if anything came up, the question could be re-examined. He assumed that MAP-supported forces were not available for use in East Pakistan because they were tied in the forces of Iran and Turkey.

Mr. Stans argued, however, that the objective should be a reduction—that the Majority language should be revised to incorporate such reduction as a long-range objective. The President wondered whether this wasn’t a general proviso that would be appropriate to every paper.

Secretary Dillon suggested that it might be easier to get Pakistan to reduce its MAP-supported forces than to reduce its non-MAP-supported forces. The President said he didn’t object to a statement of pious hope—to a long-run objective to reduce all forces.

Turning to paragraph 86, Mr. Gray read the Majority version and the new JCS version contained in their written views. He explained the difference in the two positions, and made some suggestions with respect to the language (see his briefing note attached to this memorandum).³

Secretary Dillon suggested that if the words “initiate negotiations” were eliminated from the third line of the JCS proposal and the words “take all feasible steps” were substituted, State could go along with the new JCS proposal. This approach was accepted by the Council.

Mr. Gray concluded by pointing out that the Planning Board had considered, following the last Council discussion, whether to add something to paragraph 61 to cover encouragement of private enterprise. The Planning Board had concluded that the paragraph should not be changed, on the grounds that paragraph 43–1 of the Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1)⁴ adequately covered this subject.

Secretary Mueller said that Commerce didn’t think that it would have been redundant to include the language of paragraph 43–1 in the policy paper on South Asia as well; but he bowed to Mr. Gray’s suggestion since the provision was contained in Basic Policy. He was still going to emphasize this point at every opportunity, however. It was his feeling that we should try to show that the free enterprise way is the way that these countries could get greatest economic development.

The President concluded the discussion by stating that we should be intelligent in this matter. We shouldn’t tell people in other countries that they are going to starve if they don’t do it our way.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed further the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5909; in the light of the further views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 14, 1959.

b. Adopted NSC 5909, as revised by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 2117–c, subject to the amendments in NSC Action No. 2117–b and to the following amendments:

(1) Pace 26, paragraph 60: Include the bracketed language, delete the footnote thereto, and substitute the following footnote:

“*As used in this paragraph, the term ‘limited modernization’ refers to normal replacement of obsolete or worn-out equipment.”

(2) Page 31, paragraph 76: Include the bracketed language, delete the footnote thereto, and substitute the following footnote:

“*As used in this paragraph, the term ‘limited modernization’ refers to normal replacement of obsolete or worn-out equipment.”

(3) Page 32, paragraph 77: Delete both versions of the paragraph and substitute therefor the following:

“77. In recognition of Pakistan’s present need for security and defense forces in East Pakistan and the tribal areas of West Pakistan, the United States should not now press for the reduction of Pakistan’s non-MAP-supported armed forces. However, efforts should be continued at the national level to encourage Pakistan, whenever politically feasible, to concentrate available resources on the support of forces indicated in the strategic force objectives and to eliminate those forces which are in excess of U.S. strategic force goals.”

(4) Page 33, paragraph 86: Delete both versions and substitute therefor the following:

“86. At such time as it is determined that the United States has a vital interest in acquiring the right to utilize naval, air, and communication facilities in Ceylon, take all feasible steps to obtain this right. In the interim, continue to exert, to the extent practicable, U.S. influence to assure the availability of these facilities to the United States, the United Kingdom and other Free World countries when required, and employ all appropriate means to deny the availability of these facilities to unfriendly foreign powers.”

Note: NSC 5909, as amended by NSC Action No. 2117–b and the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5909/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

Robert H. Johnson

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert H. Johnson, Director of the Planning Board Secretariat of the NSC, on August 26.
2. See footnote 15, supra.
3. This memorandum transmitted a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also dated August 14, offering their views on the revised pages to NSC 5909. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5909)
3. Not printed.
4. The text of NSC 5906/1, approved by the President on August 5, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume III.