178. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
461. In absence King Zahir, I delivered Presidential message contained Deptel 3302 to Foreign Minister Naim at 11 a.m. October 26. I attached a letter of transmittal requesting Naim to transmit letter to His Majesty in such manner as he deemed appropriate and covering point that my government did not wish to make message public.
Naim read letter carefully, showing disappointment which he did not express until later in meeting. He reviewed his talk with President, saying that President was kind enough to raise subject himself. He had [Page 368] been much impressed by President’s apparent desire, prior to his leaving President’s office, to be helpful if possible on subject of Pakistan-Afghan relations. He understood completely President’s desire not to interfere in affairs of other nations and that he possessed only a sincere desire to try to be helpful. He stated that he would transmit the letter to His Majesty without delay.
Sensing his disappointment, I told Naim he must realize it had been a most difficult time for President to analyze basic issues involved. His visit came at a time when even we here in Kabul were not certain just what situation was in vicinity of border or what trend of events there would be. This had obviously made task of any third party trying to be helpful much more complicated. I asked his analysis of current situation and what he thought future held as regards this issue.
Naim said he felt there really no need to again give me detailed explanation of their feelings as regards Pushtunistan issue. He felt that there were “too many ready ears” in the US who automatically sympathized with Pakistan. He felt that every premeditated move of Pakistan was made with view to the propaganda it would receive, particularly in America. He felt that as a nation we were “somewhat unilateral” in our thinking on this problem and he supposed this not surprising as we and Pakistan were allies. He said while he was in New York our press had called Afghan an aggressor and had showed no understanding of the Afghan case. He said Pakistan was attempting to change things in an area in which they had no right to take such action, and referred to changes of tribal leaders in Dir with bitterness. He said that what Afghanistan on her own part had done was nothing more than had always been the case when there was trouble between Pushtun tribes. They had been hopeful that their Jirgahs could get the tribes back together again. However, Pakistan was obviously making deliberate effort to bring previously unadministered Bajaur area under their control and this had been going on now for a year. He said that it was Pakistan initiative, not that of Khan of Khar by himself, that caused fort to be built where tribal Jirgahs had decided previously that none should be built. Their Jirgah representatives had been ambushed in middle of night and on this first encounter as many as 120 had been killed. He ended by saying that it was not Afghans but the Pakistanis who had taken the initiative to cause this trouble. If they continued their activities relations could obviously not improve and probably would continue to get worse.
I told him I was disappointed in his remarks as I felt throughout the years the US had given adequate proof that we had not sided with either RGA or GOP against the other. All of our efforts, including the recent initiative of President, had been to try to assist both parties to reach a solution. This was still our position regardless of impressions [Page 369] he may have received from our press. I said I thought it not surprising that the press should be as he stated and I had been concerned at their position before world opinion in the recent conflict. Most individuals regardless of nationality assumed there was a legal border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. If there was fighting on Pakistan side of line and Afghans were involved it seemed to me that conclusion would be widespread that it must be at Afghan initiative. He acknowledged validity of this line of reasoning.
Naim then expressed disappointment in President’s reply and made comment that apparently some parts of King’s letter did not meet with full understanding. He believed US could be of assistance if we would fully appreciate all aspects of issue and persuade Pakistan to stop activities which made it mandatory that there be Afghan reaction. If they continued their efforts to integrate this tribal area actively into Pakistan he could not foresee results. While he did not say so precisely he implied that end result might be further hostilities of a nature which could be disastrous to both countries and dangerous in view of world situation.
I asked if he thought there was any hope in trying to lay aside political aspects of issue and seek agreement that both sides, with such outside help as would be useful, would concentrate jointly on improving living conditions for the tribes on both sides of the border. Perhaps coordinated plan could be devised for introduction of schools, roads, and cottage industry type development which in period of ten to twenty years could vastly improve life of the tribal people. If this could be done perhaps it would ease an eventual political settlement.
Naim replied he did not think this the case and that I underestimated the real urge for political identity of the Pushtun people. He asked why I thought the Afghan tribes were so poor? He said they could have achieved more advanced living conditions under British [as?] had for instance the Punjabis. The reason this had not happened was that they valued their independence more than any other thing in life, and as result they had resisted advancing under British. What I was now suggesting would mean that the tribes on other side of line would have to develop under Pakistan military rule. Under these conditions seeds of disturbance would continue to be there as tribal people would not change their basic sense of values. He had noted this same characteristic in many of the representatives of new African nations. They were elated at their independence and think unfortunately of little else. Many, he said, showed no sign of awareness of basic problems affecting their people and country. Many of these new states had really no historical or cultural background yet they cherished their national identity above all else. He asked that we try to understand real force of such nationalistic feeling.
[Page 370]I assured Naim that we would continue to search for ways of being helpful. I knew that President’s interest had come out of a deep personal feeling that disputes between non-Communist nations in this part of world were extremely dangerous, not only for nations themselves, but for the peace and stability of the entire area.
Postscript: This message should be read with knowledge that we receiving many reports, which we inclined to accept, that Naim has submitted his resignation after serious controversy with Daud. King supposedly refused to accept and matter in abeyance until his return. Most plausible version of difficulties is that Naim returned from New York in bitter mood over Daud’s recent ill-conceived moves across border concerning which he had not been fully apprised. On other hand Daud upset at Naim for not taking advantage General Assembly to take strong stand on Pushtunistan issue. We wonder whether Naim’s refusal to do so may have resulted from his encouragement following talk with President. If so, his disappointment at President’s reply understandable and he may return to post-Rawalpindi mood of feeling we have let him down personally. His general mood during talk seemed to reflect view that Department of State had thrown cold water on previously encouraging initiative by the President.