Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, May 29, 1958—12:56 p.m.

3011. Pakistan Ambassador on instructions informed Dept May 26 GOP hoped new Kashmir resolution would be introduced in SC June by US and others.² He presented draft resolution for USG consideration (Deptel sent Karachi 2992,³ info New Delhi 2749, London 8459, USUN 839).

Department informed Ambassador full US comments would be forthcoming after due consideration. Our tentative thinking was that such action in Security Council would result in acrimonious debate re Graham report and that any resolution useful to Pakistan would inevitably be vetoed by USSR. Pak Ambassador responded GOP also considered Soviet veto likely; if veto occurred, GOP would refer Kashmir to GA next September.

Ambassador Langley if he perceives no over-riding objection should see Mirza and Noon soonest in further effort induce them halt GOP plans reintroduce Kashmir issue in SC. Ambassador might emphasize:

1. USG’s appreciation, particularly during election year, of public opinion pressures re Kashmir to which GOP exposed.

2. Basic contradiction between proceeding with US package proposal and SC consideration. Our principal reason for offering to assume traditionally unrewarding role of “go-between” was USG’s conviction that ten years had demonstrated ineffectiveness of seeking solution of Kashmir problem through SC. US believes for Pakistan to go to SC now could create perhaps insuperable obstacles to success of package proposals: SC discussion likely exacerbate situation and produce an atmosphere that would jeopardize other negotiations, and any resolution along lines Pakistani draft would involve substantive points any discussion of or action on which would inevitably affect package discussions. Moreover, as GOP aware, SC action this character not needed as prelude to GA consideration, should GOP ultimately decide on such course.

3. SC approach would produce no positive constructive results for Pakistan.

4. UNCIP resolutions constitute Pakistan’s principal international support for solution through plebiscite. Another Soviet veto would weaken general international understanding that these resolutions remain valid base for SC implementation and could produce virtually irresistible pressures for movement toward solution along lines less acceptable to Pakistan. Identical considerations apply to any GA action.

For London: Embassy should approach CRO to urge UK make supporting approach in Karachi, after appropriate coordination between Ambassador Langley and UK HICOM Karachi.

For New Delhi: Ambassador Bunker, if he perceives no overriding objection, should see Nehru during return Delhi first week June (New Delhi 3036⁴ repeated Karachi 362 and London 142) and make presentation along following lines:

1) President Eisenhower put forward his proposal in sincere effort be of help in bringing about solution of outstanding difficulties that have plagued relations between India and Pakistan for past decade.

2) Mirza and Noon have accepted President’s proposal in principle. US Government would find it helpful have indication of Nehru’s reaction to President’s proposal so that, if Nehru’s reactions favorable, planning for implementing proposal could be commenced as early as possible. If feasibility of using President’s approach left undecided for month or more, there is real likelihood that events may take place which could jeopardize prospects of proposal’s successful implementation.

3) US Government for instance informed that GOP planning raise Kashmir issue in SC. (Reference might be made to Ambassador Langley’s démarche with Mirza and Noon referred to above without mentioning details of argumentation against referral of Kashmir issue to SCat present time, but stressing pressure of public opinion on Pakistan leaders to follow through on Graham report and noting problem of prospective, damaging press leaks in event prolonged delay.)

4) In conclusion US Government hopes that GOI may be able reach decision re President’s proposal prior Nehru’s second leave period.

If Embassy believes above prodding of Nehru would risk making his final response negative rather than affirmative, approach of course should not be made. Under these circumstances Department would appreciate soonest Embassy’s evaluation of resulting situation and recommendations re alternative courses of action.

For Karachi and New Delhi: Department proposing above in order attempt under best possible circumstances persuade Mirza and Noon substitute package for SC approach, assuming always of course that Nehru willing accept American proposal. If Nehru willing accept proposal without imposing undesirable conditions, but Mirza and Noon still unwilling forego raising Kashmir in SC in June, feasibility of some stop-gap measure referred to in Karachi 2987⁵ will have to be considered.⁶

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/5–2758. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Elizabeth A. Brown of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs (UNP) and Bartlett, and approved by Rountree. Also sent to New Delhi and London and repeated to USUN.
2. A memorandum of this conversation, drafted by John M. Howison of SOA, is ibid., 690D.91/5–2658.
3. Telegram 2992, May 27, contained the verbatim text of the draft Pakistani resolution on Kashmir. (Ibid., 690D.91/5–2758)
4. .Dated May 26.(Ibid., 690D.91/5-2658)
5. In telegram 2987, May 26, Langley informed the Department in part as follows: “Despite promise Noon and Mirza that Pakistanis will consult US before taking Kashmir resolution SC, and because package approach must be kept secret if it to have any chance success, USG must attempt propose some intermediate step prevent Pakistanis from repetition same old performance, also to hold UK in check on package plan. I have nothing to suggest yet, but feel need stop gap procedure imperative.” (Ibid., 690D.91/5–2658)

6. In telegram 6936 from London, May 30, the Embassy reported that British representatives had already urged Pakistan strongly to postpone action in the Security Council until there was an opportunity for further clarification of the package proposal. (Ibid., 690D.91/5–3058)

   Langley met with Mirza on May 31 and outlined the Department’s position regarding any further Security Council consideration of the Kashmir dispute. Mirza then called Noon, who was in Lahore, and as a result of their conversation agreed that presentation of the proposed resolution on Kashmir would be delayed for 2 months. “Mirza all for giving American plan chance,” Langley reported to the Department, “and realized problem US has with Nehru. Mirza sees plan as only real hope peaceful solution Indo-Pakistani problems.” (Telegram 3034 from Karachi; ibid., 690D.91/5–3158)