367. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
662. Chief of MAAG, General WALTER, and I accompanied Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Shuff2 when he called evening September 14 on President Ayub. Also present were senior Pakistani military advisors. Main discussion related to several military aid matters which will be reported separately.
President received Shuff, whom he had met in Washington, with warm cordiality, and hour and half conversation was held in very informal and relaxed atmosphere. Several aspects of military program were of particular concern to him and he evinced considerable knowledge upon questions relating to program. He spoke frequently of mutual interests between Pakistan and US. Nevertheless, it was quite clear in this conversation as in others which Ambassador Langley and I have had with President that he is deeply concerned at what he fears might be evolving change in US policy on military aid to Pakistan.
[Page 760]President’s fears arise largely from criticism by Senators and Congressmen during course Mutual Security hearings. He emphasized this criticism was based upon failure on part of these influential Americans to recognize stakes involved in having abroad reliable friends with capacity to defend themselves and to contribute to collective security. If people of Pakistan should lose confidence that US would continue to recognize their needs, including needs in security field, course of events here would be unpredictable. He said Pakistan was now virtually surrounded by “enemies”. If US should fail provide adequate support, feeling of exposure would grow and would inevitably affect strength of alliance. Many people already felt that Pakistan should endeavor follow policies less hostile to Communist bloc countries. President did not doubt sincerity of Executive branch or its understanding of Pakistan’s needs, and this was true concerning many representatives in Congress. However, he had impression that those opposed to Pakistan military aid program were more articulate and outspoken than its defenders.
President said talk that Pakistan had too many forces was ridiculous. US aid had resulted in only negligible addition to total numbers. Even disregarding Pakistan’s obligations under collective security arrangements, it had too few, not too many. However, situation today such that it obviously was in US interest to have well-trained and equipped local forces about the world who were willing to contribute to collective defense. He cited Laos as case in point and recalled that Pakistan had often expressed its willingness to maintain with US support additional forces which could participate in collective action which might be required on part of free world. Congressional leaders should understand far better than they apparently did that it was much less expensive and politically more palatable to have friendly forces abroad than to feel compelled send US forces to meet requirements for local hostilities as they arose.
In essence, what President said was this: US had strong and loyal ally in Pakistan, and situation would remain thus as long as Pakistan people would be confident that their policies of alliance with West were appreciated and that West (US) would continue to recognize Pakistan’s needs including defense needs. Pakistan’s position should not be taken for granted. US should undertake even greater efforts to educate critics of program as to facts of political life and find means of assuring its friends that there will be no abrupt changes in policy which would leave them exposed.
Shuff and I responded to President along lines which have now become standard and, as it appeared in similar previous conversations, President seemed somewhat reassured. However, I have no doubt that this aspect of US-Pakistani relationship will continue to provide topic of lively conversation with President in future, particularly if Pakistanis [Page 761] feel reasonable balance is not maintained in various facets of our aid program here in light growing dangers they see in Chinese Communist activities in area and increased Soviet pressure in Afghanistan.