Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

264. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 17, 1960¹

Washington, August 17, 1960

SUBJECT

• Possibility of Preventing Indian Purchase of Soviet Helicopters

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. T. Eliot Weil, SOA
• Mr. William Baxter, U/MSC
• Colonel Johnson, OSD/ISA
• Mr. Albert W. Stoffel, AV
• Mr. William Carpenter, NR
• Mr. Carleton Coon, U/CEA
• Mr. Benjamin A. Fleck, SOA

Mr. Weil opened the meeting by presenting a list of questions which the reported decision of the Government of India to purchase a Soviet MI–4 helicopter has raised for the U.S. Government.² These questions and the consensus of the group’s reaction to them may be summarized as follows:

1. How important is this first Indian purchase of Soviet military equipment in terms of our relations with the Indian Armed Forces?

The messages from New Delhi seem to indicate that the Indian military leaders are doing everything they can to give the United States the opportunity to come forward with a helicopter with performance characteristics similar to those of the MI–4 and on terms which would be sufficiently close to the advantageous terms offered by the Soviet Union to justify its purchase by the Government of India rather than the Soviet helicopters. The group felt that the presence in the Indian armed forces of officers who had been trained in the United States, or who had come into contact with American officers, should act as a force in favor of continued good will toward the West and a continuing predilection for obtaining equipment from Western sources rather than from Soviet sources. The group agreed that further information should be sought from the Embassy in New Delhi concerning the reasons for Krishna Menon’s desire to purchase Soviet helicopters in spite of the opposition of his service chiefs.

2. How important is this purchase in terms of the possible effect on export sales of helicopters produced in the United States and other Western countries?

Mr. Stoffel stated that he did not have current information on the availability for export of the various helicopters manufactured in the United States. However, the group felt that the market promised to be an expanding one. It was pointed out that Bell, Kaman, and Sikorsky have all been very interested in demonstrating their products to the Government of India. Mr. Fleck pointed out that one of the enticements of the Soviet deal was the apparent Soviet offer to consider licensing the MI–4 for production in India. He asked if there were any indications that the United States firms would be interested in entering into licensing arrangements with the Government of India for manufacture of helicopters in India. Mr. Stoffel replied that he was unaware of any interest in such an arrangement on the part of any American firm and stated that he believed that both manufacture and the arrangement of licensing agreements with the Government of India would be more difficult in the field of helicopters than in the field of conventional aircraft.

3. How important is this purchase in terms of the possible effect on Indian weapons systems?

It was pointed out that present Indian weapons systems are almost exclusively British in origin. Mr. Carpenter stated that the Indians were being forced to make certain adjustments in their techniques as a result of their acquisition of C–119 transport aircraft from us and that problems arising from the introduction of a Soviet helicopter would be even greater because of the language barrier and differences in approach between Soviet and western military forces.

4. How important is this purchase in terms of the extent to which Soviet technicians may be able to penetrate the Indian forces?

The group agreed that, in itself, the purchase of one helicopter did not pose a tremendous problem in this respect, but it was pointed out that in view of the technical complexity of a helicopter and in the light of difficulties encountered by the Russians in the performance of equipment sold by them to other countries, there was a good possibility that the number of Soviet technicians, which would be brought to India in connection with the helicopter sale, would exceed current Soviet estimates and Indian expectations. As noted below, the introduction of technicians into close contact with the Indian military forces would pose very serious problems in connection with possible Indian procurement of advanced or highly classified weapons from the United States.

5. Would it be possible for the United States Government to subsidize the sale of American helicopters to India in order to meet the terms of the Soviet sale, which are reported to provide for payment in rupees and relatively easy financing?

Mr. Baxter indicated that under existing legislation there is no possible way in which funds can be used to subsidize commercial sales of helicopters to India. It was pointed out that the general question of subsidization of sales of American goods to make them competitive with artifically priced goods sold by the Communist bloc is one to which the United States Government has not as yet been able to find a satisfactory answer. Considerable skepticism was expressed over the willingness of any U.S. manufacturer to accept payment in rupees. It was also pointed out that payment in rupees does not appear feasible in connection with sales by the U.S. Government to India under the Mutual Security Act.

6. Is the Soviet MI–4 helicopter better than any available American helicopter in performance characteristics?

Upon examining performance data made available by the Department of Defense, the group concluded that no American helicopter in production is exactly comparable to the MI–4 in performance characteristics. However, Colonel Johnson pointed out that each helicopter model has differing characteristics, depending upon the mission for which it is required. He pointed out that the messages from Embassy New Delhi indicated that the Indians were quite impressed by the performance of the Bell helicopters currently being tested, although they were not in the same category as the MI–4.

7. If the United States were able to equal the terms offered to India by the Soviet Union in regard to the sale of helicopters, would this lead the Indians to attempt to use further offers of Soviet equipment to force the United States to offer bargain prices on U.S. equipment?

The group was of the opinion that this was a real possibility and that even if some way could be found to meet the terms of the Soviet offer, this would establish a precedent which might create difficulties in the future. Concern was expressed over the possible cost to the United States Government of trying to match the terms of future Soviet offers in the military field.

8. If we could find some way of meeting the Soviet terms through some form of subsidization, would the probable cost to the United States Government be justified in terms of (a) keeping India in the free world and (b) improving Indian military capabilities for possible use against Communist Chinese aggression?

Mr. Weil suggested that the answer to these questions might depend on high-level assessment of the role envisaged for the Indian armed forces in the event of a world conflict. Without knowing what that assessment is, it is difficult to know whether it would be in the interest of the United States to undertake any large-scale military program of support to the Indian armed forces. Such a program, which might logically emerge from a decision to prevent, at any cost, the purchase of Soviet military equipment by India, might well be a drain on U.S. resources and would also divert Indian resources from the basic task of economic development.

[9.] If the Indians accept the presence of Soviet military technicians in India in connection with the purchase of Soviet helicopters would this have any effect on the ability of the United States to respond favorably to any future Indian requests for more advanced types of weapons?

The group thought that this might well be one of the unfortunate aspects of any Indian purchase of Soviet helicopters.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/8–1760. Confidential. Drafted by Fleck.
2. In telegram 361 from New Delhi, August 12, the Embassy confirmed the reported sale of a Soviet MI–4 helicopter to India, and also pointed out that Krishna Menon was “reliably reported” to be pressing for the purchase of at least ten additional Soviet helicopters. The Embassy stated that it believed a decision by the U.S. Government was necessary “on what action United States Government, alone or in collaboration with United Kingdom, Italy, France or other Western suppliers, prepared take to meet Soviet offensive in sale military equipment to GOI.” (Ibid., 791.5622/8–1260)