Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

260. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of India, Ceylon, and Nepal Affairs (Fleck)¹

Washington, June 7, 1960.

INDIAN REQUEST TO PURCHASE SIDEWINDER MISSILES

The Government of India has requested to purchase an unspecified number of Sidewinder missiles. This request follows closely on our agreement to sell to India twenty-nine C–119 cargo planes and our informing the Indians of our decision to program Sidewinders and F–104 fighter planes for inclusion in our military aid program to Pakistan. On April 25 Ambassador Bunker, during his call on the President, pointed out that the Government of India, upon learning of the provision of Sidewinders to Pakistan, would undoubtedly feel itself compelled to purchase similar equipment. The Ambassador pointed out that the equivalent weapon manufactured by the British is more expensive than the Sidewinders and that purchase from the British would thus place an additional burden on the Indian budget at a time when India is already spending large unforeseen amounts on communications and transportation facilities along its northern border. Ambassador Bunker reported that the President stated that he saw no reason why we should not offer to sell to the Indians equipment similar to that furnished to the Pakistanis and that in fact he thought we should do so. Ambassador Rountree has reported that any favorable response to the Indian request, prior to delivery to Pakistan of the Sidewinders already promised, would have an extremely adverse affect on our relations with Pakistan.²

Recommendation:

It is suggested that the Secretary inform the President that our proposed response to the Indian request is as follows:

In view of the present delicate state of our relations with Pakistan and the damage which would be inflicted upon them should the Pakistanis learn that we have decided to sell Sidewinders to India prior to the delivery of the Sidewinders already promised to Pakistan, we hope to persuade the Indians to purchase the equivalent weapon from the United Kingdom.³

1. Source: Department of State, SOA Files: Lot 63 D 110, India—Sidewinders. Secret. Cleared with NEA, U/MSC, and SCA/MC. According to a June 13 covering note from Raymond L. Perkins of S/S to NEA, the memorandum was prepared for discussion by the Secretary with the President. “You are informed,” Perkins noted, “that the Secretary raised this matter with the President on June 10, and that the President approved this proposed action.” A handwritten note on the source text also indicates that the President approved of the proposed action during a meeting with Secretary Herter on June 10. No other record of the Eisenhower–Herter meeting has been found.
2. Reference is to telegram 2874 from Karachi, May 28. (Ibid., Central Files, 790D.56311/5–2860)
3. In a June 15 letter to Assistant Secretary Jones, Ambassador Bunker indicated that he was “keenly disappointed” with the decision not to go ahead with the sale of Sidewinders to India, and explained in detail why he believed that there were “strong and compelling reasons” to sell the missiles to India. (Ibid., SOA Files: Lot 63 D 110, India—Sidewinders)