Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, October 6, 1958—7:32 p.m.

753. For Ambassador. Reference Embtel 791.² Based on information contained reftel, Department apparently faces three choices:

(1) Actively support Mirza–Ayub takeover. This could stimulate violent anti-West and particularly anti-US reaction on the part of political groups and dissident army elements especially if and when they in turn might topple Mirza–Ayub rule. In any case US support takeover would presumably alienate important segments Pakistan population who, as dictatorial regime finds it necessary to apply repressive measures to insure its survival, will become progressively more disillusioned with that regime and its American supporters.

(2) Actively oppose Mirza–Ayub takeover even to extent of threatening to withdraw or reduce aid. Danger in this course is that, should Mirza and Ayub be correct in fearing Muslim League-led army revolt, US Government could be accused, should such revolt eventuate and succeed in disposing of present government, of having betrayed Mirza and Ayub, two staunchest supporters of pro-West and pro-American policies in Pakistan. We could also be accused of having done this without adequate information upon which to evaluate the dangers posed by the Muslim League-led junior army elements to the pro-Western regime of Mirza–Noon–Suhrawardy.

(3) While expressing our belief in democratic, popularly based governments as in the long run assuring greatest good to greatest number of people of any country and while making clear we are not convinced of Pakistan’s immediate need to depart from democratic institutions, take position, if only by implication, that ultimately final decision must be by Pakistan leaders.

In view of dangers to US in taking either of first two courses of action noted above, and in view of fact that your reports indicate Mirza and Ayub have already firmly and independently made up their minds to take over Government of Pakistan, Department requests you soonest to make oral presentation to President Mirza along following lines:

Ambassador recalls his conversation with President on May 24, 1958. In that conversation Ambassador, under instructions from his Government, reviewed with President attitude of United States to changes in Government without prior reference to the people.³ In light highly appreciated confidential information which President has kindly furnished Ambassador and through him to United States Government, Ambassador has been instructed to set forth again United States Government’s basic position. This position is that United States is firmly convinced all countries have both basic right and basic responsibility to choose for themselves whatever form of government they believe is best suited to insure happiness and welfare of their people.

Nevertheless, United States Government would not be reciprocating confidence with which President has spoken with Ambassador if it did not reiterate to President the fundamental belief of United States in democratic institutions. Government and people of United States for almost two centuries have conducted their own affairs on this cardinal principle that, in long term, democratic government was superior to any form of authoritarian government in assuring welfare of American people and development of their institutions and economy.

While in some instances democracies have had to depart temporarily from basic principles upon which their institutions are founded (but only as last resort and then only to protect those institutions in the long run), we do not have evidence to show this stage has been reached in Pakistan. United States Government, as friendly Government which respects sovereignty of Pakistan and cherishes its own close and friendly bonds with that country, therefore trusts that any decision to set aside Pakistan’s consistent dedication to continuing development of its democratic institutions should be taken only after most serious consideration.

Should Pakistan’s sovereign decision remain unchanged, United States Government hopes leaders of that Republic will endeavor to use their authority in such a way as to insure expanded economic and social welfare of their people and that interval of restricted rule might be as short as necessary to preserve democracy in Pakistan and to insure conditions under which free elections, already scheduled, may be held.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/10–658. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bartlett, cleared (in final draft form) by Rountree, and approved by Herter.
2. See footnote 4, supra.
3. See footnote 3, Document 312.