Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

286. Letter From the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Bartlett) to the Ambassador in Nepal (Stebbins)¹

Washington, August 4, 1960.

Dear Henry: Your letter of June 24 regarding the possibility of extending defense assistance to Nepal has aroused a good deal of thought here.² During the past six months, the question of defense assistance has been given some consideration in SOA and at the working level in the Department of the Army but it has not, so far as I know, received high-level consideration. The ideas set forth in this letter represent the preliminary thinking of SOA on the subject. I have not cleared this letter outside of the office, as I do not wish to arouse premature interest, either positive or negative, on the part of others within the Department, in the absence of any concrete indications of the nature, size, scope, or cost of any possible Nepalese request.

I agree fully with your view that the introduction of American weapons into Nepal would complicate the situation. Such a development, in addition to strengthening the Nepalese armed forces, might result in a stiffening of the Communist Chinese attitude toward Nepal, which in turn might lead to a further deterioration of Nepalese relations with the Communist Chinese. [1 line of source text not declassified]

I believe, however, that the disadvantages of providing military equipment would probably outweigh the advantages. As you indicated in your letter, the Nepalese armed forces are presently geared into those of India and the United Kingdom. In the case of hostilities, the main logistic support for the Nepalese army would, perforce, have to be provided by India. In view of Nehru’s commitment to defend Nepal, Indian forces would probably be operating in Nepal, in conjunction with the Nepalese forces. I believe, therefore, that it would be more advantageous for us to encourage the Nepalis to continue to obtain their military equipment from the Indians and the British than to attempt to establish an extremely lengthy pipeline from the U.S. to Nepal which, because of the distance separating the two countries and the necessity for transiting India, would be both costly to operate and difficult to administer.

Furthermore, the strategic importance of Nepal to India would require, I believe, the closest possible coordination between ourselves and the Indians of any U.S. military aid program in Nepal. If you have not done so, I think it would be a good idea to sit down with Harishwar Dayal³ and have an exploratory chat with him on a “personal and unofficial” basis. We would be interested in knowing his thinking on this subject. We would not, of course, want him to get the impression that we are contemplating the invitation [initiation?] of a military aid program in Nepal.

[1½ lines of source text not declassified] The only way of channeling [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] military aid through the present economic aid program, so far as I know, would be as a part of the Overseas Internal Security Program, which is discussed below.

Although we believe it preferable for the Nepalese to continue to obtain military equipment from their present suppliers, we have begun to explore the procedural and budgetary problems involved in providing such equipment to Nepal under our existing legislation. I am enclosing for your information a copy of our basic agreement with India which governs the sale of all U.S. military equipment to that country.⁴ A similar agreement with the Nepalese would be required before any sales could be made, unless an exemption could be obtained by Presidential decision.

I hasten to add, however, that I do not regard the idea of military sales to Nepal as either feasible or desirable, in view of Nepal’s rather shaky financial position and that [the] drain on her foreign exchange holdings which any purchases from us would entail. Such transactions, as you know, are handled on a strictly “cash on the barrelhead” basis, and we would not be able to reimburse the Nepalese for any funds so spent.

In regard to grant aid under the Mutual Security Program, the situation is complicated and difficult. As you know, there is a great deal of pressure to reduce the size of the worldwide program. This makes the introduction of a new country program into the overall program somewhat difficult. In order to accomplish it, we would have to have the strongest possible justification.

In view of all the foregoing considerations, SOA’s preliminary reaction is that we should leave defense assistance in the hands of the Indians and the British and concentrate our efforts elsewhere. We are making an important contribution to the defense capabilities of Nepal in our telecommunications, ropeway, road and aviation projects. The early completion of these economically justifiable projects should increase the mobility and effectiveness of the Nepalese Army, as well as rendering possible rapid logistical support from India in the event of need.

Moving from defense to a closely related field, internal security, two recent reports from the Embassy (Despatch No. 233 of June 29⁵ and CS 3/443/182 of July 12)⁶ seem to indicate that the Nepali police force is weaker [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] than we had realized. In view of the possibility that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will attempt to subvert Nepal from within rather than seize it from without, it appears that one of Nepal’s most pressing needs is to create a loyal, efficient internal security force, capable of controlling the rural areas as well as the capital.

It occurs to me, therefore, that the Embassy might wish to consider the desirability of recommending the establishment of an Overseas Internal Security Program as part of the technical cooperation program in Nepal. OISP programs are currently in operation in about 26 foreign countries under the general supervision of the Public Safety Division of ICA, working through the local USOM’s.

In its initial stages, I understand, the typical OISP program is likely to include the provision of technicians and demonstration equipment. The latter usually consists of signal equipment and transportation equipment, such as trucks or jeeps. I am told that usually small arms are not included because the recipient country usually already possesses them in adequate numbers. However, if there is urgent need and sufficient justification from the policy viewpoint, the equipment mentioned above can usually be programmed for supply to the country for non-demonstration purposes. In some of the OISP programs there is provided training in riot control, anti-guerilla tactics, and psychological warfare. In the above subjects, as well as in regular police work, training is available both in the United States and in third countries.

I have written at some length on this subject because I wanted to be sure that you were aware of the above possibilities. I believe that offering the Nepalese a modest police program would be preferable to our becoming involved in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] military assistance effort. Certainly, the political liabilities would be less. A police program administered by civilians within the framework of the existing ICA program would attract less unfavorable attention than a military transaction however well handled.

An understanding between the King and the GON on the control and orientation of the Nepali police and the objectives to be achieved by a police improvement program would appear to be a necessary precondition to our undertaking the effort. Otherwise, we might become involved in a conflict of interest between the two. [3½ lines of source text not declassified]

I wish to emphasize that the foregoing ideas are merely tentative thoughts on this subject, intended to provide a point of departure for future discussion and exploration of the problem. They have not been discussed outside of SOA. Your thoughts on the desirability and feasibility of some form of defense or internal security program and your views on the scope and direction of such program would be greatly appreciated.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ambassador Bunker for his information and for any comments which he may wish to make in regard to possible Indian reactions.

Sincerely yours,

Frederic P. Bartlett⁷

1. Source: Department of State, SOA Files: Lot 63 D 110, Nepal—1960. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Benjamin A. Fleck and Robert E. Jelley of SOA
2. In this letter, which was attached to the source text, Ambassador Stebbins noted that the Army Attaché in Kathmandu asked him that day whether he had received any briefing in the Department of State prior to his arrival in Kathmandu concerning U.S. policy on military assistance to Nepal. “If the Department has given any thought to this matter,” Stebbins wrote, “or if this question has arisen in the past, prior to the opening of the Embassy, I would be very glad to receive some guidance. My own feeling is that it might be awkward and maybe even non-productive to enter into this kind of operation at this time, largely because the Nepalese military are geared to Indian and British logistics which could only be complicated by our coming into the picture.”
3. Minister of the Indian Embassy in the United States.
4. Reference is to the mutual defense assistance agreement between the United States and India, concluded in March 1957.
5. Dated June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 890C.501/6–2960)
6. Not further identified.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.