282. Telegram From the Embassy in Nepal to the Department of State1
36. With monsoon over, Prime Minister Koirala2 faces first real test of his leadership to: (1) implement administration’s program which formed during monsoon period; (2) provide people with evidence of tangible benefits of democratic government and Nepal Congress administration (including delivery on election promises); (3) maintain vitality and unity of party organization. In spite of landslide election victory, leadership displaying commendable awareness of importance of avoiding complacency and strengthening party’s grassroots organization. Significant NC leaders are planning series of regional political conferences in next few months to acquaint district party units with NC programs and enlist their support; (4) maintain confidence of King and close working relations with Palace.
While Prime Minister is operating from position of strength, he is concerned over: (1) cracks appearing in party due to insidious effects of exposure to Kathmandu intrigue and inevitable loss of momentum and enthusiasm as honeymoon period comes to end; (2) border situation. He considers country ill-prepared to cope with defense problems, threat of infiltration and potentially awkward refugee situation; (3) relations with King and pressure from Palace to avoid any differences with ChiComs; (4) marked increase in Communist propaganda aided by Soviet Embassy and ChiComs and in activity of local Communists who are free to operate in country while NC resources and manpower are concentrated on more difficult tasks of reorganizing government and developing constructive programs.
[Page 597]Also signs that Prime Minister is becoming impatient with what he considers to be US failure in responding affirmatively and promptly to various Nepalese requests for assistance. Although Prime Minister aware of need not to be too closely associated publicly with US, he and colleagues have turned first to US for aid on projects of importance to country and party. So far, except for delivery of one plane and establishment Embassy, Prime Minister can see little tangible evidence of US support for his administration over that provided previous regime. He feels we have not responded to projects in easily identifiable manner, including assistance for monetary reform and currency stabilization project. Budget approved by Parliament has many shortcomings, but it includes tax increases which are substantial from Nepalese point of view and already politically embarrassing to NC. In addition, Birta abolition bill approved by Parliament before adjournment is genuine move toward long overdue land reform. Both Prime Minister and Subarna feel they are moving in direction of tax, land and monetary reforms which we have urged on them without corresponding response from US. Another indication of his thinking is concern over reception in US should he visit there in next few months and fear he may return empty-handed.
[1 line of source text not declassified] NC is Western oriented, genuinely democratic, with broad support, which are characteristics few governments in Asia possess. At same time, Koirala is man in a hurry and although some of his impatience due to inexperience and will wear off, important that our relations with [him] are not soured or that he become disillusioned about US or its capacity to move quickly when required.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790C.00/10–1559. Confidential. Repeated to New Delhi and Calcutta. On September 9, Henry E. Stebbins was appointed the first U.S. Ambassador resident in Nepal; he presented his credentials to the Government of Nepal on November 25. Douglas L. Heck was First Secretary of the Embassy.↩
- After the resignation of General Subarna on May 4, the King called upon Koirala to form a new government. On May 19, the King approved Koirala’s proposed list of ministers and Koirala became Prime Minister on May 27.↩