Office of the Historian

279. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1

New Delhi, April 28, 1959—11 p.m.

2623. This message outlines courses of action we recommend taking to cope with new set of conditions in Nepal.2 Considerations involved in framing these recommendations include:

(1)
Importance not playing into Thapa’s hands and showing fallacy his policies.
(2)
[2 lines of source text not declassified] As previously reported, King admitted having become committed to receive Soviet aid during his trip to Russia where he received red carpet treatment [2½ lines of source text not declassified]. I am confident pendulum will swing in our direction again in not too distant future, and we will have opportunity resume attempts establish closer relationship with King.
(3)
Need to work with new government, which essentially friendly to us, without associating ourselves too closely, to avoid arousing King’s suspicions of its loyalties or our motives.

I recommend that:

(1)
We should avoid trying to outbid Soviets or indulge in recriminations against Nepalese. To react sharply either way now would be mistake.
(2)
In my visit Nepal May 5-8, I propose inform King and GON officials of my regret their failure to keep me advised on negotiations with USSR and especially decision to establish Soviet Embassy in view our previous understanding this subject. In addition, in view size Soviet aid and limited capacity of Nepalese to absorb foreign aid, I feel Nepal will probably not require any increase in US assistance for some time to come (this is something I will be reviewing with Washington in next few months). I will also make point of seeing Subarna and B. P. Koirala to obtain their reaction to development and comments on role and scope of US aid new government has in mind.
(3)
For time being, we should continue present level of aid and projects without major change in emphasis. We should conclude negotiations on aviation project as soon as possible and, once signed, deliver planes immediately. Similarly, hope there will be tangible evidence of implementation Telecommunications and Ropeway Projects before monsoon.
(4)
Proposal for stepped-up USIS Information Program being reported separately.3 Meantime, USIS working on plan for TDY assignment of officer to Kathmandu until Johnson’s4 replacement arrives.
(5)

Unless conversations in Kathmandu lead to different conclusion, I am inclined defer extending invitation to King and definitely intend avoid giving Nepalese impression we planning rush in with Embassy. If questioned by Nepalese, I propose inform them that matter under consideration by Department as it has been for some time.

Comment: There will be occasion in next few months to invite King to US. His visit, if properly timed, could have very salutary effect, and one solution to timing of opening of Embassy in Kathmandu would be announcement while King in Washington.

(6)
Embassy will shortly start working discreetly with USOM to tackle administrative problems involved in establishment resident mission. In this connection, would appreciate clarification from Department on present status of plans for staffing and financing resident Embassy. Important to have well-organized plan so that Embassy can be established with minimum delay and confusion when time comes.
(7)
We should continue keep GOI informed our thinking and plans re Nepal to avoid their getting impression we attempting push them aside. Embassy will also use every available opportunity instill in Indians greater sense of urgency in their own approach to Nepal.
(8)
We should take good look at our program in Nepal. I propose discuss this in detail with Drake5 during my visit there.

Bunker
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90C/4–2859. Confidential. Repeated to Calcutta and Kathmandu.↩
  2. Voting in Nepal’s first general elections began on February 18 and concluded on April 3. Over two-thirds of the parliamentary seats were won by the Nepali Congress, led by B. P. Koirala.↩
  3. On April 29, the Embassy in New Delhi forwarded to the Department the Country Team’s recommendations for countering the increased Communist propaganda offensive in Nepal. (Despatch 1264 from New Delhi; Department of State, Central Files, 790C.5–MSP/4–2959) The Country Team recommendations are summarized in telegram 2647, infra.↩
  4. Edmund R. Johnson, Cultural Affairs officer in Nepal.↩
  5. Russell P. Drake, Director of the U.S. Operations Mission in Nepal.↩