Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

37. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, May, 17, 1958—1 p.m.

2933. Reference: Deptels 2569² and 2661.³ I presented the President’s letter (dated May 14) to Nehru 7:00 p.m. May 16.

Nehru read letter and expressed appreciation for what President had written him. He then

(A) expatiated at length about difficulties negotiating with GOP. He felt basic problem Indo-Pakistan relations was bitterly anti-Indian mental attitude of Pakistani leaders which was however not representative of attitude of Pakistan common people.

(B) stressed extreme instability GOP.

(C) stressed intemperate tone of attacks on India by GOP leaders and Pakistani press, recent threats by them of war against India, and acts of sabotage in Kashmir.

(D) referred to failure GOP to agree to IBRD proposals on canal waters and unilateral GOP denunciation of 1948 Indo-Pakistan canal waters commitment.⁴

(E) stated Pakistanis always considered discussion of any subject to be a commitment.

Nehru expressed wish that elections could be held in Pakistan and that more stable government could result. In any event elections would give indication probable trend of events.

Nehru stated Graham’s suggestion of Prime Ministers’ meeting under his chairmanship was wrong approach since it would simply result in each side arguing its case before an umpire. I explained President’s proposal contemplated wholly different approach, namely, to take up as a group problems which had proved separately insoluble and to negotiate about them through experts and in secret. I explained mechanics Trieste negotiations in detail.

I stated President was also writing Mirza whom we believed reliable and strong enough to carry out commitments. I stressed fact self-interest of countries would be overwhelming motive for doing so and emphasized need for faith and allowance for the possibility of regeneration which Nehru himself had often mentioned. I emphasized depth President’s interest in solution Indo-Pakistan problems and good effect their settlement would have on US Congress and people.

Nehru promised reply to President’s letter, stating he would consider matter carefully and would take it up after his return from holiday. He agreed inform me when he was ready to discuss matter further.

I told Nehru we were informing UK of our approach.

Discussion lasted one hour and ten minutes. Nehru looked tired but seemed relaxed, friendly and in good spirits.

Full memorandum of conversation is being pouched to Bartlett this afternoon.⁵

Bunker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/5–1758. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Repeated to Karachi and London.
2. See Document 37.
3. See footnote 2, supra.
4. Pakistani and Indian representatives signed that agreement in New Delhi on May 4, 1948; for text, see 54 UNTS 45.
5. Bunker transmitted a full memorandum of this conversation with Nehru to Bartlett on May 17 under cover of a brief letter. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/5–1758)