Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

175. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, October 15, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Reports from Ambassadors at Karachi and Kabul on “Pushtunistan” Question

Following your conversation with His Royal Highness Sardar Mohammad Naim, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan, in New York on September 23,² you requested reports from our Ambassadors at Karachi and Kabul on the current status of the “Pushtunistan” question.

Copies of the requested reports are enclosed.³ Both Ambassadors are of the opinion (a) that it would not be helpful at this time for the United States to intervene in the “Pushtunistan” controversy, (b) that in view of our relations with Pakistan, it is important that we continue to recognize the Durand Line as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and (c) that in view of the potential dangers arising from the recent clashes on the Afghan-Pakistan border, we should continue quietly to discourage further hostilities.

Our Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr. Rountree, has made the following points:

1. Recent border incidents involving Afghan incursion into Pakistan territory emphasize the need for improved Afghan-Pakistan relations.

2. The defeat of the invading Afghan tribesmen by the Pakistani tribesmen, and the fact that Pakistani tribes did not rally to fight for “Pushtunistan” may lead the Afghan Prime Minister to play down the issue in the future.

3. There would be no prospect for an improvement in relations if this depended on Pakistan’s recognizing that Afghanistan has any legitimate voice in affairs of the tribal territories in Pakistan.

4. Pakistan believes the Soviet policy of supporting Afghanistan’s position on “Pushtunistan” increases the gravity of the issue for Pakistan and the rest of the free world.

5. The United States has always refrained from any actions which might encourage Afghanistan to believe we would support its “Pushtunistan” claims. Rather, we have made it clear that we recognize Pakistan’s sovereignty up to the Durand Line. We have made determined efforts to encourage the cessation of hostile propaganda and have encouraged closer economic cooperation.

6. Any United States action implying that a legitimate issue exists might encourage the Afghans to take their claims to the United Nations, or to risk military action along the border. Since the recent defeat of invading Afghan tribesmen might lead to Afghanistan’s seeking a military victory, serious engagements are not to be ruled out; and our efforts should be directed toward localizing border disturbances rather than becoming involved in the “Pushtunistan” question.

7. In view of the fact that our position in Pakistan has suffered in recent months as a result of Soviet propaganda and offers of aid, it is particularly important that we avoid giving the Pakistanis any reason to question our position vis-à-vis the “Pushtunistan” question.

8. The Pakistanis have given assurances that they are prepared to cease propaganda at any time that the Afghans agree to do likewise and are prepared to discuss outstanding problems other than “Pushtunistan”. They are not prepared to make concessions involving their sovereign territory.

Our Ambassador to Afghanistan, Mr. Byroade, agrees with the foregoing and stresses the following points:

1. The best we can hope for now is that if Prince Daud can survive without engaging in further hostilities, he may gain a more realistic view of “Pushtunistan” and a gradual subsidence of tensions may follow. If the Pakistanis ostentatiously exploit their current advantage, Daud’s position and that of the more extreme Pushtunistan advocates may be strengthened.

2. Prospects of final solution are difficult to envisage under any conceivable Afghan Government, but in the long run the integration of Pakistani tribal regions into Pakistan national life may lead to a solution. Among the reasons for believing that mediation efforts at this time would serve no useful purpose are: (a) personal mistrust between President Ayub and Prince Daud, and (b) the fact that Pakistan believes it has no reason to recognize the existence of the “dispute” generated by the Afghans.

3. Among the factors involved in the Afghan position are: (a) concern for the welfare of the tribes; (b) traditional efforts to stir up the tribes against forces in neighboring territories; (c) efforts of the Royal Family to ingratiate itself with Afghan tribes strong enough to destroy the dynasty; (d) efforts to nurture a basis for claims to territory west of the Indus in case Pakistan were to disintegrate; and (e) a desire to placate certain Afghan extremists who consider the “Pushtunistan” campaign as a step toward territorial annexation.

4. No move at this time by the President to resolve the “Pushtunistan” issue would offer sufficient chance of success to warrant use of his high office.

I concur in the findings and recommendations of the two Ambassadors. I believe we should be alert for opportunities to discourage hostile acts and propaganda and that we should make every effort to encourage closer economic relations. I am convinced, however, that it would not be in our national interest to undertake any intervention in the “Pushtunistan” question at this time.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize the Department to thank the Ambassadors on your behalf for their reports.

2. That you authorize the Department, if queried by the Afghan Government, to say the Ambassadors’ reports are still under consideration.

3. That, in view of the fact that you have broached the subject of the current “Pushtunistan” situation only to the Afghan Government, you authorize the Department to continue to withhold the fact that the matter was discussed in your conversation with Prince Naim.

Christian A. Herter⁴

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Afghanistan. Secret.
2. See Document 171.
3. Neither printed. Reference is to telegram 691 from Karachi, October 6, and telegram 407 from Kabul, October 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/10–660 and 689.90D/10–1260)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.