Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

352. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 52–59

Washington, May 5, 1959.

THE OUTLOOK FOR PAKISTAN²

The Problem

To estimate political and economic developments in Pakistan over the next few years and their implications for the US.

Conclusions

1. The military regime of General Ayub has, in its first six months, made a start towards dealing with the staggering political and economic problems of Pakistan. The regime has appointed competent ministers and appears to have popular support, and we do not foresee the development of any significant organized opposition within the next year or two. (Paras. 6–20)

2. Over the longer term, however, there are a number of factors which may frustrate achievement of the regime’s efforts to develop the political and economic foundations for enduring stability. There are possibilities for rivalries and dissension within the military. Pressures are likely to build up among civilians who will want more participation in running the country’s affairs than Ayub is likely to give. These pressures are likely to be stronger in East Pakistan, which is the main center of Communist activity and where the people resent West Pakistan domination of the government. Should the regime’s firm grip on the country be loosened, Communist influence in East Pakistan would probably expand, and could result in a serious threat to the continued unity of Pakistan. (Paras. 21–28)

3. The prospects for some short term improvement in the economic situation, particularly in food production, are fairly good. A major relaxation of tensions with India, including a settlement of the Indus waters problem, could open the way to a reduction of the excessive cost of the military establishment and to a reopening of trade with India, to the considerable advantage of Pakistan. Such steps, if coupled with the establishment of a stable and efficient government and continued substantial foreign aid, could help Pakistan meet the basic economic problem it now faces. However, the prospects for long term economic growth commensurate with the aspirations or even the requirements of an expanding population are not bright. (Paras 29–38)

4. In view of the depth of Pakistani hostility toward India and the number of issues still outstanding between the two countries, a change in the basic anti-Indian orientation of Pakistan’s foreign policy will be slow to develop. However, the atmosphere for negotiation between the two countries has improved somewhat in recent months, and at least the beginning of a general settlement between the two countries may be achieved during the period of this estimate. Pakistani-Afghan tensions will probably persist. Pakistan will remain concerned about the expansion of Soviet influence in Afghanistan. However, overt aggression by either side is unlikely during the period of this estimate. (Paras. 39–42)

5. During the period of this estimate, it is unlikely that there will be any major change in Pakistan’s openly pro-Western foreign policy. Over the longer run there may be a trend away from close alignment with the West, particularly if civilian elements gain major influence in the government. We do not believe, however, that Pakistan’s foreign policy will become actively anti-Western in the foreseeable future. Pakistan will probably continue modest trade with the Communist states but any significant expansion of relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc is unlikely. (Paras. 44–51)

Discussion

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 6–38.]

IV. Foreign Affairs

Pakistan’s Relations with its Neighbors

39. India: Both Pakistan’s leaders and the mass of its people have tended to assess practically every development in foreign policy in terms of their own “cold war” with India. The primary objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy since 1947 has been the bolstering of the country’s position vis-à-vis India. The long-standing hostility and the number of issues between the two countries will make any change in Pakistan’s basic orientation slow to develop. This is so even though the new regime is acutely aware of India’s military superiority and is eager to concentrate its efforts on Pakistan’s internal problems.

40. Nevertheless, there has been some improvement in the atmosphere for negotiations between the two countries. Leaders of the new regime in Pakistan have, initially at least, displayed a generally moderate and conciliatory attitude toward India, and are presently in a stronger internal position than their predecessors to carry out a policy of compromise with India. The Pakistani regime has for the first time since Partition made some moves toward permanent resettlement of Moslem refugees from Kashmir, thus implicitly abandoning the concept that these refugees must some day be returned to their homes. Sporadic border clashes in both East and West Pakistan and in Kashmir have continued, but the regime has acted promptly to stop the shooting and has minimized publicity on the incidents.

41. The new regime, whose finance minister is on leave from a position with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has indicated that it is prepared to look with favor on the new proposal which the IBRD is about to put forth for solution of the Indus waters dispute. If the Indus waters problem were to be solved, the ground would be clear for an attack on the emotion-laden Kashmir dispute. A strong Pakistani regime might eventually find it possible to accept a settlement pretty much along the present cease-fire line if some way could be found for a face-saving Pakistani “presence” in the Vale of Kashmir. Thus, the beginning of a general settlement between the two countries may be achieved during the period of the present estimate.

42. Afghanistan: Pakistan’s eleven-year-old quarrel with Afghanistan has had much less serious consequences than its quarrel with India. With US encouragement and assistance, Pakistani-Afghan relations have improved considerably since 1955, when tension between the two countries resulted in mobilization of the Afghan army and a Pakistani blockade of Afghan transit trade. The Afghan government has demonstrated deep distrust of the military regime, however, and acute resentment at the imprisonment of noted Pakistani Pushtun leaders who have opposed the central government’s efforts to increase its control over the Pushtun area. Conversely, the military regime in Karachi is likely to continue concerned about the expansion of Soviet influences in Afghanistan (especially in the military field) and is unlikely to give up all thoughts of overthrowing the present Afghan regime should a favorable opportunity occur. In this atmosphere, a permanent settlement of the Pushtunistan dispute is unlikely, although we believe that overt aggression by either side is unlikely during the period of this estimate.

43. Other Middle East States: The secularminded military regime is unlikely to revive the efforts of earlier governments to compete for leadership of the Moslem world. It will probably continue to seek cooperation with Turkey which it regards as a model modern Asian state. It will probably continue to look down upon Iran as unstable, unreliable, and the weakest link in the Baghdad Pact. Sufficiently far removed from Nasser to be unafraid of the effects of radical Arab nationalism on its own position, the Karachi regime is likely to remain more willing than Turkey or Iran to come to some kind of accommodation with the UAR, especially if it feels the West is moving in this direction.

Relations with the West and the Communist Bloc

44. During the period of this estimate, it is unlikely that there will be any major change in Pakistan’s openly pro-Western foreign policy. Ayub and other top military officers are all convinced of the necessity of continued US aid in both the military and the economic fields. These leaders and most of the officer corps are genuinely anti-Communist and are unlikely to do anything which would adversely affect US and Free World defense interests in Pakistan. At the same time, their pique over US aid policies in regard to India is likely to continue and their resentment at their country’s increasing dependence on the US to grow. This, coupled with the leaders’ confidence in their own ability to control events in Pakistan, will probably make the present government less inclined than its unstable predecessors to confide in the US and seek its advice on internal matters and foreign policy issues.

45. Since the ouster of President Mirza, who was generally respected and trusted in London, there have been some indications of coolness in relations between Pakistan and the UK. Pakistan’s new leaders have made no effort to conceal their annoyance at unrestricted British sales of military equipment to India. This coolness, however, is unlikely to lead to estrangement between Pakistan and the UK or to threaten the Commonwealth tie.

46. Pakistan’s leadership sees its membership in both SEATO and the Baghdad Pact primarily as a means of getting arms from the US in order to improve its position vis-à-vis India. Nevertheless, Pakistani leaders are in sympathy with the anti-Communist objectives of both treaty organizations, and value the US commitment of support against Communist aggression. They will probably continue to co-operate in both pacts, at least as long as the US appears to want to preserve them and continues to supply military aid.

47. Ayub has in the past talked about contributing Pakistani troops in the event of a Western-supported UN operation or direct Western involvement in a limited war in Asia. The military regime probably believes that it could thereby increase Pakistan’s prestige internationally, acquire combat experience for its troops, and have the expenses footed by the West. This idea will probably continue to have considerable appeal to the Pakistani military, and, should the appropriate circumstances arise, the Ayub regime would probably be prepared to supply troop units for use outside the country, if this could be done without endangering internal security or Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis India.

48. The Communist bloc has generally supported India in the latter’s quarrels with Pakistan and has hardened its attitude toward Pakistan since signature of the Pakistani-US bilateral military agreement in March 1959. Pakistani leaders are aware of the military threat to their northern borders posed by the USSR and Communist China. They have attempted to strengthen their defense posture through membership in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, and they have succeeded in obtaining armaments and a pledge of support by the US against Communist attack. At the same time, their membership in those Western-sponsored military alignments has acerbated Pakistan’s relations with India and Afghanistan.

49. The military regime is likely to continue the modest trade arrangement now in effect with the Soviet Bloc, and perhaps, as a device for maintaining US support, to display occasional signs of susceptibility to Soviet economic and technical assistance. No cordiality of relations with the Soviet Bloc, however, is likely to develop in the foreseeable future.

50. Relations with Communist China are not likely to expand. Pakistani governments have in the past apparently flirted with the idea of trying to use Communist China as a counterweight to India. However, the military regime is probably more aware than its predecessors that West Pakistan, as well as India, shares a Himalayan border with Communist China and that the potentially dangerous indigenous Communist movement in East Pakistan is particularly susceptible to encouragement by Peiping. Recent events in Tibet have caused some Pakistani and Indian leaders to become more aware of the desirability of a joint approach to defense of the subcontinent. If both countries come to feel that they are directly threatened by Chinese Communist expansionism, they might eventually move toward a common effort to resist it.

51. Over the longer term, there may be a trend away from close alignment with the West, particularly if civilian elements gain major influence in the government. Especially in East Pakistan, the public has never fully supported the strong pro-Western orientation of Pakistan’s governments and Afro-Asian neutralist ideas have considerable popular appeal. The military regime, in order to enhance its popular support, may make gestures toward closer ties with the Arab nations and increased cultural relations with the Communist bloc. In addition, increased trade with the Bloc may offer a means of disposing of Pakistan’s surplus agricultural commodities, especially cotton and jute. Nevertheless, Pakistan will continue to have its predominant ties with the West. Except in the unlikely event of a takeover of the government by Communist or Communist-dominated elements, we do not believe that Pakistan’s foreign policy will become actively anti-Western in the foreseeable future.

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates were interdepartmental reports appraising foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the U.S. Intelligence Board, discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups, approved by the USIB, and circulated to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the members of the NSC.

   According to a note on the cover sheet, the following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and The Joint Staff. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on May 5 with the exception of the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Security Agency, as well as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. Those representatives abstained since the subject being considered was outside their jurisdiction.

2. Supersedes NIE 52–56, “Probable Developments in Pakistan,” dated 13 November 1956. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 52–56 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. VIII, pp. 473–475.]