394. Airgram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
I met with President Ayub the evening of Nov 29. He was extremely pressed for time due to his planned departure the following morning for his Far Eastern tour. Although he had several Cabinet members waiting for a meeting with him and a dinner party already assembled, he asked me when I made a move to leave after having concluded my business to remain to discuss a subject which was a matter of concern to him.
The President began by saying that he had no doubt concerning the new Administration’s interest in Pakistan, nor did he feel it likely that United States policies with respect to the support of Pakistan and other allies would be changed. He was, however, concerned at the number of people who had mentioned this to him and had expressed the belief that a new situation might present itself which would require a change in Pakistani policies. Not only had the President brushed aside comments of this sort with reassuring statements, but he had endeavored at press conferences to make it clear that he anticipated no change in United States–Pakistan relations. Nevertheless, he thought I should know the steady flow of news stories to the effect that the United States would concentrate upon India in its aid activities was causing a problem. He believed that the problem would in any event resolve itself when the new Administration took office and made its position clear.
The President said he recognized why the United States extended substantial aid to India. He would not criticize that policy, although he did feel that the United States failed to make effective use of India’s unadmitted but nevertheless vital reliance upon America in bringing pressures upon Nehru to follow more sensible policies. Pakistan’s interest in a non-communist India was certainly no less than the United States’. He feared, however, that it was inevitable that communist gains in India would be registered regardless of American aid, and that would leave Pakistan even more clearly the only strong anti-communist bastion in the area. He feared that some Americans did not fully appreciate the importance to the Free World of having a strong Pakistan. If aid were to be concentrated in any particular country to develop a Western “showpiece”, it was hard to understand why Pakistan, [Page 823] an anti-communist ally, would not be the recipient of that increased aid, rather than a neutral whose policies were often contrary to those of the Western-oriented nations and whose chances of avoiding increased communist influence were far less than those of Pakistan. Moreover, the new regime in Pakistan had established the stability and program direction which rendered it possible to achieve great success in the effective utilization of aid resources.
In discussing the matter with the President, I of course emphasized the interest in Pakistan of both American political parties, and I cited the Kennedy–Cooper resolution supporting the concept of aid to South Asia generally. The President fully accepted my comments along these lines, and repeated his earlier assertion that he was confident that there would be no lack of interest on the part of the new Administration in helping Pakistan. His essential point was that there should be a distinction between aid to India and aid to Pakistan, and if any country in the area was to receive particular attention he thought it would be best to focus that attention upon Pakistan. Favoritism toward India would make it more difficult for the Governments of anti-communist nations participating in collective security arrangements to explain to their people the advantages of a policy of forthright commitment as against the policy of neutral countries often leaning toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc yet receiving massive aid from both sides in the East-West conflict.
In reporting the foregoing, I refer to the considerations set forth in Embtel 902,2 to which the Department replied in Deptel 917.3 Present significance is that matter raised personally by President.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/12–360. Secret. Drafted by Rountree on December 1.↩
- In telegram 902, November 16, Rountree pointed out that newspaper reports in Pakistan were emphasizing the interest in India on the part of President-elect Kennedy and his advisers. He noted that the Pakistani Government and public were “highly sensitive to any indication that new US policy might evolve favoring India and other neutrals over firm US allies.” He concluded: “While I am confident that new administration will attach no less importance to Pakistan, I am concerned that unless this soon made clear, our position in this country might suffer.” He suggested that this issue be discussed with a representative of the new administration “in order to emphasize importance that latter’s interest in Pakistan and other allies be made clear, even before assuming office.” (Ibid., 790D.5–MSP/11–1660)↩
- Telegram 917 to Karachi, November 25, reads in part as follows: “Point will, of course, be important part policy briefing new Secretary on NEA matters. If this question raised by GOP you might remind them that the last Kennedy–Cooper report endorsed aid to both countries and Kennedy endorsed the recommendations of the IBRD Bankers Mission.” (Ibid., 790D.5–MSP/1 1–1660)↩