Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

370. Airgram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

G–64

Karachi, September 23, 1959.

REF

• Depcirtel 149, August 19, 1959²

In accordance with the Department’s circular telegram 149 August 19, I submit herein an analysis of United States objectives and the role of United States and non-United States programs in the Fiscal Year 1961 in achieving them.

General

Our objectives in Pakistan, as I understand them, are the continuance of a non-communist government willing and able to resist communist blandishments or pressures from within and without; increased association and identification with other South Asian governments and peoples, and with the Free World community; a lessening of tensions between Pakistan and its neighbors in order to improve the climate for sound political and economic progress and to strengthen the bonds of these nations with the Free World, thereby augmenting their resistance to communist penetration; a strong, stable and, if possible, a popularly-based government; an increasingly sound and developing economy; and a posture of military strength contributing to area stability and as appropriate to the defense of the Free World.

The principal elements of our United States governmental aid programs designed to help achieve these objectives in Pakistan are projects financed by the Development Loan Fund; technical cooperation; surplus agricultural commodities under PL 480; defense support aid designed to render it possible for Pakistan to maintain a reasonable level of defense forces without impairing existing levels of economic stability; and military assistance. Although the amounts provided vary greatly among the components, each is a vital element.

Also vital have been United States governmental programs other than the MSP. Our informational activities have played an important role in bringing about a better understanding of such matters as United States policies and objectives, the extent and motivations of United States aid to Pakistan, Free World positions with respect to important international questions, and the dangers of international communism. They have assisted materially in creating a climate in which positive accomplishments have been achieved. The Exchange of Persons Program and various educational projects, for example, have contributed and are contributing substantially toward better understanding and toward the development of knowledge and skills essential for the growth of Pakistan.

Our total programs in Pakistan would be of relatively little value and effectiveness, moreover, in the absence of the regular Foreign Service program to provide over-all political and economic guidance and direction in our relations with this country.

Adequate funds for all of these purposes are essential.

United States governmental aid has been supplemented by substantial programs being carried out by American private organizations, notably the Ford Foundation which now maintains 51 technicians and advisors in Pakistan and conducts a number of projects which suitably supplement our governmental efforts. The United Nations, the International Bank, the Colombo Plan countries, and, to a lesser extent, other nations, also contribute significantly to Pakistan’s development. Nevertheless, the large bulk of assistance in this field has come, and for the foreseeable future will come, from United States governmental sources.

Pakistan could hardly have survived its early years as an independent country if it had not been for substantial American aid programs. It is, in fact, a measure of the success of those programs that despite tremendous difficulties the nation has been sustained and has maintained, indeed greatly strengthened, its orientation toward the Free World. Pakistan is a staunch member of collective security alliances against international communism, and its policies have been highly favorable to the United States. Despite frequently heard criticism of United States military assistance to Pakistan, the existence in this country of an efficient military force is an asset which should not be minimized. Common interests between the United States and Pakistan in security matters have resulted in Pakistan’s willingness to extend to the United States the use of facilities in this country [1 line of source text not declassified].

It is one month since I arrived in Pakistan. In that period I have gained the firm impressions that: (1) the new regime is earnestly and conscientiously pursuing programs designed to achieve greater effectiveness in the utilization of all available resources for economic progress, and despite great handicaps, including an acute shortage of technical and administrative skills, its prospects for progress in this program are good, assuming an adequate level of foreign aid; (2) despite its military character, the regime has not increased military expenditures and is fully aware of the importance of maintaining no more forces than those considered by it to be essential for a minimum defense effort. Nevertheless, Pakistani leaders are deeply concerned over what they consider to be threats to Pakistan from the north, south and east and are acutely sensitive to any suggestion that Pakistan’s defense forces are larger than needed and should be reduced.

I am convinced that any substantial change in American policies with respect to economic and military assistance to Pakistan, which would indicate to the Pakistanis a lessening interest on our part in their future and security, would bring about a loss of confidence in the United States on the part of Pakistan which might appreciably affect Pakistan’s orientation and thus endanger the achievement of American objectives here. By the same token, I am convinced that an adequate recognition by us of Pakistan’s needs, both for defense and economic growth, will permit the maintenance and strengthening of a situation in Pakistan generally favorable to our objectives. Two qualifications should be cited: First, the absence of any substantial deterioration in the international sense and, second, the maintenance of an effective self-help effort by the Pakistanis themselves. The road ahead to Pakistan’s self-sufficiency is, however, an exceedingly hard one.

Economic Aid

Program submissions for FY 1961 propose the provision of economic aid to Pakistan totalling $245,200,000 (Defense Support—$107 million; Technical Cooperation—$8.2 million; Title I—Public Law 480—$60 million; Development Loan Fund—$70 million). This figure (which is exclusive of any United States assistance for the Indus waters plan if accepted by India and Pakistan) was based upon the conclusion reached after long study that a United States Government program of this magnitude would provide minimum needs to sustain the Pakistan economy and to inject into it sufficient resources to make a degree of progress in the improvement of the standard of living of the growing Pakistani population necessary (1) to give the Pakistani people some hope for the future and (2) to give us some hope that, if such progress is maintained, our assistance eventually can be reduced or eliminated and Pakistan can stand on its own feet.

The Country Team was encouraged to believe that despite the fact that a program of this magnitude would not exceed total obligations under the respective programs in FY 1959, various favorable factors should render it possible in FY 1961 to achieve substantially greater results than those which have been accomplished toward self-sufficiency up to this time. The principal reason for this belief is the expectation that the present regime can be counted upon to make more effective use of available resources. Also, it is expected that in FY 1961 aid arrivals will increase markedly above the present rate so that, for example, the impact of DLF loans contracted in prior fiscal years will be an extremely important factor in the situation. Further, the economic and productive benefits of previous investments in Pakistan in development projects will by FY 1961 be showing far greater results than in the present early stages of construction.

It should thus be a part of our program to find means of achieving an annual rate of economic growth such as to provide at least a modest but continuing improvement in per capita production and consumption. Such growth is important in the short run for the stability of the present government and in the long run for an orderly domestic political evolution and the achievement of our joint strategic objectives. The desired rate of growth will be dependent upon an increase in the input of external resources and an improvement of resource use in development efforts. This will require, in terms of United States aid, a proper balance between defense support, essential even for any “holding action”; technical assistance, which is vital to fill a tremendous gap in trained technicians and administrators; development loan funds which, added to projects already approved, will provide the major foreign contribution for capital improvement; and surplus disposals under PL 480, which are essential to meet minimum consumption requirements until there is an appreciable improvement in local food and other agricultural production.

The proposed economic aid program for FY 1961 must be considered in the light of a number of specific efforts which the USOM now has underway. After Country Team discussions here, I support the general position taken by the USOM in its program submission. I believe the overall aid level proposed seems reasonable. It is not [now?] more than enough to meet expected shortfalls in Pakistan’s budget and import requirements and to stimulate the desired growth. There is, of course, a risk that the program may not be sufficient; that events may prove assumptions regarding substantial increases in tax receipts, export earnings, and improvement in local performance to have been overly optimistic. There is a strong possibility that the amounts indicated in the program submission for PL 480 and development loan funds will exceed the absorptive capacity of the Pakistani economy, and if this proves to be the case it might be necessary urgently to increase from the proposed level of $107 million the amount of Defense Support to be programmed.

Achievement of better resource utilization is vital. The USOM has been lessening its administrative over-burden and achieving greater effectiveness by reducing the number of projects in which it is engaged, by reorganization and pruning of technical personnel, and by providing more efficient financial management. We should continue to concentrate on these aspects.

On the Pakistani side, broad changes in economic and administrative philosophy, policies and procedures are essential and are beginning to receive official authorization. Dependence upon governmental controls should, where possible, give way to greater dependence upon market incentives in areas where economic and social purposes can be served better thereby. Such reforms, affecting both the public and private sectors of the economy, are long overdue.

Improvements already made and the government’s apparent awareness of the remaining problems are encouraging. The government has tightened the foreign exchange budget, introduced an export bonus scheme for a limited sector of exporters, improved tax collections, curtailed inflationary deficit financing, and released some consumer goods from restrictive price controls. Under USOM urging, the Government of Pakistan is considering the abandonment of a policy with respect to wheat of government controls and uneconomic prices for one providing greater price incentives and a partially free market. While this latter program is fraught with difficulty, including the possibility of strong public resentment to consumer price rises which are expected to require increases in wages, I have no reason to doubt the views of USOM that there is at least a good chance that the net effect will be highly advantageous to the economy.

In view of my short time in Pakistan, I am not in a position to formulate firm conclusions as to whether our economic aid program, either current or projected for FY 1961, provides the best possible approach for the achievement of its objectives. I thus cannot say categorically that the assumptions upon which the program submission is based are in all respects valid or that it will not become necessary in the period ahead to undertake revisions in emphasis and scope. It is, of course, essential to maintain a degree of flexibility in thinking and planning which will render it possible to meet new situations as they arise and to benefit from experience of success or failure in projects or approaches. With this reservation, however, I believe that the current plans for United States assistance in FY 1961 make considerable sense and provide the best immediately available guide. Pakistan confronts an immense task in putting its economic house in order. However, there is a substantial basis for optimism in the determination being evidenced by the Ayub regime to undertake policies and methods which will expedite the processes of growth and move towards ultimate independence of external assistance. In these efforts, United States influence should be exercised in an understanding, helpful and constructive fashion.

Military Aid

United States aid to support the Pakistani defense effort has been based on the commitment made in the Aide-Mémoire of 1954. This commitment was designed to meet the deficiencies in four infantry and 1½ armored divisions, six air squadrons, and certain naval units. Deliveries under this program have gone reasonably well and fulfillment of the commitment per se should be completed by the end of 1960, with the exception of the delivery of one squadron of transport aircraft. Nevertheless, even though this specific commitment might soon be met, it is clear that the Pakistani forces will require continued United States military aid and, in my judgment, it is very much in the interest of the United States that such aid be provided. The greatest need in this connection will be for trucks, tank and signal equipment to replace World War II material originally considered assets when the program was formulated but now urgently in need of replacement.

The fact is frequently overlooked by critics of the program that military aid to Pakistan was inaugurated not merely because Pakistan desired that aid but because it was important to the achievement of American objectives that Pakistan be helped in the military field. The commitment of 1954 was, in fact, a quid pro quo for Pakistan’s membership in the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO). It was doubtful at the time the commitment was made that we could achieve our objectives without military assistance; it is in my judgment unlikely now that we could maintain our strategic and policy interests in this country in the absence of continued substantial military support.

Pakistan has been a strong and active member of CENTO and SEATO. Its position with respect to the Soviet Union and international communism has been largely consistent with our own. As noted above, certain military facilities have been granted to the United States in Pakistan [2½ lines of source text not declassified]. Our aid in the military field has thus not only given us a close relationship with Pakistan in security matters, which is to our benefit, but it has given Pakistan a feeling of confidence which has made it possible for successive Pakistani governments to pursue policies generally in the interest of the Free World. With our help, Pakistan has been able to maintain forces for internal security and with a capability of resisting external aggression. In the international situation which we confront today, it is of very great value indeed to have a staunch ally with the capability of contributing, and the willingness to contribute, significantly to collective security.

The motivations of the United States military aid to Pakistan have been explained in the foregoing context. Unfortunately, military aid to Pakistan, despite its enormous value in the achievement of our objectives in this country, has often been misunderstood and misinterpreted by influential persons in the United States. This arises largely from the complex reasons why Pakistan has felt it necessary to maintain a substantial military force. One such reason is the threat which Pakistan feels, rightly or wrongly, as a result of its differences with India. India has a large army and a modern air force; Indian military strength is generally estimated to be about two and one-half to three times that of her smaller neighbor. This has been one motivation for Pakistan defense expenditures; sometimes it appears that Pakistan’s concern over India exceeds her concern over defense vis-à-vis international communism.

It would, of course, be greatly to our advantage and to Pakistan’s advantage if a situation could evolve whereby both Pakistan and India could reduce military expenditures to the extent that they are related to defense against each other. I, personally, am not convinced, however, that the creation of even cordial relations between the countries could prudently result in any appreciable reduction of the forces of either, at least for the foreseeable future. My conviction in this regard stems from my belief that while each is regarded by the other with suspicion and distrust, India and Pakistan would feel compelled to maintain forces at about or near their present levels in the light of threats to their security from forces under the control of international communism. Moreover, I believe it is in the interest of the United States and the Free World that both retain sufficient military strength to give them a sense of confidence in their capability for self-defense and, in the case of Pakistan, confidence in its capability to contribute to collective security in the context of CENTO and SEATO.

In present circumstances and for the next several years, any effort on our part to bring about an appreciable reduction in Pakistan’s armed forces, or any decision substantially to reduce the present level of military aid to Pakistan, would be regarded as a severe blow, not only by President Ayub whose power base is the army, but also by most Pakistanis. The consequences might be seriously adverse to us in terms of the orientation of Pakistan’s foreign policy. It would certainly reduce the extent of the influence of the United States in Pakistan which can now be employed usefully in the direction of our objectives in this country. Quite apart from purely military considerations we should, in my considered judgment, support the Pakistani military forces at about their present level unless and until a situation develops in which the Pakistanis themselves can be brought to feel that their security does not require forces at this level.

I should point out that a reduction in military aid would not necessarily result in smaller armed forces in this country. It is probable that the Pakistans would simply spend more of their own limited resources for defense, thus aggravating the already acute economic problem. In other words, we cannot merely transfer aid from a military to civilian account and expect beneficial results; the opposite would probably be the case.

Most of the reasons which justified aid in the past—such as CENTO, SEATO and military facilities—are still valid today. There are special factors which recently have assumed great importance in Pakistani thinking: The Chinese Communist threat to the Indian subcontinent, growing Soviet influence and penetration in Afghanistan, and the internal weaknesses of the Iranian regime. These factors will possibly become increasingly serious and present difficult issues for us and Pakistan. It is yet too soon to estimate clearly the course of events arising from these factors or how they should affect our thinking on the role of Pakistan’s forces. However, one thing is clear: We cannot afford now any major risks vis-à-vis Pakistan which reductions in military aid would entail.

For these reasons, we should continue to support the military units in Pakistan which are now MAP-supported; we should plan military assistance which will include modernization of equipment, taking into consideration Pakistan’s capability to absorb as well as financial limitations. Furthermore, we should not now make further approaches to Pakistan suggesting reduction of their non-MAP supported forces.

At the same time, we must, of course, endeavor to encourage the Pakistanis to keep military expenditures within reasonable limits and to control their appetites for modern weapons beyond their capacity effectively to absorb or to maintain them. Pakistani military authorities are extremely anxious to “graduate” from their present fighter aircraft to aircraft of the “century” series. I agree fully with MAAG’s view that it would not be wise to supply weapons of this character, at least for several years. I do not doubt the estimate of American military authorities here that the Pakistan Air Force could not yet absorb these planes, and it is clear that their provision would involve far more funds than we could reasonably expect to obtain for Pakistan in the immediate fiscal years ahead and, at the same time, complete the basic equipment needs of the ground forces which should be of highest priority. I should note, however, that our failure to respond favorably to Pakistan’s request for modern aircraft already poses difficulties for us in our relations with Pakistan, and I predict that in the period ahead continued denial of such planes will not be easy.

I have no independent judgment concerning the make-up of the FY 1961 military program which has been proposed by MAAG within the ceiling limitation of $50 million established by the Pentagon for planning purposes. I agree in general that primary emphasis should be upon equipment for the ground forces. Whether or not a program in the magnitude indicated is sufficient to achieve our objectives in the military field depends upon many factors, some of which it is not yet possible to evaluate. One factor having a bearing on the adequacy of the FY 1961 program, however, will be whether the FY 1960 program will be permitted to include a substantial number of tanks, upon which we had counted for delivery under that program. The Country Team has strongly recommended that the recently revised FY 1960 program be amended again to include the tanks which had been removed therefrom.

In stating that we should continue our military aid program to Pakistan, I have much in mind problems which are posed for us in our relations with India. One reason I do not now believe we should consider the provision of modern fighter aircraft is that such provision no doubt would create difficulties with India. I believe we should bear constantly in mind this aspect of the matter and that in deciding upon specific items of equipment for Pakistan, we should, wherever possible and feasible, avoid the provision of equipment which would be unduly provocative to India. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that our relations with Pakistan in the military field should not now, any more than in the past, be determined on the basis of whether or not India would be likely to object, since in no presently conceivable circumstances would India approve military assistance to its neighbor. The safest course to pursue with both countries is, in my judgment, to do substantially what we have done in the past and insofar as practicable avoid exacerbating the situation with innovations which would focus undue attention in India upon the military program in Pakistan.

As President Ayub has stated to me on several occasions, the United States has a strong friend and ally in Pakistan. At the same time, the President has shown great sensitivity to criticism in the United States of military aid to this country. Such criticism has evoked very sharp local reactions whenever it has been published. This is due largely to a growing fear in Pakistan that there might be evolving in the United States a change in policy toward military aid to this country. If Pakistan should become convinced that such a change will materialize to the detriment of Pakistan’s defense posture, it would be difficult to predict the consequences. Indeed, I believe Congressional criticism of the military program has cast a darker cloud on United States-Pakistan relations than any recent development. Fortunately, it is as yet only a warning cloud.

Information and Cultural Program

The United States Information Service in Pakistan operates in accordance with the instructions contained in the OCB Operations Plan for Pakistan.³ Its specific objectives are to create a better understanding of the United States and support for its policies; to publicize United States economic, technical and military assistance programs; to keep the people of Pakistan alert to the dangers of communism, and to encourage wider support of and more active participation in regional security organizations. The USIS is also responsible for the conduct of the Department of State’s PL 584 and 402⁴ educational exchange programs, and is field agent of the President’s Fund cultural programs.

As noted above, these aspects are an important and integral part of the total United States Government’s program in Pakistan. The Agency maintains a staff of 35 Americans and 295 local employees, with an annual budget of $874,000, excluding funds for the Educational Foundation, the IMG and the President’s Fund.

As the informational arm of the United States in Pakistan, it is imperative that USIS operate in very close coordination with ICA, MAAG, and other elements of the American establishment. It must function as a well-knit, coordinated country operation under the general direction of the Ambassador and with day-to-day, indeed hour-by-hour, contacts with other American elements. Its effectiveness also depends to a great extent upon the receptivity of the host government to its operation. In these respects, I believe USIS in Pakistan is generally doing an admirable job.

With a government-controlled press closely monitoring internal political news, there is nevertheless a receptivity to United States releases and materials which explain democratic processes and the operation of political parties in our country. Pamphlets on American democratic institutions find ready acceptance. The willingness of the government to permit publication of this type of information is, I believe, an encouraging although obviously inconclusive indication of its sincerity in claiming that it wishes to return to democratic processes as soon as the situation permits.

I need not recount here the wide scope of USIS operations in Pakistan, as they are well-known to Washington agencies. I have been greatly impressed with the comprehensive dissemination of information through all media, and its reception in this country. The Voice of America, for example, has a large number of listeners, running close to BBC notwithstanding difficult reception conditions. It is encouraging that surveys indicate that Radio Moscow is near the bottom of the list in popularity.

The twelve United States Information Centers are making the United States well and favorably known in strategic Pakistani cities. The fact that the Municipal Committee of Rawalpindi voluntarily offered space for a library in that city at a time when space in the new capital area is at a premium is an indication of the respect with which the Program is held in Pakistan.

The Educational Exchange Program continues to pay large dividends. During FY I960, 92 Pakistanis will visit the United States under the exchange program and 25 Americans will come to Pakistan. The value of the program is evidenced by a wider understanding of the United States on the part of the grantees, which is expressed both in private and public utterances and in published materials. I am pleased that the Educational Exchange Program will be expanded from $350,000 in FY 1960 to $500,000 in FY 1961 from PL 480 rupees available in this country. I attach considerable importance to this particular aspect of the program.

In summary, the USIS program in Pakistan is not spectacular but is a solid operation contributing to a better understanding of the United States and its policies and helping to win support for our objectives here. It has been hampered during the last year by serious personnel shortages which now seem on the way to being corrected.

In view of the reception of the United States Information Program in Pakistan and the opportunities which we have for favorably influencing the situation here, I believe the USIS budget is an austerity budget and I earnestly hope that in FY 1961 adequate funds can be provided to carry out this essential function. While I do not have sufficiently detailed knowledge to evaluate the adequacy of the budget as submitted by agency representatives here, it is my impression that it is about right for our purpose.

Aid From Sources Other Than the United States Government

The bulk of foreign aid received by Pakistan in past years and expected in the next several years has been and will be from the United States. Our governmental aid programs have, however, been supplemented by important contributions from other sources, and it is expected that in the FY 1961 foreign aid from these sources will be in the neighborhood of $50 million, excluding exporter credits.

The IBRD has made loans totalling $126 million to date. Although the Bank has appeared very reluctant to extend substantial additional loans, it is understood that a further $10 million loan to the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation can be expected soon. Moreover, it is expected that the Bank will make a major contribution to the financing of Indus waters development, if and when an agreement is reached between India and Pakistan. It is also expected that Colombo Plan countries and Germany will contribute substantially to this program, along with the United States. Estimates of the requirements of Pakistan for foreign exchange assistance in FY 1961, as used elsewhere in this evaluation, exclude requirements for the Indus waters development which presumably will be financed over and above all “regular” aid.

Among the Colombo Plan contributors to Pakistan’s development, Canada has been by far the most important. Canada’s contributions through June of this year aggregated over $102 million, mainly for the Warsak Dam and accompanying hydroelectric developments, and wheat. As major projects have neared or reached completion, the scale of Canadian aid has been steadily reduced and no significant increase can be expected except for that occasioned by the Indus waters scheme. Australia and New Zealand have made smaller contributions for projects in various fields.

FAO has been the largest contributor among the UN organs, followed by UNTAA and UNESCO. The scale of technical assistance rendered Pakistan through these and other international organizations (IBRD, ITU, WMO, ILO, ICAO, WHO and IAEA) is in aggregate slowly but steadily shrinking, and aside from increased activity due to the Indus waters scheme, is expected to continue to do so.

The largest contributor from among non-governmental organizations is the Ford Foundation, which had committed by the middle of this year $14 million of help for Pakistan. The Foundation’s programs have concentrated on key points of the development process, namely the Planning Commission and the educational system. The Foundation is financing the Harvard Group in the Planning Commission and three polytechnic institutes in Karachi, Dacca and Rawalpindi; home economics colleges in Karachi, Dacca and Lahore; a number of village aid academies, and various other educational ventures.

The Asia Foundation makes smaller but significant contributions in the technical assistance field.

From time to time, other governments have contributed foodstuffs for relief purposes. Such contributions in the past have been made by the USSR, India, Communist China, Ceylon and Burma. Relief supplies also are provided by such organizations as CARE, the Church World Service and the Catholic Relief Service. The volume of such gifts in any given year depends upon the need and, in the case of gifts from other countries, the political capital which might be gained. It is impossible to forecast what future volume of gifts of this nature might be expected.

Not falling in the category of aid or development loans are exporter credits which in the past have been extended by the Export-Import Bank as well as by the United Kingdom ($28 million this year) and Germany ($40.5 million this year). These are essentially commercial loans despite their repayment terms which are somewhat longer than usual. As Pakistan’s credit worthiness improves, such loans might become easier to obtain, but the Ministry of Finance is expected to keep a tight rein on them to avoid an over-obligation of foreign exchange.

Coordination of Programs

Over-all responsibility for local coordination of United States Governmental programs is, of course, vested in the Ambassador. The principal instrument by which this is accomplished is the Country Team, consisting of the senior representatives of the several United States missions. Regular twice-weekly meetings are held in the course of which matters of mutual interest are discussed. The Country Team concept, moreover, applies in day-to-day operations so that on all matters involving responsibilities of two or more missions regular liaison is maintained at appropriate levels. The Special Assistant for MDAP is charged with special responsibility in assisting the Ambassador in his coordinating function.

I feel that I am appropriately consulted by the mission heads upon matters of importance. I have also been impressed with the effectiveness of the working relationship at lower levels between and among the missions. For example, both the ICA and military programs for the FY 1961 were subjected to careful review and comment by all missions constituting the Country Team. The economic impact of the proposed military program, as well as the effect of the proposed economic program on military matters, were thus taken into account.

A specific officer of USIA is charged with liaison responsibility vis-à-vis USOM and the working relationship between the two missions otherwise is such that there is good coordination. While differences of opinion inevitably arise, I believe that these differences are worked out in a satisfactory manner. Coordination between USIA and MAAG is likewise working well.

I am particularly pleased with the relationship which exists between representatives of non-United States Governmental agencies assisting Pakistan and officials of United States missions. There seem generally to be not only good official relations but also close personal friendships among the people primarily concerned. For example, the Ford Foundation keeps the Embassy and USOM well-informed on its projects, and particularly those which have a bearing upon efforts being made through USOM.

Liaison between the Embassy and USOM on the one hand and those responsible for Colombo Plan activities on the other hand seems equally good. The principal contributor to Colombo Plan projects in Pakistan is Canada, and the Canadian High Commissioner keeps us fully informed of matters which would be of interest to the United States.

These relationships and the present means of coordination thus appear in general excellent. I believe that they provide ample opportunity for discussion of proposed programs before they are undertaken, and thus minimize duplication, harmful competition or inconsistencies.

Conclusion

Generally speaking, we are making good progress in the achievement of many of our objectives in Pakistan as stated at the beginning of this evaluation:

Certainly there is in power here a “non-communist government willing and able to resist communist blandishments and pressures from within and without.”

While Pakistan’s relations with India and Afghanistan leave much to be desired, the Department is aware that there are hopeful signs that relations with India are on the upswing. Moreover, there seems to be a growing awareness in Pakistan of the desirability of finding some way to improve relations with Afghanistan, now at a low point, and I believe that any constructive thoughts that we have in this connection, which would not jeopardize Pakistan’s interests, will not in present circumstances fall on deaf ears. Pakistan’s general identification “with the Free World community” is highly satisfactory.

There is at present in Pakistan “a strong stable government”, to a considerable extent at least now enjoying the support of the people. Although it is a benevolent dictatorship, it has publicly professed its desire to return to a more democratic form as soon as conditions permit. While we should encourage a return to the rule of law and democratic forms appropriate to Pakistan, we should recognize that in present circumstances there is some validity in the regime’s contention that a too-early and ill-planned return to democracy might not be in Pakistan’s interest, or our own. It is obvious that the regime does have strong opposition particularly among former politicians, and its continued stability will depend in large measure upon its effectiveness in dealing with this opposition.

The Government seems determined to work toward “an increasingly sound and developing economy.” Presumably, however, our ultimate objective in the economic field is to assist in the creation of a situation in which large-scale American assistance is no longer required. Unfortunately, relatively little progress has been made thus far toward the achievement of such viability. Although it would be unwise to become overly optimistic over prospects of success in this endeavor, at least these prospects seem better now than at any time in Pakistan’s short history, assuming a continuation of large-scale foreign assistance over the years immediately ahead and a continuation of the Government of Pakistan’s apparent determination with respect to self-help.

Finally, Pakistan maintains, with our support, “a posture of military strength contributing to area stability and as appropriate to the defense of the Free World.”

There are few underdeveloped countries in Asia where the situation presently comes so close to conforming with stated United States objectives. That is not to say these objectives have been reached, or even nearly reached, particularly in the economic development field. We should, however, take considerable satisfaction from the fact that, despite many disappointments in the implementation of various aspects of our program, and despite the enormous dearth of natural and trained human resources, the relatively stable situation in Pakistan and Pakistan’s general orientation are among our most valuable assets in this part of the world. In order to continue to capitalize upon these assets, continued substantial American aid is required. Our failure to provide such aid as appropriate—economic, military, psychological and political—would bring about quickly a reversal in an otherwise encouraging situation. In the absence of unforeseen developments, I believe the programs which have been proposed for the FY 1961 will provide reasonable assurance that no such reversal will take place.

Rountree

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90D/9–2359. Secret. Also sent to Dacca, Lahore, and Peshawar.
2. In circular telegram 149, the Department of State requested analyses of U.S. objectives and the role of U.S. programs in achieving those objectives in various countries. (Ibid., 120.171/8–1959)
3. Dated March 20. (Ibid., S/S-OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Pakistan)
4. P.L. 584, the Fulbright Act, was passed by Congress on August 1, 1946; it authorized an educational exchange program. (60 Stat. 754) P.L. 402, the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act, or Smith-Mundt Act, authorized a comprehensive information and educational exchange program. It was approved on January 27, 1948. (62 Stat. 6)