Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, May 27, 1959—6:56 p.m.

2848. From Rountree for Ambassador Langley.

1) By now you have probably received memo of my conversation May 8 with Pakistan Ambassador pouched all addressees May 14. Summary cabled Deptel 2720 to Karachi.² Position contained paragraph 3 therein represents statement USG’s current policy toward future aid to Pakistan armed forces and has been cleared by Defense and ICA. It substantially reflects military part of “package” which was endorsed at highest levels of USG just a year ago and is based on: a) assumption worldwide East-West tensions will not increase materially b) communist military threat to NEA area will not become more acute and c) India will accept in effect similar conditions re military build-up, i.e., modernization of equipment “should proceed in an orderly and gradual manner as a result of natural attrition and take into account absorptive capacity as well as the financial limitations” of country. I believe you are in substantial agreement with this substantive position as indicated your briefing papers for Draper committee representatives. (Embdes 762 February 26)³

2) Department had planned issue instruction to you discuss proposed position with Ayub and, depending upon outcome of discussion had planned request New Delhi obtain Indian reaction to similarly limiting modernization of its equipment. We would have asked you emphasize our deep interest in continuing support Pakistan both economically and militarily, stressing that security for Pakistan is also inherent in our collective security arrangements with it and on specific assurances such as contained in recent US note delivered by you to Ayub on April 15 Embtel 2328.⁴ If Pakistan and India in general agreement re modernization policy we finally would have asked UK to help support it.

3) Before such instruction is sent however would appreciate your personal advice as to timing and method of approach. We had thought present time appropriate as any in reasonably near future since: a) 1954 agreement implementation coming to end, b) basic principles for Indus settlement appear to have been agreed upon, c) new Pakistan regime seems sincerely concerned with strengthening country’s financial position and d) continued refusals on ad hoc basis of GOP requests for military items (as for instance re F–104’s, Embtel 2485)⁵ may tend to lead more to resentment by Pakistan than would frank exchange of views. As for approach we felt you in best position handle it due your close relations with Ayub who alone can make final decision. In connection both timing and method of approach we most anxious reduce to minimum any excuse for military to think we and Ayub, if he accepts position, are “letting them down” because military’s loyalty to new regime is basic guarantee of its stability. We believe promise continued military support beyond 1954 commitment should be welcome to military.

4) Instructions re your reply to Ayub letter requesting F–104’s (Embtel 2485) will be influenced by your reply this telegram.⁶

5) For Brown New Delhi—Would appreciate your reactions re substance of proposed USG position and of timing and method of approach in relation GOI.⁷

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/5–2759. Secret. Drafted by Bartlett and approved by Rountree. Also sent to New Delhi and repeated to London.
2. See footnote 4, supra.
3. Despatch 762 is printed as Document 344. The briefing papers are summarized in Document 353.
4. See footnote 6, Document 348.
5. See footnote 3, supra.
6. Langley replied to this cable in telegram 2662 from Karachi, May 30, advising against speaking with Ayub short of an actual Indian agreement on arms limitation. (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/5–3059)
7. Brown replied in telegram 3050, Document 73.