342. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1

1681. For Secretary Henderson from Ambassador. Reference your 1691.2 Our major problem with Pakistan perhaps irrational but nevertheless powerful—and still growing—feeling of government and public that there is little advantage in being firmly committed as ally USA since USA concentrates its favors on uncommitted nations such as India and Egypt. I well understand that our higher interest and global responsibilities should lead us take into major account as well as to aid extensively these important countries which we wish deny to USSR and world Communism and, if possible, win over to our side. I have realized this so well that I have, if anything, underplayed groundswell of anti-Americanism which was inevitable from day we initiated substantial assistance to the feared and hated Hindu. I can only assume that this Pakistani fixation on India rather than on USSR was thoroughly taken into account when present policy of military aid to Pakistan was instituted in 1954. On this assumption, I can only assume further that we wish preserve a meaningful Pakistan alliance as well as conciliate India. We will not be able to do so if we appear grant more definite and explicit assurances of assistance to India in case of Pakistani aggression than we are willing to give Pakistan in case of Indian aggression. If we examine record, such guarantees to India outweigh those to Pakistan beginning with those of President, equivalent of which has never been given GOP. Up to last winter, we could argue that India had received essentially verbal assurances, while Pakistan had received tanks, planes and major-scale economic aid. Present massive assistance to India knocks props from under that argument, particularly as it frees economic resources for diversion to military purposes.

Please see my telegram 16783 of today’s date on related subject. My purpose in availing myself your thoughtful request for suggestions [Page 697] is to stress importance of convincing present GOP that we are not subordinating alliance with Pakistan to our courtship of India. Furthermore, I feel attitude toward India of President Ayub but more particularly of Foreign Minister Qadir and Finance Minister Shoaib offers more hope of arriving at sensible Indo-Pakistan modus vivendi than anything else I have observed since my arrival Pakistan.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/1–1759. Secret; Priority. Repeated to New Delhi.
  2. In telegram 1691, January 16, Deputy Under Secretary Henderson requested Ambassador Langley’s advice and suggestions regarding his upcoming visit to Pakistan. Henderson was scheduled to arrive in Karachi on January 23 for the Sixth Session of the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council. (Ibid., 110.13–HE/1–1659)
  3. In telegram 1678, January 17, Langley commented as follows: “I believe US should establish position which would be uniform whenever it becomes necessary to make statement either publicly or officially to Pakistanis or Indians in Washington, New Delhi or Karachi. I believe such policy statement should indicate identical position by US towards aggression against either India or Pakistan by other.” He was responding to remarks which Ambassador Bunker made at Calcutta on January 13, regarding the U.S. position in the event of Pakistani aggression against India. (Ibid., 790D.5/1–1759)