Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

405. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State¹

Manila, April 10, 1958—6 p.m.

4219. Deptel 3962.² Upon receipt reftel I cancelled appointment I had arranged with Serrano and Vargas for this morning on grounds that certain information which I was awaiting from Washington had not come through and meeting would have to be postponed.

I very much regret delay in dealing with immediate problem we face both for reason that ban on third-power aircraft is certainly undesirable for implementation of our air logistic program in this area and also because I very much fear that unless we move promptly to resolve this question it will leak out to press here. Although ban has been in existence for two weeks and so far, presumably due to efforts of Serrano and Vargas, it has been held confidential, we have already had one inquiry from Chronicle reporter who seems to have gotten wind of this problem, and prospects of satisfactory solution would of course be impaired if matter became public.

Yesterday at Bataan celebrations in making appointment for this morning I mentioned to Vargas that I hoped to obtain further details concerning function of liaison officer. He immediately said that his idea was that liaison officer, who he emphasized would be under exclusive control of Phil military, would deal only with actions of third-power aircraft and would work out procedures with base commander. In reply to my inquiry as to whether such liaison officer would be deputized to deal with all aspects of third-power aircraft of interest to Phil laws and would in effect do no more than verify in conjunction with base commanders that US authorities were in fact complying with Phil laws in this respect, he promptly replied in the affirmative. In the light of this brief exchange with Vargas I believe there is considerable possibility of working out problem of third-power aircraft in a manner which would fully protect our interests while removing this issue from the field of controversy. In addition to solving immediate problem, it would be very valuable test case as to possible utilization of such liaison officer to our advantage in regard to other aspects of the applicability and operation of Phil law on bases. The problem we are facing in regard to third-power aircraft is of course merely one facet and a reflection of deeper issues in regard to bases question in the Philippines. In large part many of our current difficulties arise from the fact that the US under the 1947 Agreement, and in particular under the practices which have developed on the basis of that agreement, enjoys far more than in any other country where there are US bases a degree of extraterritoriality and total control of these bases. This situation arose in part because at the time of the 1947 Agreement the US was asserting title to these bases. When claim to title was abandoned in 1956 it has become increasingly difficult to defend many of the privileges and rights which we had exercised, and in large measure continue to exercise, in respect to these bases. For example, the question of applicability of Phil law did not arise in any serious form as long as the base areas were treated by us as US territory. With the abandonment of title, however, it is difficult for me to see how we can successfully maintain that Phil law does not apply to these areas and that if this principle was admitted it follows logically that Phil Government would wish and possibly insist on some means of satisfying themselves that applicable Phil laws are in fact being complied with by US authorities. I very much fear that if we maintain the position that no Phil official has any business on US bases (in essence an assertion of extraterritorial rights) that at some date in the future, and possibly in the not too distant future, we will be involved in a head-on collision with Phil Govt and our friends and supporters inside government who sincerely wish to see bases arrangement work smoothly, and effectively will be forced into same position as those elements who are either antagonist or at least indifferent to maintenance of present bases structure.

We have, I am convinced, a strong ally in the AFP who are thoroughly convinced of the vital necessity of these bases to the security of the Phils, and I would say to a large degree in the Philippine Foreign Office. I consider it of vital importance that we retain these allies and I believe a gesture in the direction of Phil sensibilities in the form of a liaison officer under conditions to be worked out to mutual satisfaction is probably the best means of averting in the future a much more serious challenge to our bases position here.

What we are of course trying to protect here is the efficient operation of these bases from a military point of view. And by yielding a little amount at the present time, which I believe could be done without detriment to the efficient operation of the bases, we might save ourselves much more serious difficulty in the future. In fact, it seems to me incontestable that in matters dealing with colonial or former colonial countries those nations which have been somewhat ahead of events have in the long run succeeded in protecting their vital interests much more effectively than those countries which have attempted to hold on to every scrap of privilege stemming from the previous relationship. I fully realize that there are many who believe that this is the “camel’s nose under the tent” and that a concession now would be followed by further demands to a point where efficient functioning of bases would be imperiled. I have only been a short time in the Philippines, but others who have been here longer agree with me in stating that while there may be some element of risk in this respect, in general the Phil character responds favorably to generous treatment. In this case the AFP would very likely consider it a matter of honor to work with and not against the US military authorities if we accepted the stationing of liaison officers on the bases. On the other hand, if the Filipino believes that he is being treated as a second-class individual in inferior status then all of his talent for legal hairsplitting and intrigue comes to the fore. In general, I believe there should be no concession made to forces in this country seeking to undermine US/Phil relations, and I would not hold the above views if I believed that Barrera and persons of this opinion were dominant in the Phil Govt. Concessions, however, to elements in the Phil Govt whose desire is to promote Phil/American relations, and in this instance the harmonious functioning of our bases arrangement, is quite a different matter.

I therefore urge for all of foregoing reasons that I be authorized to explore ad referendum the function of AFP liaison officer at Clark limited to questions of third-power aircraft under 1953 agreement.³

I would suggest Department repeat Embtel 4178⁴ to CINCPAC. My only purpose in sending it direct to Department was in hopes of getting prompt authorization for proposed meeting this morning with Serrano and Vargas.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/4–1058. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, PACAF, USARPAC, CINCPACREPPHIL, COMNAVPHIL, and 13th AF SAMAP.
2. Telegram 3962 to Manila, April 9, reads in part: “Pending further study and development joint State–Defense position, we believe you should not discuss function liaison officers in Thursday appointment with Serrano.” (Ibid., 711.56396/4–858)
3. Regarding this agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 2, pp. 600–603.
4. In telegram 4178 from Manila, April 8, for Walter S. Robertson, Bohlen expressed his concern over CINCPAC’s reluctance to install Philippine liaison officers on U.S. bases. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/4–858)