Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

211. Despatch From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

No. 1633

New Delhi, June 27, 1958.

REF

• CA–1082, August 1, 1957²

SUBJECT

• United States Policy with regard to Kerala

In compliance with the request for periodic progress reports contained in the last paragraph of the referenced instruction, the Embassy is submitting herewith the results of its most recent appraisal of the efforts made to carry out the courses of action suggested by the Department. A summary of the measures undertaken by relevant offices of the mission and the Consulate General in pursuance of the policies outlined in CA–1082 is attached as Enclosure 1.³

On the basis of its review of developments within India and in Kerala as well as of its own activities, the Embassy believes that it has carried out the letter and spirit of the Department’s instruction to the extent that has proved feasible. Experience and observation suggest, however, that there are certain factors present in the Indian scene which perhaps were not taken sufficiently into account in developing the courses of action outlined in CA–1082 and consequently the Embassy, in consultation with the Consul General of Madras, is putting forward a number of suggestions for further action.

It has become clear over the last year that the removal of the communists from power in Kerala is related to the problem of combatting communism in India as a whole. As the Department recognized, the key factors in the struggle are the Government of India and the Congress Party. On the basis of its explorations and observations to date, the Embassy tends to believe that the chief problem confronting both and any interested party such as the U.S. is not so much the attitude of the leadership toward communism but their ability to organize effective measures for challenging it, exposing its true nature and offering more acceptable alternatives. While it is true that the Indian leaders appear to be insufficiently versed in communist doctrine to know what they are up against in trying to best the communists, they nevertheless seem to be quite definite in their rejection of communism as a solution for India. This position not only is taken privately but has been voiced publicly with increasing frequency during recent months by numerous leaders from Mr. Nehru down the line. The record to date would also indicate that the Government of India is more alert to and is exploiting more opportunities to discredit the communists than is the Congress party as such. This has been evinced in the action of four key cabinet officers—Pandit Pant (Home Ministry), Morarji Desai (formerly Commerce, new Finance Ministry) A. K. Sen (Law Minister), S. K. Patil (Transport and Communications Ministry). At the same time it needs to be kept in mind that one underlying belief of numerous Government of India leaders with whom this subject has been discussed is that the chief deterrent to communism in India is satisfactory progress in economic development and that this, therefore, has prior claim in limited talents and resources, since failure on this front would overshadow and render useless efforts in all other directions.

The Congress party on the other hand presents a somewhat discouraging spectacle. It is still in the process of finding its role in independent India. There are those in its ranks, notably President Dhebar and Prime Minister Nehru, who publicly deplore the idea of the Congress becoming solely preoccupied with winning elections, and who would continue to emphasize its service-to-the-nation role as Gandhi developed it. The clarification of their fuzzy thinking on this plus more effective Congress organization is hampered by the fact that the key officials of the Congress party and its executive arm appear to be lacking in the necessary organizational talent, with the result—or so it appears to the Embassy—that there appears to be little prospect of early revitalization of the Congress in the Center and consequently of Center assistance to Kerala Congress party.

Taking these considerations into account, the Embassy, while continuing to pursue to the maximum extent possible the policies and courses of action outlined by the Department [1½ lines of source text not declassified] proposes that emphasis be given in the immediate future to two additional courses of action—one directly related to Kerala, the other aimed at strengthening the forces of democracy in India generally, with only indirect application to Kerala.

Recommendation 1:

The Embassy believes that under prevailing circumstances it is desirable for the United States to have more direct access to and contact with developments in Kerala. To do this, consideration has been given to the possibility of establishing a consulate-cum-reading room at Cochin. While our analysis indicates that there appears to be sufficient economic and commercial activity in which U.S. interests are involved to give us legitimate grounds for requesting the Government of India’s permission to establish a consulate, we are inclined to believe that, for the immediate future at any rate, our interests can best be served by augmenting the staff of the Madras consulate by one officer with political and economic reporting experience (plus secretary) and by providing him with sufficient travel funds to enable him to spend a portion of every month in the various parts of Kerala. This should be accompanied by stepped-up USIS activity from Madras. The total cost should be less than that of establishing a consulate.

The reasons for this recommendation are:

(1) it could be implemented with minimum of delay. Any negotiations with the Government of India over the establishment of a consulate would have to be carefully timed and might be protracted.

(2) it would enable an on-the-spot assessment of the following factors which need to be taken into account and carefully weighed before a decision is taken to establish a consulate:

(a) Is the case for establishing a consulate sufficiently obvious that it could be done under a communist regime without arousing undue suspicion?

(b) Would the location of a consulate in Congress-controlled Cochin heighten suspicion of U.S. motives?

(c) Would the location of a consulate in Cochin best serve our purposes since it is not an important listening post, politically, and travel to other parts of the state would in any case be necessary?

(d) Would there be grounds for maintaining a consulate in the event of the communist regime being overthrown?

(e) To what extent would the establishment of a consulate under a communist government increase the respectability and prestige of that government or become a target of attack as an espionage center?

(f) Would the establishment of a U.S. consulate be likely to lead to the establishment of Iron Curtain country consulates?

(g) Would the establishment of a consulate during a communist regime be likely to pose the dilemma of increased trade requests which our basic policy will not permit us to meet?

Thus, the augmentation of the Madras staff would give us the maximum flexibility of action while enabling us to increase our coverage while we are making up our minds on the question of the consulate.

(3) In the absence of a more positive GOI or Congress Party policy vis-à-vis communism in Kerala, USIS is reluctant to reopen with the Government of India the delicate question of establishing an additional USIS sub office in Cochin, since there are many more important cities in India desiring a USIS library (Ahmedabad, Madurai, Allahadad, for example).

Recommendation 2:

The Embassy should step up efforts to provide advice on or to expose key groups to the democratic process and procedures in action. Toward this end we recommend:

(a) We should seek to provide Congress officials at national, state and local levels with first-hand experience in the workings of the U.S. political system and particularly the political parties. The election this autumn would seem to constitute an ideal opportunity that should not be missed. Key party officials should be invited to witness the election and to study the operations of political parties at all levels.

(b) Student exchanges should be increased. One possibility would be to work out an expanded Fulbright type program⁴ drawing on the U.S. rupee account.

(c) A parliamentary delegation should be invited to the United States.

In the meantime the Embassy will seize every opportunity to suggest specific measures that serve the purpose of denying aid and comfort to the communists in general and in Kerala in particular. For example, it should be possible, under appropriate circumstances, (a) to discourage economic expansion [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that is likely to produce benefits to Kerala while the communists are in power and (b) to discuss with appropriate GOI officials what the GOI plans to do about reported business offers of the Rumanians and Hungarians in Kerala; and why in view of the stated attitude of GOI leaders toward communism, responsible Ministers (such as Shrimali (Education) and Dey (Community Development) most recently) continue to make public statements praising the record of the Government of Kerala.

For the Ambassador:

Edward P. Maffitt
Acting Deputy Chief of Mission

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.91/6–2758. Secret.
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. VIII, p. 363.
3. Not printed.
4. Reference is to P.L. 584, approved August 1, 1946, generally called the Fulbright Act after its sponsor Senator J. William Fulbright (D.–Ark.), which established an international educational exchange program. (60 Stat. 754)